> On 10 Sep 2018, at 18:34, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> Bruno Marchal Wrote: >>> >>> > I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by >>> > matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 >>> > years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or >>> > physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible. >>> >>> If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what >>> "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago? >> >> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated >> “sum” on all computations. >> >> Matter = observable >> >> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is a >> primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) reality >> from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be >> shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced to some >> mode of arithmetical self-reference. >> >> >> >>> I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any such >>> answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which you >>> admit confuses you. >> >> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe that we >> have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced to >> some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, because it can >> be reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, with Mechanism, >> physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent. >> >> >> >> >> >>> And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the reply >>> would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give examples >>> of. >> >> Digital Mechanism is the doctrine that there is a level of description of >> our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or body, >> if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that description >> level. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> I seems possible to me that there could be a matter >> decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes me, decompiles me into some code, >> transports that code, and compiles that code into a digital-technology-based >> "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be me 2. and "I" would exist >> again. >> >> But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output - I don't >> think I would exist anymore. > > How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to distinguish > (without observable clue, by personal introspection) if it has been > recompiled in a physical reality or in a number-theoretical reality imitating > my brain below my substitution level? > It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role in > consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything Turing-emulable, but then > mechanism is false.But invoking (primitive) Matter in this way seems > arbitrary, and it re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding > something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the > physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to your > experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which emulates all > computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a machine by another has > been discovered in arithmetic. > > Bruno > > > > > If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code,
What do you mean by decompiling a material body? I cannot make sense of this expression. > that code was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a > biocompiler - https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler - for example) I > might be able to check if my new body was different from my old body by > comparing medical records. > > If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my code had > been compiled - not into my previous material reality - but into a numerical > reality. I'm not sure how that would change my life. I'd probably say, "Yeah, > sure" and still be a materialist. Yes, the whole point is that it will not change your life, but now you need to explain the appearance of the physical reality without any ontological commitment, except for some numerical reality (but that is already done when hypothesising Mechanism (with or without matter at the start). Bruno > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
