But you have contributed to establishing a term:
*cybernetic delusion* - the delusion that software or programming in a conventional computer device (even one with many processors) will ever achieve consciousness That is useful. @philipthrift On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 9:58:09 AM UTC-5, [email protected] wrote: > > > It seems people will remain in the delusion that software or programming > in a conventional computer device - even with many processors - will > achieve consciousness. Searle's Chinese Room argument still does apply > here, as anyone should clearly be able to see. > > One can wave the magic word "cybernetic" around all one wants, but it is > clearly not useful. > > There are lots of delusions in the world: Ghosts, spirits, gods, and the > "cybernetic" one above is among them. > > > @pphilipthrift > > On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 9:42:40 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >> >> I'm beginning to suspect that you're a chatbot... a pretty good one - the >> best I've seen, even. Your responses are syntactically correct and >> seemingly relevant semantically, but whenever I or anyone else tries to pin >> you down and get you to articulate specifics, your response is inevitably >> to quote some article or another. Getting closer to passing the Turing Test >> - give your creator my respect. >> >> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 10:15 AM <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> I understand basically what your idea is, but "cybernetic dynamics" >>> reminds me of Norbert Weiner's subject of cybernetics, something I read >>> about decades ago: >>> >>> >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybernetics:_Or_Control_and_Communication_in_the_Animal_and_the_Machine >>> >>> One should be able to replace every neural+glial cell with a synthetic >>> one, but the technology has to advance: >>> >>> >>> https://neo.life/2018/05/the-birth-of-wetware/ >>> >>> ... >>> >>> *Pink juice* >>> >>> Koniku’s chemical sensor is still in development, so what Agabi and >>> Sadrian show me is likely to continue evolving for some time. On the >>> outside, it sports a globular, gray-green shell with a vaguely alien look, >>> about eight inches wide. Inside, metal architecture supports a silicon chip >>> with spidery wires converging in the center, where networked neurons sit >>> inside a clear bubble made of a biocompatible polymer. >>> >>> When a client tells Koniku what substance it wants to sense, the company >>> identifies cellular receptors that would ordinarily bind to that substance. >>> Then it creates neurons that have those receptors. To do that, it uses >>> gene-editing technology to tweak the DNA of neuron precursors. Koniku >>> obtains those from a supplier, which manipulates skin or blood cells from >>> mice into blank-slate cells known as induced pluripotent stem cells. >>> >>> Once Koniku has nurtured these engineered precursors into living >>> neurons, they could, in theory, smell odors like a drug-sniffing dog might. >>> Or they could detect any number of substances that have corresponding >>> receptors. Some receptors are more sensitive and narrowly tuned to attach >>> to one substance. Others are, as Agabi puts it, more “promiscuous,” >>> accepting an entire class of chemicals, like nitrates. The Koniku Kore >>> contains neurons with both types of receptors. >>> >>> After they’ve created their mix of customized neurons, Agabi and his >>> colleagues use the Death Star laser to build a polymer structure for the >>> neurons to sit on. Then they place the cells on that structure and wait for >>> them to begin to network together among a set of mushroom-shaped >>> electrodes. Ultimately, a few “reporter” neurons will serve as the >>> essential neuron-silicon connection. This means they are both connected to >>> the neuron network and “plugged in” to the chip using the natural process >>> of endocytosis, in which a cell gradually engulfs foreign matter. Agabi >>> says Koniku has developed a special DNA coating for its electrodes. When a >>> neuron tries to engulf the DNA, it creates a seal that will later let the >>> electrode pick up electrical signals the neuron produces when its receptors >>> bind to a given chemical or class of chemicals. >>> >>> Almost all of this technology was around before Koniku, though not >>> exactly in this arrangement. Perhaps the newest element here is what Agabi >>> calls “pink juice.” The usual life span of a neuron in a lab is counted in >>> days or weeks, but Koniku’s neurons can survive for up to two months. >>> That’s because they’re bathed in pink juice, which feeds them and keeps >>> them alive. >>> >>> At first, Agabi won’t tell me the exact recipe beyond saying that >>> they’re a mix of “vitamins, minerals, and sugars.” But I piece some of it >>> together by talking to Thomas DeMarse, a neuroscientist at the University >>> of North Carolina. >>> >>> *Biology is technology, Agabi says. Everything else is a simulation* >>> >>> DeMarse spent time in the spotlight in the early 2000s for his research >>> teaching rat neurons in a dish to fly a virtual plane by connecting them to >>> flight simulator software. He also did groundbreaking research on neuron >>> survival. He points out that there are a number of similar “juices” already >>> on the market, with names like BrainPhys and Neurobasal. Those pink juices >>> get their color from a substance called phenol red, which indicates the >>> liquid’s pH level. They also contain a carbonate buffer that helps maintain >>> acidity and simulates conditions in the brain. Using similar materials, >>> DeMarse was able to keep neurons alive on a desk for two years. They