On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 6:45:11 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > > > On 10/14/2018 11:13 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Sunday, October 14, 2018 at 9:53:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 10/14/2018 2:48 PM, John Clark wrote: >> >> >*And there are sound reasons for doubting the consciousness of >>> computers -* >>> >> >> Name one of them that could not also be used to doubt the consciousness >> of your fellow human beings. >> >> >> The reason for not doubting that other human beings are conscious is that >> (1) I am conscious and (2) other human beings are made of the same stuff in >> approximately the same way that I am and (3) they behave the same way in >> relation to what I am conscious of, e.g. they jump at a sudden loud sound. >> >> Brent >> > > > The thought crossed my mind yesterday: I was helping a young man applying > for a Ph.D. program in chemical engineering with his application, and we > were talking about chemistry and consciousness*, and I mentioned a type of > zombie - a being that could converse (like an advanced Google Assistant or > Sophie Robot) but not be conscious - and I thought it was *possible* he was > a zombie. > > * cf. > *Experience processing* > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ > > > I suppose you've read Scott Aaronson's take down of Tononi's theory. So I > wonder why you would reference Tononi. > > One problem with the "experience is primary" theory is that there's no way > for it to evolve. If it's a property of matter why are organized > information processing lumps of matter more capable of experience than > unorganized lumps of the same composition...the obvious answer is that the > former process information, and processing information is something natural > selection can work on. Smart animals reproduce better. Animals with > experiences...who cares? > > “Emotional-BDI agents are BDI agents whose behavior is guided not only by > beliefs, desires and intentions, but also by the role of emotions in > reasoning and decision-making." This makes a false assumption that > emotions are something independent of beliefs, desire, intentions, > reasoning, and decision making. But this says nothing about the > satisfaction and thwarting of desires and intentions. Why are those enough > to explain emotions. I agree that emotions are necessary for reasoning in > the sense that emotions are the value-weights given to events, including > those imagined by foresight, and that some values are primitive. > > I think it is false that "Purely informational processing, which includes > intentional agent programming (learning from experience, self-modeling), > does not capture all true experiential processing (phenomenal > consciousness). " It is a cheat to put in "purely". In fact all learning > and intentional planning must include weighing alternatives and assigning > value/emotion to them. I don't see any need for a further primitive > modality. For example, a feeling of dizziness is a failure to maintain > personal spacial orientation which is a value at a very low (subconscious) > level. Sure there are feelings and emotions...but I think they are all > derivative from more primitive values that are derivative from evolution. > > I think the reason you are attracted to this idea is that it is closed > within the computer/information/program frame. And that is why I use the > example of the AI Mars Rover. Sure, emotion cannot be derived within a > computer. Emotion is something useful to a robot, an AI that works and > strives within an external world which also acts on it. > > Brent > > > > I'll include the reference to
*Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The Unconscious Expander)* https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799 Since I say that IIT is still in the *information-oriented paradigm *and not in the *experience-oriented paradigm*, Aaronson's post helps my case. I don't quite follow the rest. A person may feel pleasure (a modality) without reasoning "I need to feel pleasure now." - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
