I should add that the cybernetic description of a system is entirely
functional, but the emphasis is on the holistic perspective. Functionalism
tends to be reductive, but the consciousness identified with a given
cybernetic description is the system as a whole. That's why replacing a
neuron with an artificial replacement does not change the consciousness.

On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:30 AM Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> What I'm suggesting draws on both functionalism and identity theory. It's
> functional in the sense that the constitutive aspect of cybernetics is
> entirely functional. There is nothing in a cybernetic description beyond
> the functional relationships between the parts of that system. It draws on
> identity theory in the sense that I'm claiming that consciousness *is* 
> cybernetic
> dynamics. What I'm adding is the same move that panpsychism makes - that
> there is something it is like to be any cybernetic system, and this
> includes many more things than brains, and crucially, does not depend on a
> specific substrate.
>
> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:13 AM <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> I must assume you have already studied (hopefully over many years) in
>> philosophy the difference between
>>
>> *functionalism*: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/
>>
>>     and
>>
>> *identity theory*: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/
>>
>> A short way of expressing identity theory over functionalism is
>>
>>     *A simulation is not a synthesis.*
>>
>>
>> *Experiential materialism* is a variant of identity theory in which
>>
>> • psychical properties, as well as physical ones, are attributed to
>> matter, which is the only basic substance
>>
>>      so that
>>
>> • the material composition of the brain has both physical and psychical
>> aspects.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 7:38:46 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>
>>> Maybe you could tell me what specific criticism you have rather than
>>> quoting a wikipedia article.
>>>
>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 7:50 PM <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I don't believe in the "*functional* equivalence" principle
>>>>
>>>>    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)
>>>>
>>>> as it does not capture the nature of what is needed for consciousness
>>>> (as many critics - some listed there - have pointed out).
>>>>
>>>> If I had to pick something vs. "cybernetic dynamics" it would be
>>>> "neurochemical dynamics". That seems closer to me.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>
>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 5:31:56 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Then you're missing the point of the alternative I've been offering.
>>>>> It's not about the *matter itself*, it's about the cybernetic
>>>>> dynamics implemented in the matter. So I would predict that you could
>>>>> replace your brain neuron by neuron with functional equivalents and your
>>>>> consciousness wouldn't change, so long as the cybernetics were unchanged.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019, 6:08 PM <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Well we know *some* matter has a psychical aspect: *human brains*.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Unless one is a consciousness denier.
>>>>>> - https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 4:58:04 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Panpsychism of any flavor that identifies matter with a psychic
>>>>>>> aspect is subject to the problems I described earlier.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It never occurred to me to google something like "theoretical
>>>>>>> psychology" <https://www.google.com/search?q=theoretical+psychology>
>>>>>>> but there's a lot there. How much of it is interesting, I don't know.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think as we flesh out the connectome, theoretical psychology will
>>>>>>> take on more legitimacy and importance.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 5:16 PM <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There is a whole spectrum of panpsychisms (plural) - from
>>>>>>>> micropsychism to cosmophychism:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/
>>>>>>>> cf. https://www.iep.utm.edu/panpsych/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That is not a "real science" yet is its basic problem of course.
>>>>>>>> But consciousness science in general really isn't yet either.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> One would think there would be a group of theoretical psychologists
>>>>>>>> - there is theoretical physics, chemistry, and biology, but theoretical
>>>>>>>> psychology is in a much weirder state - who would be involved.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 3:48:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> My question for panpsychists is similar to my question for Cosmin:
>>>>>>>>> what does it buy you in terms of explanations or predictions?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Just blanket-asserting that all matter is conscious doesn't tell
>>>>>>>>> me anything about consciousness itself. For example, what would it 
>>>>>>>>> mean for
>>>>>>>>> my fingernails to be conscious?  Does my fingernail consciousness 
>>>>>>>>> factor in
>>>>>>>>> somehow to my own experience of consciousness?  If so, how? What 
>>>>>>>>> about all
>>>>>>>>> the other parts of my body, about individual cells?  Does the bacteria
>>>>>>>>> living in my body contribute its consciousness somehow? It quickly 
>>>>>>>>> runs
>>>>>>>>> aground on the same rocks that arguments about "soul" do - there's no
>>>>>>>>> principled way to talk about it that elucidates relationships between
>>>>>>>>> brains, bodies, and minds. Panpsychism does nothing to explain the 
>>>>>>>>> effect
>>>>>>>>> of drugs on consciousness, or brain damage. Like Cosmin's ideas, it's 
>>>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>>>> just post-hoc rationalization. Panpsychism is the philosophical 
>>>>>>>>> equivalent
>>>>>>>>> of throwing your hands up and saying "I dunno, I guess it's all 
>>>>>>>>> conscious
>>>>>>>>> somehow!"
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> What I'm suggesting posits that consciousness arises from the
>>>>>>>>> cybernetic organization of a system, that what the system 
>>>>>>>>> experiences, as a
>>>>>>>>> whole, is identified with the informational-dynamics captured by that
>>>>>>>>> organization. This yields explanations for the character of a given
>>>>>>>>> system's consciousness... something panpsychism cannot do.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Terren
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:57 PM <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I see the coin made (as the ones lying on my desk right now made
>>>>>>>>>> of metal) of matter.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The two sides of the coin (of matter) are *physical *and
>>>>>>>>>> *psychical*:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If ὕ – the first Greek letter for “hyle”, upsilon (υ) with
>>>>>>>>>> diacritics dasia and oxia (U+1F55) – is used for the symbol of 
>>>>>>>>>> matter, φ
>>>>>>>>>> (phi) for physical, + ψ (psi) for psychical, then
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>            ὕ = φ + ψ
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (i.e., the combination of *physical* and *psychical* properties
>>>>>>>>>> is a more complete view of what matter is). The physical is the
>>>>>>>>>> (quantitative) behavioral aspect of matter – the kind that is 
>>>>>>>>>> formulated in
>>>>>>>>>> mathematical language in current physics, for example – whereas the
>>>>>>>>>> psychical is the (qualitative) experiential aspect of matter, at 
>>>>>>>>>> various
>>>>>>>>>> levels, from brains on down. There is no reason in principle for 
>>>>>>>>>> only φ to
>>>>>>>>>> the considered by science and for ψ to be ignored by science.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 2:10:05 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I see them as two sides of the same coin - as in, you don't get
>>>>>>>>>>> one without the other.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:00 PM <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or material]
>>>>>>>>>>>> computation" then does that mean there is realm for (A) 
>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness and
>>>>>>>>>>>> one for (B) physical [or material] computation?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Is A like some spirit or ghost that invades the domain of B? Or
>>>>>>>>>>>> does B invade A?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>
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