would >>> have lived longer, he says, but during that time he moved from Caltech to >>> Georgia Tech, and the plates started to leak en route. >>> >>> Later, when I ask Agabi if he’ll at least tell me whether his pink juice >>> contains phenol red and a carbonate buffer, he confirms the first and >>> denies the second. Academic groups may have needed the carbonate buffer to >>> simulate the brain, but unlike those neuroscience labs, Koniku is >>> unconcerned with mimicking the brain, Agabi says. “The power of the neuron >>> comes from the computational density — as long as we maintain that, we can >>> change everything else.” >>> >>> With the help of Koniku’s pink juice and a new automated pump system >>> that will be incorporated into each sensor, Agabi expects to eventually >>> reach DeMarse’s record for neuron longevity. Even then, his customers would >>> have to swap out their Koniku equipment every two years, but no one has >>> requested products with greater neuron longevity — and therefore, Agabi >>> says, it has not been a development priority. With the technology at hand, >>> he says, he could develop a Koniku Kore that would last five years, were a >>> customer to require it. >>> >>> Improving on evolution >>> “To me the devil is in the details here,” says DeMarse. What he means >>> is: before Koniku, its kind of wetware lived in academic and government >>> labs. In addition to DeMarse’s research, scientists at DARPA have worked >>> for a long time on an artificial nose to detect cancer. William Ditto, now >>> of the Nonlinear Artificial Intelligence Lab at North Carolina State >>> University, used leech neurons in a dish to carry out basic computations. >>> Although no one has done exactly what Koniku says it’s doing, there’s >>> plenty to back up the argument that someone could do it. In fact, DeMarse >>> says he was “tickled” to read about Koniku’s innovations. Gabriel A. Silva, >>> director of the Center for Engineered Natural Intelligence at the >>> University of California, San Diego, is also intrigued by Koniku’s >>> potential. “I never underestimate groups like this because they’re >>> trailblazers,” he says. >>> >>> Still, Agabi’s colleagues in the academic world maintain some skepticism >>> about whether his technology can live up to his grand ambitions and radical >>> vision for the future of machine intelligence. >>> >>> For one thing, neurons have evolutionary baggage that might be >>> unnecessary for a computer. As an example, Rajesh Rao, director of the >>> Center for Neural Engineering at the University of Washington, points to >>> myelin, the fatty sheath that insulates nerve fibers and helps signals >>> propagate in the brain. It’s not clear, Rao says, that the optimal computer >>> would have to mimic that method of communication. Or consider dendrites, >>> the branches that stretch out from the body of a neuron. Neuroscientists >>> aren’t sure whether dendrites actually participate in information >>> processing or are just wires that pass information from cell to cell. Does >>> moving information in a computer really demand some version of dendrites? >>> >>> With issues like this in mind, all the scientists I spoke with for this >>> article said that while looking to biology for inspiration will be >>> essential for the development of AI, they were not entirely convinced by >>> Agabi’s argument that it will require biology itself. Just as planes use >>> the same principles of lift as birds do without feathers or hollow bones, >>> “we can extract the computational principles of how the brain processes >>> information” and use them in a manner “independent of actual implementation >>> in biological tissue,” Rao says. >>> >>> For example, neuromorphic chips are silicon chips designed using >>> biological principles, attempting to mimic some ways that the brain >>> processes information while leaving some of its baggage behind. Ditto, the >>> researcher who once made a computer out of leech neurons, is now working on >>> a “chaotic chip,” which constantly changes from analog to digital >>> processing — as often as a billion times a second — in order to solve >>> problems more efficiently. He argues that AI will require the plasticity >>> and adaptive capacity of biology, but that the biological element is >>> optional. >>> >>> After all, coaxing neurons in a dish into computation isn’t so easy, >>> either. Even making sure they grow successfully is difficult; Silva >>> remembers struggling during graduate school with neurons that had suddenly >>> stopped growing, seemingly for no reason. “It turned out that the >>> manufacturer of the coverslips we used had changed the formulation of the >>> glass,” he says. “That alone was enough to make the neurons unhappy.” Even >>> when they do grow, a group of neurons, however well networked and >>> organized, do not automatically make a brain. The distance from chemical >>> sensing to cognition is awfully long, and the slippery nature of even the >>> idea of cognition complicates this question. A basic system that uses >>> reward or punishment to teach things to computers “is going to give you >>> some behavior that will look intelligent,” Rao says. But isn’t there more >>> to cognition than that, more ingredients and sensory inputs that help us >>> react to, interact with, and make sense of the world? The wetware recipe >>> for that is far from clear. >>> >>> ... >>> >>> >>> @philipthrift >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 8:33:09 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>> >>>> I should add that the cybernetic description of a system is entirely >>>> functional, but the emphasis is on the holistic perspective. Functionalism >>>> tends to be reductive, but