> On 18 Oct 2018, at 17:26, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, October 18, 2018 at 9:00:21 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 17 Oct 2018, at 00:38, Brent Meeker <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On 10/16/2018 11:58 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 1:01:40 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 10/16/2018 1:14 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> But here is the thesis I think of the experience-oriented (vs. >>>> information-oriented) paradigm*: Experience cannot be represented: It does >>>> not exist outside of its material instantiation. >>> >>> But that's just an assertion that, not only am I giving up, but you must >>> give up too. I'm defining "the hard problem" to be "the impossible >>> problem". >>> >>> Most things don't exist outside of their material instantiation, including >>> intelligence. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> With representationalism, one can run "intelligent" software on CPUs, GPUs, >>> etc. made of basically any material (as long as the computing structure - >>> "Turing-equivalence" - is the same). Experientialism >>> (anti-representationalism) says it has to be particular materials >>> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry> ]. >> >> I know what it says. You've posted it many times. But I haven't seen any >> reason to believe it. > > I agree with you. > > []p (beweisbar(‘p’) is representational, > > []p & p is provably not representational, due to its implicit invocation of > the truth of p. > > Matter is usually conceive in the 3p, representational view, n and his itself > a representational. But truth is not, and it is truth which play the > important role for consciousness. > > Matter is either primary ultra-inert matter, what made the original A-TOMOS > of Democrat. Irreductivel material. Today we have broken atoms, and with > enough energy we can broke proton, etc. Even if we find new ATOMOS, it is > doubtful we could use them for something as “semantical” than consciousness. > > But there is extreme originality of wanting this. I wait for an explanation > for how to test that idea. > > Bruno > > > > > The connection between experience (phenomenal material consciousness)
I don’t understand “material” in this setting. We agree that consciousness is phenomenal, but material has to be phenomenal too if we assume that the brain is Turing emulable (which is not that much to assume, as the alternative is using ontological commitment. The adjective “material” is like the adjective “divine”, without explaining what it means and how it acts, it is eluding the problem more than clarifying it. > and truth (experiential modal logic) Truth is, normally, beyond experience. The experience is true, but truth extends far beyond all possible experience. (Again provably so with the common use of mathematics when assuming computationalisme). > would be that it is possible for there to be different kinds of consciousness > via alternative material substrates. All universal machine can emulate all universal machine. Consciousness is a priori independent of the substrate at the ontological level, now, if by “substrates” you mean the stable observable with smell and taste, sure all universal machine can taste the difference between water and wine, letting them know by sense the global difference and the universal goal (like help yourself). With mechanism, the substrate are explained by a sort of competition of universal machines. There are infinitely many below the substitution level, and finitely many above that you can count in your neighbourhood (a lot, as not only there is the colleagues in the office, but I would mention each bacteria in the room, and the flies).All that might be emulated by Quarks and electrons, or branes and superstrings, but that is basically y equivalent with caming with a u among the phi_i, computing the “universe”, when mechanism explains, to get both the qualia and the quanta, we need to extract the core physics from the self-referential ability of the universal machine. Any universal base would do. Chosing the initial universal machine defines all the phi_i and associates a number to each machines. A universal machine is a referential system for all machines, including itself. If the physicist comes up with a physical experimental uncomputable constant, that would be like adding an oracle. This does not change the “theology of the machine”, but despite this should be done only in last resort. The key point perhaps, is that consciousness does not supervene on any computation run by any universal machine. Consciousness supervenes on infinity of computations, and its “textures” is associated by the proximity structure of the (infinitely many) true provable and consistent extensions. Bruno > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
