> On 10 Sep 2018, at 20:54, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 6:28 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > Matter = observable > > Speed is observable, is speed matter?
Yes, and it belong to the realm of the quanta. It is observable and sharable. > The qualia red is observable, is red matter? Yes, but it is not sharable. It is “physical”, but not in physics. The length wave might belong to sharable physics, but the qualia itself is private and non sharable. It will be in Z1* minus Z1, if you have read the papers I mentioned. > > > Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle > > If I never hear another word about Aristotle I will not in any way feel > deprived. That might explain why you seem unable to conceive reality in a different way than Aristotle. Plato: what we see might not be real. Aristotle; real is defined by what we see. > > >A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced to some other field”. > > OK > > >May believe that biology is not primary, because it can be reduced > >(apparently) to chemistry and physics. > > Yes > > > with Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent. > > No. You can't have a Turing Machine without a machine That contradicts all papers on Turing machine. A Turing machine is finite set of quadruplets, as I have recalled more or less recently. > and you can't have a number theory, or a theory of any sort, without a brain > made of matter. Gödel greatest contribution is the arithmetization of arithmetical theories (and others). Even Robison arithmetic can prove the existence of richer theories like PA and ZF. You commit an ontological commitment to defeat a theory. That is how the creationist criticise the theory of evolution. There is no evidence that a brain, or an amoeba, is made of primary matter. Quantum mechanics shows, at the least, that the notion of matter is unclear, but all serious philosopher of mind knew this since Plato. > > > Digital Mechanism is the doctrine that there is a level of description of > > our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or body, > > if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that description > > level. > > Digits are numbers Not really, but OK. > so I guess you believe in Digital Mechanism, It is my working hypothesis. > unless you believe there is something special about the atoms that happen to > occupy your body right There is no atoms, once we postulate Mechanism. That is the result of the informal UDA, and that is what all machine understand soon or later in arithmetic, or in any of its consistent extensions. To have *ontological* atoms, you need a non computational theory of mind. That is not obvious, especially if you are stuck at the easiest step (step 3). > now so that they "cannot be reduced to some other field", that is to say > unless you believe the matter in your body is primary. In arithmetic, my conscious experience cannot be associate with any particular computational state, but with an infinity of them, making matter into a statistics on computations (a term which I use always in the sense of Turing, Church, Post, Kleene: that is in the mathematical sense). Bruno > > John K Clark > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
