> On 11 Sep 2018, at 12:43, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, September 11, 2018 at 4:18:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 10 Sep 2018, at 18:34, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal Wrote: >>>> >>>> > I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by >>>> > matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 >>>> > years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or >>>> > physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible. >>>> >>>> If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what >>>> "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago? >>> >>> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated >>> “sum” on all computations. >>> >>> Matter = observable >>> >>> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is a >>> primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) reality >>> from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be >>> shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced to some >>> mode of arithmetical self-reference. >>> >>> >>> >>>> I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any >>>> such answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which >>>> you admit confuses you. >>> >>> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe that >>> we have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced >>> to some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, because it >>> can be reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, with >>> Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the reply >>>> would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give examples >>>> of. >>> >>> Digital Mechanism is the doctrine that there is a level of description of >>> our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or body, >>> if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that description >>> level. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> I seems possible to me that there could be a matter >>> decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes me, decompiles me into some >>> code, transports that code, and compiles that code into a >>> digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be me >>> 2. and "I" would exist again. >>> >>> But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output - I don't >>> think I would exist anymore. >> >> How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to distinguish >> (without observable clue, by personal introspection) if it has been >> recompiled in a physical reality or in a number-theoretical reality >> imitating my brain below my substitution level? >> It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role in >> consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything Turing-emulable, but >> then mechanism is false.But invoking (primitive) Matter in this way seems >> arbitrary, and it re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding >> something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the >> physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to your >> experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which emulates all >> computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a machine by another has >> been discovered in arithmetic. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code, > > What do you mean by decompiling a material body? I cannot make sense of this > expression. > > > > > > "Decompiling" just means reverse engineering, as the synthetic biologists do > for simple life now. > > An actual , simple biomolecular form (like DNA) is reversed engineered into > some software code (a chemical language, like an XML for chemistry), That > might be modified. and then a molecular assembler makes an actual new life > form. > > This is extrapolated to more complicated life forms.
That is basically how I discovered the notion of computation by studying the molecular genetics of bacteria and virus. But then I found Gödel’s theorem, and saw that the recursion tricks illustrated by the bacterial genome is done ad infinitum already in arithmetic. I will still take some time to digest the discovery of the universal machine and why it makes all this possible. I took time to really understand the Church-Turing thesis: it is a miracle, Gödel is right on this. I do not assume a physical universe, also, nor its non existence at the start, but if we assume digital Mechanism, the assumption of a physical universe is premature. There is an invalid frequent way to invoke it to solve the mind-body problem without recognising that this entails a non-mechanist theory of mind. (Meaning we don’t survive at all with a digital brain, which is a *very* strong hypothesis, using magic or infinite amount of information). Bruno > > > - Philip Thrift > >> that code was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a >> biocompiler - https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler >> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler> - for example) I might be able >> to check if my new body was different from my old body by comparing medical >> records. >> >> If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my code >> had been compiled - not into my previous material reality - but into a >> numerical reality. I'm not sure how that would change my life. I'd probably >> say, "Yeah, sure" and still be a materialist. > > Yes, the whole point is that it will not change your life, but now you need > to explain the appearance of the physical reality without any ontological > commitment, except for some numerical reality (but that is already done when > hypothesising Mechanism (with or without matter at the start). > > Bruno > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
