On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 10:49:44 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > > > On 10/15/2018 5:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 6:45:11 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 10/14/2018 11:13 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, October 14, 2018 at 9:53:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10/14/2018 2:48 PM, John Clark wrote: >>> >>> >*And there are sound reasons for doubting the consciousness of >>>> computers -* >>>> >>> >>> Name one of them that could not also be used to doubt the consciousness >>> of your fellow human beings. >>> >>> >>> The reason for not doubting that other human beings are conscious is >>> that (1) I am conscious and (2) other human beings are made of the same >>> stuff in approximately the same way that I am and (3) they behave the same >>> way in relation to what I am conscious of, e.g. they jump at a sudden loud >>> sound. >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> >> The thought crossed my mind yesterday: I was helping a young man applying >> for a Ph.D. program in chemical engineering with his application, and we >> were talking about chemistry and consciousness*, and I mentioned a type of >> zombie - a being that could converse (like an advanced Google Assistant or >> Sophie Robot) but not be conscious - and I thought it was *possible* he was >> a zombie. >> >> * cf. >> *Experience processing* >> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ >> >> >> I suppose you've read Scott Aaronson's take down of Tononi's theory. So >> I wonder why you would reference Tononi. >> >> One problem with the "experience is primary" theory is that there's no >> way for it to evolve. If it's a property of matter why are organized >> information processing lumps of matter more capable of experience than >> unorganized lumps of the same composition...the obvious answer is that the >> former process information, and processing information is something natural >> selection can work on. Smart animals reproduce better. Animals with >> experiences...who cares? >> >> “Emotional-BDI agents are BDI agents whose behavior is guided not only by >> beliefs, desires and intentions, but also by the role of emotions in >> reasoning and decision-making." This makes a false assumption that >> emotions are something independent of beliefs, desire, intentions, >> reasoning, and decision making. But this says nothing about the >> satisfaction and thwarting of desires and intentions. Why are those enough >> to explain emotions. I agree that emotions are necessary for reasoning in >> the sense that emotions are the value-weights given to events, including >> those imagined by foresight, and that some values are primitive. >> >> I think it is false that "Purely informational processing, which includes >> intentional agent programming (learning from experience, self-modeling), >> does not capture all true experiential processing (phenomenal >> consciousness). " It is a cheat to put in "purely". In fact all learning >> and intentional planning must include weighing alternatives and assigning >> value/emotion to them. I don't see any need for a further primitive >> modality. For example, a feeling of dizziness is a failure to maintain >> personal spacial orientation which is a value at a very low (subconscious) >> level. Sure there are feelings and emotions...but I think they are all >> derivative from more primitive values that are derivative from evolution. >> >> I think the reason you are attracted to this idea is that it is closed >> within the computer/information/program frame. And that is why I use the >> example of the AI Mars Rover. Sure, emotion cannot be derived within a >> computer. Emotion is something useful to a robot, an AI that works and >> strives within an external world which also acts on it. >> >> Brent >> >> >> >> > I'll include the reference to > > *Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The Unconscious > Expander)* > https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799 > > Since I say that IIT is still in the *information-oriented paradigm *and > not in the *experience-oriented paradigm*, Aaronson's post helps my case. > > I don't quite follow the rest. A person may feel pleasure (a modality) > without reasoning "I need to feel pleasure now." > > > It's not a question of what it's possible to feel, but whether that it can > be accounted for by information processing. "I feel pleasure now." may > well be a function of specific perceptions, values, and reasoning about > them. I don't see any attempt to prove this cannot be the case. It seems > that helping yourself to a primitive "experience" built into matter is just > baseless speculation unless you have some project to measure or > characterize this experience and show how it interacts with > information...because we certainly know that information can give pain or > pleasure. > > Brent >
Information can give pain or pleasure, like watching Fox News vs. a cuddly nature show. But here is the thesis I think of the experience-oriented (vs. information-oriented) paradigm*: *Experience cannot be represented: It does not exist outside of its material instantiation.* * and why a biocomputer is a new kind of computer - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
