> On 17 Oct 2018, at 00:38, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 10/16/2018 11:58 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 1:01:40 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 10/16/2018 1:14 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> But here is the thesis I think of the experience-oriented (vs. >>> information-oriented) paradigm*: Experience cannot be represented: It does >>> not exist outside of its material instantiation. >> >> But that's just an assertion that, not only am I giving up, but you must >> give up too. I'm defining "the hard problem" to be "the impossible problem". >> >> Most things don't exist outside of their material instantiation, including >> intelligence. >> >> Brent >> >> >> With representationalism, one can run "intelligent" software on CPUs, GPUs, >> etc. made of basically any material (as long as the computing structure - >> "Turing-equivalence" - is the same). Experientialism >> (anti-representationalism) says it has to be particular materials >> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry> ]. > > I know what it says. You've posted it many times. But I haven't seen any > reason to believe it.
I agree with you. []p (beweisbar(‘p’) is representational, []p & p is provably not representational, due to its implicit invocation of the truth of p. Matter is usually conceive in the 3p, representational view, n and his itself a representational. But truth is not, and it is truth which play the important role for consciousness. Matter is either primary ultra-inert matter, what made the original A-TOMOS of Democrat. Irreductivel material. Today we have broken atoms, and with enough energy we can broke proton, etc. Even if we find new ATOMOS, it is doubtful we could use them for something as “semantical” than consciousness. But there is extreme originality of wanting this. I wait for an explanation for how to test that idea. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
