> On 9 Feb 2019, at 10:22, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Friday, February 8, 2019 at 5:53:01 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 4 Feb 2019, at 19:09, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> As I have said, I am language-oriented. What this means is that I say that >> science (from that perspective) is a collection of domain-specific languages >> - general relativity, particle physics, chemistry, microbiology, cellular >> biology, neurobiology, psychology, sociology, ,… > > They all use English. The theories differ but sometimes can be related, like > chemistry is in principle reducible to quantum mechanics, with electron > playing a preponderant role. Yet, high level chemistry will develop higher > level tools not always easily reducible to quantum physics. > For the mind body problem, with mechanism, we have the choice of choosing any > language, and any Turing complete theory. The machine theology (G*), which > should include physics, is theory independent. The physical reality is phi_i > independent. > > > > > > There is English. But there is also also a collection of mathematical > language "dialects", like "Lagrangian": > > This Is What The Standard Model of Physics Actually Looks Like > https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like > > "The Lagrangian is a fancy way of writing an equation to determine the state > of a changing system and explain the maximum possible energy the system can > maintain ... Despite appearances, the Lagrangian is one of the easiest and > most compact ways of presenting the theory.”
That is technical language. It is just natural language with some technical terms added to it. Yes, a Lagrangian contains a lot of information, but it is open if the setting is classical or quantum, which changes a lot the interpretation problem. > > > > Suppose there is a conference Languages for the Mind-Body Problem, including > > G* > EMPL⁺ G* is a theory, not a language. G* is the same whatever classical ontological (Turing-complete) theory you take. (Even if you add infinity axioms, or super-Turing elements). > > The irony to me is that there are people talking about those languages which > could refer to themselves at a conference presenting those languages. > > ⁺ Experiential Modalities Programing Language > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ With mechanism, experiential modalities are given by the variant of provability using “ & p” in the definition, like []p & p, or []p & <>t & p. That “& p” makes them qualitative and undefinable by the machine concerned, but a rich consistent machine can study the complete theology (at the propositional level) of a simpler machine that she knows/believes to be sound (or just consistent). > > > > > > >> - however one wants to carve them up (they are all human inventions anyway). > > > “Brain” is an invention of the human, but the brain itself is more an > invention of nature. With mechanism, eventually nature is a result of > “consciousness selection or projection”. A result of sharable first person > indterminacies, from all “relative computational states existing in the > sigma_1 arithmetic" > > > >> The terms 'reduction', 'emergence' are really about how expressions (aka >> theories) in one domain language relate to (can compile to, translate to, >> can be defined in terms of) another domain language, rather than some >> teleological, causal relation. > > Non problem with this. But the representation have to be faithful, and proved > to be so when used. > > > >> >> But languages have semantics, including the "what" they are about. > > Yes. Languages and theories have semantics. That is what mathematical logic > is all about. Proof theory, Model theory, and the relation between proofs and > model, where a model is usually a mathematical structure verifying the > statements of the theory. > > > > > Even though the terms "model", "interpretation", "domain of discourse" etc. > are used in mathematical logic [ > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/True_arithmetic : "The domain of discourse is > the set N of natural numbers..This structure is known as the standard model > or intended interpretation of first-order arithmetic."], I've thought more > recently of using substrate instead. Hmm… that would augment the probability of doing a mistake already done by early pythagoreans: to believe that arithmeticalism (only numbers) entails that there are things made of numbers. But Mechanism is more idealistic; the only “non-number-theoretical things” are only dreamed by numbers, through the computations mimicking them correctly in arithmetic (which exist by the digital mechanist assumption). > > > > >> In the case of an experience processing language, there would be some >> fundamental "atoms" or "units" of experientiality, like ψbits. > > > Experience is usually private and non provable. But when machine’s introspect > themselves they got reason to believe in such true, from their perspective, > statement which are non provable. > > A unit of experience does not make sense to me, to be honest. Subjective > experience does not admit third person description at all, although they do > admit meta-pointers to them, thanks our Mechanist admission of the invariance > of consciousness for some digital transformation. > > Consciousness is not material. It indexical, relational, and the attribute of > some higher order “hero” or person. Person are conscious, not things. I tend > to believe that bacteria are already conscious, but that consciousness is not > much more differentiate than the universal consciousness of its environment. > It is an altered state of consciousness, quite unlike the usual mundane one, > which refers to long and complex path. With mechanism there might be reason > to expect us being very rare in the physical reality. > > Consciousness is primitively the knowledge of our existence, but it is not > definable, nor provable, yet indubitable. All (Löbian) universal machine > already knows that. Consciousness is not really just consistency, but it is > the semantic, or truth, of that consistency. The hero get that something is > happening. > > Bruno > > > > On the "units of experience", that's the concern of the micropsychism > literature. I wrote something yesterday on this in the context of John > Archibald Wheeler's "it from bit": > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/02/08/2bits-qbits-xbits-a-cosmos/ Sum up it here please. It is an important issue. Thank you (in advance). Bruno > > - pt > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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