> On 11 Sep 2018, at 19:42, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 9/11/2018 2:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 11 Sep 2018, at 01:54, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 9/10/2018 9:34 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno Marchal Wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> > I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by >>>>>> > matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven >>>>>> > (40 years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or >>>>>> > physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible. >>>>>> >>>>>> If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what >>>>>> "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago? >>>>> >>>>> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated >>>>> “sum” on all computations. >>>>> >>>>> Matter = observable >>>>> >>>>> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is a >>>>> primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) >>>>> reality from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it >>>>> can be shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be >>>>> reduced to some mode of arithmetical self-reference. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any >>>>>> such answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter >>>>>> which you admit confuses you. >>>>> >>>>> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe that >>>>> we have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be >>>>> reduced to some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, >>>>> because it can be reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. >>>>> Similarly, with Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or >>>>> Turing equivalent. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the >>>>>> reply would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give >>>>>> examples of. >>>>> >>>>> Digital Mechanism is the doctrine that there is a level of description >>>>> of our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or >>>>> body, if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that >>>>> description level. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I seems possible to me that there could be a matter >>>>> decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes me, decompiles me into some >>>>> code, transports that code, and compiles that code into a >>>>> digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be >>>>> me 2. and "I" would exist again. >>>>> >>>>> But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output - I don't >>>>> think I would exist anymore. >>>> >>>> How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to distinguish >>>> (without observable clue, by personal introspection) if it has been >>>> recompiled in a physical reality or in a number-theoretical reality >>>> imitating my brain below my substitution level? >>>> It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role in >>>> consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything Turing-emulable, but >>>> then mechanism is false.But invoking (primitive) Matter in this way seems >>>> arbitrary, and it re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding >>>> something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because >>>> the physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to your >>>> experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which emulates all >>>> computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a machine by another has >>>> been discovered in arithmetic. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code, that code >>>> was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a biocompiler - >>>> https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler >>>> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler> - for example) I might be >>>> able to check if my new body was different from my old body by comparing >>>> medical records. >>>> >>>> If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my code >>>> had been compiled - not into my previous material reality - but into a >>>> numerical reality. I'm not sure how that would change my life. I'd >>>> probably say, "Yeah, sure" and still be a materialist. >>>> >>>> - pt >>> >>> That's a point I've made before. It's all very well to say that you could >>> be replaced by an abstract machine (e.g. arithmetic) running your code; but >>> to make that work there would also have to be an emulation of your >>> environment, including its physics. So then it's not clear that anything >>> is different. It becomes a metaphysical just-so story. >> >> >> It makes everything different. It entails that Aristotelian physics is >> wrong, that Newtonian physics is wrong, it predicts QM, qualitatively and >> quantitatively, with the means to distinguish qualia and quanta. It entails >> a variety of life after death. It entails that the fundamental science >> cannot be physics, but a theory of consciousness (indeed G*). It changes >> absolutely everything, and it probably explains the current suffering on the >> planet, which is obvious as Mechanism shows how much we have not yet leave >> the Middle-Âge, which will be terminated the day theology comes back at the >> faculty of science. >> The debate God/non-God is mainly a fake debate invented by >> Aristotelians/materialist to make us forget that science is born from the >> doubt on the physical universe, not the doubt on God, which is the pointer >> of what is real and unknown. >> >> The whole point of the reasoning in Mechanism is to show that metaphysics >> and theology have testable consequences, and indeed that Plato’s theory fits >> the facts, and that Aristotle’s theory does not. >> >> We cannot see the difference INTROSPECTIVELY, between the arithmetical >> reality and the physical reality (once we postulate Mechanism), but the >> whole point is that once we open the eyes we can SEE and MEASURE the >> difference. > > OK. What is this difference and how is it measured?
It is the difference between classical boolean (like Newtonian physics) and Quantum Physics. Physics must appear in the logic S4Grz1 and/or Z1* and/or X1*. If the three of them where boolean, or not enough quantum-like, Mechanism would be in trouble. But that is not the case. I have predicted the many-world and a measure problem before I discovered that the physicists already get a physics which is a probability calculus on histories. So mechanism is the only theory which fits the facts. The physical theory does not work as they missed consciousness (almost methodological, but in still inconsistent when used in metaphysics/theology). Matter is the “élan Vital” of the materialist. Nobody has ver detect it, and it makes everything more difficult to explain (it needs a non mechanist theory of mind, and of matter). It is up to you to explain what you mean by MATTER, and what role it has for consciousness. But if your explanation use the computationalist theory of mind, then you are showing that in arithmetic the machine will also believe correctly in matter, despite we will know they are wrong by construction, and that leads to a contradiction. I am not criticising physics at all. I only argue (constructively) that metaphysical materialism is nonsensical once we assume the computationalist theory of mind. Don’t tell me that you believe that arithmetic does not exist, you need only x+0 = x & Co. or simpler, you need only Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz). Besides Comp. (i.e CT+YD,) nothing else is assumed. Bruno > > Brent > >> I predicted 40 years ago, the meany worlds, the indeterminacy of nature, the >> non-locality of nature, the non cloning theorem , all this from just the >> hypothesis that there is no magic in the brain. Then with Church thesis, the >> argument becomes qualitative, and we get the whole of physics (qZ1*), and up >> to now, it fits with the observation, where physicalism needs to invoke gods >> and substantial souls to avoid inconsistency without eliminating >> consciousness from reality. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
