# Re: [SUSPICIOUS MESSAGE] [SUSPICIOUS MESSAGE] Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

```> On 29 Dec 2018, at 11:55, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, December 29, 2018 at 3:58:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 27 Dec 2018, at 21:57, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> What if conventional mathematics itself is in error by assuming its primary
>> elements are numbers?
>
> Conventional mathematics is informal. It does not assume primary notion. Now,
> numbers are implicitly accepted as elementary notion, but so are finite sets,
> combination, strings of symbols, etc.
>
> With mechanism, all you need to assume explicitly is one universal machinery.
> If you use the comboantors S and K, the numbers can be defined, like with
> Barendrecht numbers VfI, Vf(VfI), Vf(Vf(VfI))), … as I have illustrated
> recently in the Combinator Thread, or like with Church’s numbers, etc.
> We could have used the Game-of-Life Patterns, or the lambda expression, or a
> von Neuman (virtual) machine, etc.
>
> I use number because people are more familiar with them. Most people can
> easily conceived that “17 is odd” is true independently of them, but would
> have an harder time to conceive that KKK=K independent of them, even if this
> does not mean much more than the first (left) projection of (K, K) is K.
>
>
>> (There is arguably something to category/type theory that maybe gets away
>> from this.)
>>
>>
>> What if primary elements include/are non-numbers - (qualitative*)
>> experiences?
>
> I do not conceive easily that the qualitative can be primary. It is like
> starting from the mystery (qualia, consciousness) to explain the simple
> (numbers, addition, multiplication).
> With mechanism, the qualitative requires some machinery (neurons,
> transistors, or numbers, or finite sets, symbols, etc.).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>> *
>
>> HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies
>> Vol 9 No 31 (2016)
>> <http://secure-web.cisco.com/1CkaiNXRGzWchgHfNBqNKroaJrcns3uH0YBtGTrkZD2KTsb3sVBMlhrDHl29E706AuB3SwsD0fvRH4NqYnmzUIXofMpNU6E_x9GT48hIfbo0m0KcBuqAL_-1QKMKQUg14jqK7ytvHouTxK0qdeTbt--vTzwJvORikO4Valawnv_-xtgkN5DLUaQy6efIJvrmDOLAjFJgb1n0YbDJwveNMQPhpIP1UeJAn-HiAB4GekvkC8cuhPriDLNfSjaMBaQGe/http%3A%2F%2Fwww.humanamente.eu%2Findex.php%2FHM%2Fissue%2Fview%2F23>:
>>  The Enactive Approach to Qualitative Ontology: In Search of New Categories
>>
>> Introduction
>> <https://secure-web.cisco.com/1k7nAyNFY-mc26iFQjBROVBdnvhU6d9dhNsc4YlGN27WCP23XO9pYsD568zs_bF0F8R80TC9xnDT8m6KZuhE-b3ZwD1RFeu-sXHdR4hZE369i3ZmBh-VWRQ6ZfjsFHozKhblgzSocdCNtJ9GI1b7OKvCurFfGJ6UjydKlb4UtrE-bzIh9xw9G-ZAF-Q923Fc8rahqnQDAoRUVHieGeiBmXdSsmPDbExFuxSTVQVWhqiyfJNlSmvHZA4u30po8TGIs/https%3A%2F%2Fphilarchive.org%2Farchive%2FPACITT>:
>> – the enactive approach opposes the Cartesian bifurcation of reality into
>> psychological and physical
>> – complements quantitative categories, offering a mathematical treatment of
>> qualitative aspects of reality
>>
>>
>
>
> In  "the qualitative requires some machinery (neurons, transistors, or
> numbers, or finite sets, symbols, etc.)":
>
> Neurons and transistors are typically seen as being made of matter -
> chemicals, atoms, etc. -```
```
They are made of matter, but that does not mean that such a matter is required,
and indeed, computation are realised without matter too, in any Turing complete
reality (like the sigma_1 segment of the arithmetical truth).

If some matter play some role, either that role is Turing emulable, and this
means that we have to refine the the choice of the mechanist substitution
level, or that is not possible, but that would mean there is no substitution
level, and that we are infinite non computable entities, and we can’t say yes
to the digitalist surgeon (and thus mechanism would be wrong).

> whereas numbers, finite sets, symbols are something else (whatever
> mathematical ontology one has).

Well, yes, they are immaterial entities. Elementary ideas, if you want; but
simpler than anything else. All scientists agrees on use and meaning (which is
actually part of the mystery, but here the math shows that we have to assume
them: universal entities cannot be derived from non universal one.

>
> But matter itself has psychical (in addition to physical/numerical)
> constituents, according to the "enactive approach" (above).

I have never see an evidence for primary matter, and I don’t see what it could
mean that such primary matter can have psychical ability.

Maybe you could try to tell me what you mean by “matter”, so that I can make
sense of your proposal.

I am not asking a metaphysical question. I am just trying to understand what
you mean by “matter”.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
>
>
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