On Tuesday, September 11, 2018 at 4:18:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 10 Sep 2018, at 18:34, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> Bruno Marchal Wrote: >>> >>> *> I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by >>>> matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 >>>> years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or >>>> physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible.* >>> >>> >>> If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what >>> "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago? >>> >>> >>> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated >>> “sum” on all computations. >>> >>> Matter = observable >>> >>> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is >>> a primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) >>> reality from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it >>> can be shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced >>> to some mode of arithmetical self-reference. >>> >>> >>> >>> I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any >>> such answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which >>> you admit confuses you. >>> >>> >>> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe >>> that we have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be >>> reduced to some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, >>> because it can be reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, >>> with Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the >>> reply would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give >>> examples of. >>> >>> >>> Digital Mechanism is the doctrine that there is a level of description >>> of our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or >>> body, if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that >>> description level. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> I seems *possible *to me that there could be a matter >> decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes *me*, decompiles *me* into >> some code, transports that code, and compiles that code into a >> digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be *me >> 2*. and "I" would exist again. >> >> But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output - I >> don't think I would exist anymore. >> >> >> How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to distinguish >> (without observable clue, by personal introspection) if it has been >> recompiled in a physical reality or in a number-theoretical reality >> imitating my brain below my substitution level? >> It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role in >> consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything Turing-emulable, but >> then mechanism is false.But invoking (primitive) Matter in this way seems >> arbitrary, and it re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding >> something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the >> physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to your >> experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which emulates all >> computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a machine by another has >> been discovered in arithmetic. >> >> Bruno >> >> > > > If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code, > > > What do you mean by decompiling a material body? I cannot make sense of > this expression. > > >
"Decompiling" just means* reverse engineering*, as the synthetic biologists do for simple life now. An actual , simple biomolecular form (like DNA) is reversed engineered into some software code (a chemical language, like an XML for chemistry), That might be modified. and then a molecular assembler makes an actual new life form. This is extrapolated to more complicated life forms. - Philip Thrift that code was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a > biocompiler - https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler - for example) I > might be able to check if my new body was different from my old body by > comparing medical records. > > If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my code > had been compiled - not into my previous material reality - but into a > numerical reality. I'm not sure how that would change my life. I'd probably > say, "Yeah, sure" and still be a materialist. > > > Yes, the whole point is that it will not change your life, but now you > need to explain the appearance of the physical reality without any > ontological commitment, except for some numerical reality (but that is > already done when hypothesising Mechanism (with or without matter at the > start). > > Bruno > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
