> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:02, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Perspectivism is a form of modalism. >>>>> >>>>> Nietzsche is vindicated. >>>> >>>> Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, >>>> perhaps! >>>> All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology >>>> (capable only of saying what God is not). >>>> >>>> Bruno >>> >>> From https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/ >>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/> >>> 6.2 Perspectivism >>> >>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his >>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of perspective. >>> He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of >>> their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore failed to control >>> those perspectival effects (BGE 6; see BGE I more generally). Commentators >>> have been both fascinated and perplexed by what has come to be called >>> Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a major concern in a number of >>> large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, e.g., Danto 1965; Kaulbach 1980, >>> 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; Poellner 1995; >>> Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has been as much contestation over >>> exactly what doctrine or group of commitments belong under that heading as >>> about their philosophical merits, but a few points are relatively >>> uncontroversial and can provide a useful way into this strand of >>> Nietzsche’s thinking. >>> >>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in his >>> usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a critical >>> side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers for ignoring >>> the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we saw, he >>> simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a positive >>> contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to be) >>> the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he >>> writes, >>> >>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute >>> reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the spirit >>> has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in this way for >>> once, to want to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation of >>> the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter understood not as >>> “disinterested contemplation” (which is a non-concept and absurdity), but >>> rather as the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra in one’s power, and to >>> shift them in and out, so that one knows how to make precisely the >>> difference in perspectives and affective interpretations useful for >>> knowledge. (GM III, 12) >>> >>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy at >>> least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of >>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal the >>> way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. >>> Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised >>> conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one >>> perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of others, >>> without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as >>> possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional >>> picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a positive >>> set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, limited >>> cognitive agent. >>> >>> >> >> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly not with >> neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many perspective of the >> One, or at least can be interpreted that way. >> >> Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure relativism, >> which does not make sense, as we can only doubt starting from indubitable >> things (cf Descartes). But Nietzsche might have been OK, as the text above >> suggested a “revised conception” of objective. >> >> With mechanism, you have an ablate truth (the sigma_1 arithmetical truth), >> and the rest is explained by the perspective enforced by incompleteness. > > My reading of Nietzsche is he thought that there are many different > perspectives and one can only approach the truth by looking from different > perspectives but never taking one of them as definitive. This goes along > with his denial and rejection of being a system builder. I think he equated > system builders with those who took their perspective to be the only one.
Yes, when we built theories of everything, we cannot claim to have got the last ultimate one. But Nietzsche is close to the contradiction of relativism, in the domain of studying the ultimate reality (that we search). He escapes it by saying that he is not a system builder, but then, what is he talking about? You are right, the perspectivism of the universal machine, imposed by incompleteness, is much more precise, and is probably not equivalent with Nietzsche’s one, although there might be some relations. Obviously (?), Mechanism is closer to Plato, Plotinus, and also Leibniz, Spinoza, but there too we can find many differences, at least in the interpretation of the systems. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org > <mailto:email@example.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.