> On 11 Sep 2018, at 01:54, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 9/10/2018 9:34 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal Wrote: >>>> >>>> > I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by >>>> > matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 >>>> > years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or >>>> > physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible. >>>> >>>> If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what >>>> "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago? >>> >>> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated >>> “sum” on all computations. >>> >>> Matter = observable >>> >>> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is a >>> primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) reality >>> from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be >>> shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced to some >>> mode of arithmetical self-reference. >>> >>> >>> >>>> I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any >>>> such answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which >>>> you admit confuses you. >>> >>> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe that >>> we have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced >>> to some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, because it >>> can be reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, with >>> Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the reply >>>> would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give examples >>>> of. >>> >>> Digital Mechanism is the doctrine that there is a level of description of >>> our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or body, >>> if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that description >>> level. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> I seems possible to me that there could be a matter >>> decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes me, decompiles me into some >>> code, transports that code, and compiles that code into a >>> digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be me >>> 2. and "I" would exist again. >>> >>> But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output - I don't >>> think I would exist anymore. >> >> How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to distinguish >> (without observable clue, by personal introspection) if it has been >> recompiled in a physical reality or in a number-theoretical reality >> imitating my brain below my substitution level? >> It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role in >> consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything Turing-emulable, but >> then mechanism is false.But invoking (primitive) Matter in this way seems >> arbitrary, and it re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding >> something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the >> physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to your >> experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which emulates all >> computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a machine by another has >> been discovered in arithmetic. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code, that code >> was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a biocompiler >> -https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler >> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler> - for example) I might be able >> to check if my new body was different from my old body by comparing medical >> records. >> >> If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my code >> had been compiled - not into my previous material reality - but into a >> numerical reality. I'm not sure how that would change my life. I'd probably >> say, "Yeah, sure" and still be a materialist. >> >> - pt > > That's a point I've made before. It's all very well to say that you could be > replaced by an abstract machine (e.g. arithmetic) running your code; but to > make that work there would also have to be an emulation of your environment, > including its physics. So then it's not clear that anything is different. > It becomes a metaphysical just-so story.
It makes everything different. It entails that Aristotelian physics is wrong, that Newtonian physics is wrong, it predicts QM, qualitatively and quantitatively, with the means to distinguish qualia and quanta. It entails a variety of life after death. It entails that the fundamental science cannot be physics, but a theory of consciousness (indeed G*). It changes absolutely everything, and it probably explains the current suffering on the planet, which is obvious as Mechanism shows how much we have not yet leave the Middle-Âge, which will be terminated the day theology comes back at the faculty of science. The debate God/non-God is mainly a fake debate invented by Aristotelians/materialist to make us forget that science is born from the doubt on the physical universe, not the doubt on God, which is the pointer of what is real and unknown. The whole point of the reasoning in Mechanism is to show that metaphysics and theology have testable consequences, and indeed that Plato’s theory fits the facts, and that Aristotle’s theory does not. We cannot see the difference INTROSPECTIVELY, between the arithmetical reality and the physical reality (once we postulate Mechanism), but the whole point is that once we open the eyes we can SEE and MEASURE the difference. I predicted 40 years ago, the meany worlds, the indeterminacy of nature, the non-locality of nature, the non cloning theorem , all this from just the hypothesis that there is no magic in the brain. Then with Church thesis, the argument becomes qualitative, and we get the whole of physics (qZ1*), and up to now, it fits with the observation, where physicalism needs to invoke gods and substantial souls to avoid inconsistency without eliminating consciousness from reality. Bruno > > Brent > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
