On Friday, October 19, 2018 at 12:08:10 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 18 Oct 2018, at 17:26, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Thursday, October 18, 2018 at 9:00:21 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 17 Oct 2018, at 00:38, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On 10/16/2018 11:58 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 1:01:40 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10/16/2018 1:14 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> But here is the thesis I think of the experience-oriented (vs. >>> information-oriented) paradigm*: *Experience cannot be represented: It >>> does not exist outside of its material instantiation.* >>> >>> >>> But that's just an assertion that, not only am I giving up, but you must >>> give up too. I'm defining "the hard problem" to be "the impossible >>> problem". >>> >>> Most things don't exist outside of their material instantiation, >>> including intelligence. >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> >> With *representationalism*, one can run "intelligent" software on CPUs, >> GPUs, etc. made of basically any material (as long as the computing >> structure - "Turing-equivalence" - is the same). *Experientialism* >> (anti-representationalism) says it has to be particular materials [ >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry ]. >> >> >> I know what it says. You've posted it many times. But I haven't seen >> any reason to believe it. >> >> >> I agree with you. >> >> []p (beweisbar(‘p’) is representational, >> >> []p & p is provably not representational, due to its implicit invocation >> of the truth of p. >> >> Matter is usually conceive in the 3p, representational view, n and his >> itself a representational. But truth is not, and it is truth which play the >> important role for consciousness. >> >> Matter is either primary ultra-inert matter, what made the original >> A-TOMOS of Democrat. Irreductivel material. Today we have broken atoms, and >> with enough energy we can broke proton, etc. Even if we find new ATOMOS, it >> is doubtful we could use them for something as “semantical” than >> consciousness. >> >> But there is extreme originality of wanting this. I wait for an >> explanation for how to test that idea. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > The connection between experience (phenomenal material consciousness) > > > I don’t understand “material” in this setting. We agree that consciousness > is phenomenal, but material has to be phenomenal too if we assume that the > brain is Turing emulable (which is not that much to assume, as the > alternative is using ontological commitment. The adjective “material” is > like the adjective “divine”, without explaining what it means and how it > acts, it is eluding the problem more than clarifying it. > > > > > and truth (experiential modal logic) > > > > Truth is, normally, beyond experience. The experience is true, but truth > extends far beyond all possible experience. (Again provably so with the > common use of mathematics when assuming computationalisme). > > > > would be that it is possible for there to be different kinds of > consciousness via alternative material substrates. > > > > All universal machine can emulate all universal machine. Consciousness is > a priori independent of the substrate at the ontological level, now, if by > “substrates” you mean the stable observable with smell and taste, sure all > universal machine can taste the difference between water and wine, letting > them know by sense the global difference and the universal goal (like help > yourself). With mechanism, the substrate are explained by a sort of > competition of universal machines. There are infinitely many below the > substitution level, and finitely many above that you can count in your > neighbourhood (a lot, as not only there is the colleagues in the office, > but I would mention each bacteria in the room, and the flies).All that > might be emulated by Quarks and electrons, or branes and superstrings, but > that is basically y equivalent with caming with a u among the phi_i, > computing the “universe”, when mechanism explains, to get both the qualia > and the quanta, we need to extract the core physics from the > self-referential ability of the universal machine. > > Any universal base would do. Chosing the initial universal machine defines > all the phi_i and associates a number to each machines. A universal machine > is a referential system for all machines, including itself. > > If the physicist comes up with a physical experimental uncomputable > constant, that would be like adding an oracle. This does not change the > “theology of the machine”, but despite this should be done only in last > resort. > > The key point perhaps, is that consciousness does not supervene on any > computation run by any universal machine. Consciousness supervenes on > infinity of computations, and its “textures” is associated by the proximity > structure of the (infinitely many) true provable and consistent extensions. > > Bruno > >
My beginning point: I am taking Galen Strawson and Philip Goff (has been posting his recent debates) seriously, and saying *what does this mean?* What it means (in my context) is that computing has another (semantic) dimension that has not been considered: *experientiality*. Computing is currently defined in informational terms. That would include any Turing-equivalent processing, any super-Turing possibility, hyperarithmetical processing [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperarithmetical_theory ], and so on. Experience processing would not be information processing in the general sense above. It would that which would provide (substrate) a true semantics for *experiential modal logic*. Matter is that which provides that (information+experience) substrate. Consciousness could not exist without matter. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
