On 10/15/2018 5:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 6:45:11 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 10/14/2018 11:13 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Sunday, October 14, 2018 at 9:53:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 10/14/2018 2:48 PM, John Clark wrote:
>/And there are sound reasons for doubting the
consciousness of computers -/
Name one of them that could not also be used to doubt the
consciousness of your fellow human beings.
The reason for not doubting that other human beings are
conscious is that (1) I am conscious and (2) other human
beings are made of the same stuff in approximately the same
way that I am and (3) they behave the same way in relation to
what I am conscious of, e.g. they jump at a sudden loud sound.
Brent
The thought crossed my mind yesterday: I was helping a young man
applying for a Ph.D. program in chemical engineering with his
application, and we were talking about chemistry and
consciousness*, and I mentioned a type of zombie - a being that
could converse (like an advanced Google Assistant or Sophie
Robot) but not be conscious - and I thought it was *possible* he
was a zombie.
* cf.
*Experience processing*
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
<https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/>
I suppose you've read Scott Aaronson's take down of Tononi's
theory. So I wonder why you would reference Tononi.
One problem with the "experience is primary" theory is that
there's no way for it to evolve. If it's a property of matter why
are organized information processing lumps of matter more capable
of experience than unorganized lumps of the same composition...the
obvious answer is that the former process information, and
processing information is something natural selection can work
on. Smart animals reproduce better. Animals with
experiences...who cares?
“Emotional-BDI agents are BDI agents whose behavior is guided not
only by beliefs, desires and intentions, but also by the role of
emotions in reasoning and decision-making." This makes a false
assumption that emotions are something independent of beliefs,
desire, intentions, reasoning, and decision making. But this says
nothing about the satisfaction and thwarting of desires and
intentions. Why are those enough to explain emotions. I agree
that emotions are necessary for reasoning in the sense that
emotions are the value-weights given to events, including those
imagined by foresight, and that some values are primitive.
I think it is false that "Purely informational processing, which
includes intentional agent programming (learning from experience,
self-modeling), does not capture all true experiential processing
(phenomenal consciousness). " It is a cheat to put in "purely".
In fact all learning and intentional planning must include
weighing alternatives and assigning value/emotion to them. I
don't see any need for a further primitive modality. For example,
a feeling of dizziness is a failure to maintain personal spacial
orientation which is a value at a very low (subconscious) level.
Sure there are feelings and emotions...but I think they are all
derivative from more primitive values that are derivative from
evolution.
I think the reason you are attracted to this idea is that it is
closed within the computer/information/program frame. And that is
why I use the example of the AI Mars Rover. Sure, emotion cannot
be derived within a computer. Emotion is something useful to a
robot, an AI that works and strives within an external world which
also acts on it.
Brent
I'll include the reference to
*Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The Unconscious
Expander)*
https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799
Since I say that IIT is still in the /information-oriented paradigm
/and not in the /experience-oriented paradigm/, Aaronson's post helps
my case.
I don't quite follow the rest. A person may feel pleasure (a modality)
without reasoning "I need to feel pleasure now."
It's not a question of what it's possible to feel, but whether that it
can be accounted for by information processing. "I feel pleasure now."
may well be a function of specific perceptions, values, and reasoning
about them. I don't see any attempt to prove this cannot be the case.
It seems that helping yourself to a primitive "experience" built into
matter is just baseless speculation unless you have some project to
measure or characterize this experience and show how it interacts with
information...because we certainly know that information can give pain
or pleasure.
Brent
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