> On 14 Dec 2018, at 20:50, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Friday, December 14, 2018 at 11:27:05 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:27, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 6:49:34 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 18:05, [email protected] <> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 11:34:48 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, [email protected] <> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, [email protected] <> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> SNIP >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG. >>>>> >>>>> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification modes >>>>> were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where unfortunately the >>>>> made “stealing” was made in 1248. >>>>> >>>>> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test >>>>> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. >>>>> Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible with >>>>>> Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its >>>>>> appearance comes from something else, non physical. >>>>>> >>>>>> Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and >>>>>> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the >>>>> physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised >>>>> sense). To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies >>>>> digitalness (or you can assume it outright). >>>>> >>>>> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot >>>>> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that >>>>> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a >>>>> computation run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing >>>>> complete). This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to >>>>> emerge from a statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the >>>>> machine). When we do the math, we do recover already that the observable >>>>> of the universal machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a >>>>> quantum logic, with a symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. >>>>> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains on >>>>> the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any >>>>> evidences. >>>>> >>>>> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer in >>>>> place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of >>>>> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. >>>>> >>>>> Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, to >>>>> some existing "universal machine" doing anything? >>>> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the >>>> existence of a universal machine. >>>> >>>> You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism >>>> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need >>>> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable. >>> >>> >>> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain Digital >>> transplantation. Yes. >>> >>> I don’t claim it is true. >>> >>> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it >>> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without >>> collapse). >>> >>> I don't believe it's testable. Has that been done to any degree? And if it >>> were, I don't see how it would predict quantum theory. AG >> >> >> That is a quite sane attitude, and rather normal remark, before studying the >> argument/proof. >> >> Now, if instead of not believing, you positively disbelief that Digital >> Mechanism is testable, you need to prove or argue for that statement, or >> better, to say at which step of my argument you depart from. >> >> Or you invoke your personal opinion, which is then like abandoning the >> scientific attitude in the domain, to sell a “pseudo-religion”. I don’t >> think so (I hope). >> >> >> >> >>>> But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without going >>>> further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation of >>>> materialism. AG >>> >>> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. >>> >>> Which form of materialism are you referring to? >> >> Weak Materialsim: the idea that we have to *assume* physical things, like >> anything whose existence is inferred from observation and is judged to be >> not having a simpler explanation which does not invoke a ontological >> commitment in (Aristotelian) substance. >> >> >> >> >>> Not the form or definition used by Stenger. >> >> He is just unclear about that, but he seems to clearly assume analysis and >> some physical reality. >> >> Its book will be very helpful to get the whole physics, when enough of the >> arithmetical quantum logic is known. Despite being decidable, the >> propositional theology is quickly intractable, today. >> >> >> >> >>> He never affirms or denies a primal unknown other than possibly energy >>> underlying matter. >> >> Yes. That is already a lot. >> >> >> >> >>> If you replace mind by digital machine for a person, mustn't the machine >>> depend on matter to do any calculations? AG >> >> It does not. By definition, a computation requires only another universal >> machine. >> >> If you could show how a simple calculation, like 2 + 2 = 4, could be done in >> the absence of matter, I could become a believer in digital replacement of a >> person or anything. > > It is the other way round. I assume that we can survive that physical and > digital substitution, > > That's a truly HUGE assumption and I find your rationale for it weak.
I don’t defend that hypothesis, I am not a philosopher. I study its observable consequences, and compare it to the experimental facts. Now, it is a huge assumption in metaphysics, but its opposite is also very huge, as it presupposes quite special actual infinities in both mind and matter. > But more important, I don't see how you can calculate anything based on the > idea that emulations are possible for everything. Mechanism proves that matter is not entirely computable. Emulations are not possible for everything. Quite the contrary. If “I” am Turing emulable, then basically everything which is NOT me, is not Turing emulable a priori. > As distinguished from programs I am familiar with, what you seem to wind up > with is CHAOS. Proof? > There seems to be no logic, or shall we say ordering or controlling of the > sequences of your calculations to produce anything intelligible. AG I do not see what you are alluding too. Have you understand what is a universal dovetailer, and how their existence and execution in arithmetic follows from Church-Turing Thesis. A computation is something made by a universal machine, so there is always local order and control. Without more specific remark, I cannot comment. Bruno > > > then I show from this that 2+2=4, and more generally consciousness is done in > absence of matter, and that matter is only a phenomenological appearance in > the mind of number/machine. > > That we could survive a digital transplant can be motivated by molecular > biology, or just by the fact that we don’t know in Nature anything non-Turing > emulable used by organism (evolution assumes codes and redundancy, without > infinite precision, as the assures stability of life with resection > unexpected inputs). > > > > >> But to do this calculation, the number 2 must be stored somewhere, >> presumably in matter. If not stored in matter, then where? Ball in your >> court. AG > > > You can emulate a register by a finite sequence like (6, 2, 8), and you can > code the finite sequence (6, 2, 8) by the number 2^6 * 3^2 * 5^8 (2, 3, 5 = > the prime numbers). By the uniqueness of factor decomposition of the natural > numbers, you can recover by addition and multiplication the data 2. > > Note that I have used exponentiation, and to define it with just addition and > multiplication, I need the notion of finite sequence, so, to eliminate the > implicit use of the exponential axiom, Gödel used some theorem in elementary > number theory, like the so-called Chinese Lemma (we can come back on this). > > Of course, this is just the beginning of the beginning of the representation > of the partial recursive functions, and their computations, in arithmetic. > That is obviously rather long to describe in one post. > > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
