On 10/14/2018 11:13 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Sunday, October 14, 2018 at 9:53:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 10/14/2018 2:48 PM, John Clark wrote:
>/And there are sound reasons for doubting the consciousness
of computers -/
Name one of them that could not also be used to doubt the
consciousness of your fellow human beings.
The reason for not doubting that other human beings are conscious
is that (1) I am conscious and (2) other human beings are made of
the same stuff in approximately the same way that I am and (3)
they behave the same way in relation to what I am conscious of,
e.g. they jump at a sudden loud sound.
Brent
The thought crossed my mind yesterday: I was helping a young man
applying for a Ph.D. program in chemical engineering with his
application, and we were talking about chemistry and consciousness*,
and I mentioned a type of zombie - a being that could converse (like
an advanced Google Assistant or Sophie Robot) but not be conscious -
and I thought it was *possible* he was a zombie.
* cf.
*Experience processing*
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
I suppose you've read Scott Aaronson's take down of Tononi's theory. So
I wonder why you would reference Tononi.
One problem with the "experience is primary" theory is that there's no
way for it to evolve. If it's a property of matter why are organized
information processing lumps of matter more capable of experience than
unorganized lumps of the same composition...the obvious answer is that
the former process information, and processing information is something
natural selection can work on. Smart animals reproduce better. Animals
with experiences...who cares?
“Emotional-BDI agents are BDI agents whose behavior is guided not only
by beliefs, desires and intentions, but also by the role of emotions in
reasoning and decision-making." This makes a false assumption that
emotions are something independent of beliefs, desire, intentions,
reasoning, and decision making. But this says nothing about the
satisfaction and thwarting of desires and intentions. Why are those
enough to explain emotions. I agree that emotions are necessary for
reasoning in the sense that emotions are the value-weights given to
events, including those imagined by foresight, and that some values are
primitive.
I think it is false that "Purely informational processing, which
includes intentional agent programming (learning from experience,
self-modeling), does not capture all true experiential processing
(phenomenal consciousness). " It is a cheat to put in "purely". In
fact all learning and intentional planning must include weighing
alternatives and assigning value/emotion to them. I don't see any need
for a further primitive modality. For example, a feeling of dizziness
is a failure to maintain personal spacial orientation which is a value
at a very low (subconscious) level. Sure there are feelings and
emotions...but I think they are all derivative from more primitive
values that are derivative from evolution.
I think the reason you are attracted to this idea is that it is closed
within the computer/information/program frame. And that is why I use
the example of the AI Mars Rover. Sure, emotion cannot be derived
within a computer. Emotion is something useful to a robot, an AI that
works and strives within an external world which also acts on it.
Brent
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