the consciousness identified with a given >>>> cybernetic description is the system as a whole. That's why replacing a >>>> neuron with an artificial replacement does not change the consciousness. >>>> >>>> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:30 AM Terren Suydam <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> What I'm suggesting draws on both functionalism and identity theory. >>>>> It's functional in the sense that the constitutive aspect of cybernetics >>>>> is >>>>> entirely functional. There is nothing in a cybernetic description beyond >>>>> the functional relationships between the parts of that system. It draws >>>>> on >>>>> identity theory in the sense that I'm claiming that consciousness *is* >>>>> cybernetic >>>>> dynamics. What I'm adding is the same move that panpsychism makes - that >>>>> there is something it is like to be any cybernetic system, and this >>>>> includes many more things than brains, and crucially, does not depend on >>>>> a >>>>> specific substrate. >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:13 AM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I must assume you have already studied (hopefully over many years) in >>>>>> philosophy the difference between >>>>>> >>>>>> *functionalism*: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ >>>>>> >>>>>> and >>>>>> >>>>>> *identity theory*: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/ >>>>>> >>>>>> A short way of expressing identity theory over functionalism is >>>>>> >>>>>> *A simulation is not a synthesis.* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *Experiential materialism* is a variant of identity theory in which >>>>>> >>>>>> • psychical properties, as well as physical ones, are attributed to >>>>>> matter, which is the only basic substance >>>>>> >>>>>> so that >>>>>> >>>>>> • the material composition of the brain has both physical and >>>>>> psychical aspects. >>>>>> >>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 7:38:46 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Maybe you could tell me what specific criticism you have rather than >>>>>>> quoting a wikipedia article. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 7:50 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don't believe in the "*functional* equivalence" principle >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> as it does not capture the nature of what is needed for >>>>>>>> consciousness (as many critics - some listed there - have pointed out). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If I had to pick something vs. "cybernetic dynamics" it would be >>>>>>>> "neurochemical dynamics". That seems closer to me. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 5:31:56 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Then you're missing the point of the alternative I've been >>>>>>>>> offering. It's not about the *matter itself*, it's about the >>>>>>>>> cybernetic dynamics implemented in the matter. So I would predict >>>>>>>>> that you >>>>>>>>> could replace your brain neuron by neuron with functional equivalents >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> your consciousness wouldn't change, so long as the cybernetics were >>>>>>>>> unchanged. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019, 6:08 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Well we know *some* matter has a psychical aspect: *human brains* >>>>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Unless one is a consciousness denier. >>>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>> https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 4:58:04 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Panpsychism of any flavor that identifies matter with a psychic >>>>>>>>>>> aspect is subject to the problems I described earlier. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> It never occurred to me to google something like "theoretical >>>>>>>>>>> psychology" >>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.google.com/search?q=theoretical+psychology> but >>>>>>>>>>> there's a lot there. How much of it is interesting, I don't know. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I think as we flesh out the connectome, theoretical psychology >>>>>>>>>>> will take on more legitimacy and importance. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 5:16 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> There is a whole spectrum of panpsychisms (plural) - from >>>>>>>>>>>> micropsychism to cosmophychism: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ >>>>>>>>>>>> cf. https://www.iep.utm.edu/panpsych/ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> That is not a "real science" yet is its basic problem of >>>>>>>>>>>> course. But consciousness science in general really isn't yet >>>>>>>>>>>> either. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> One would think there would be a group of theoretical >>>>>>>>>>>> psychologists - there is theoretical physics, chemistry, and >>>>>>>>>>>> biology, but >>>>>>>>>>>> theoretical psychology is in a much weirder state - who would be >>>>>>>>>>>> involved. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 3:48:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> My question for panpsychists is similar to my question for >>>>>>>>>>>>> Cosmin: what does it buy you in terms of explanations or >>>>>>>>>>>>> predictions? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Just blanket-asserting that all matter is conscious doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>> tell me anything about consciousness itself. For example, what >>>>>>>>>>>>> would it >>>>>>>>>>>>> mean for my fingernails to be conscious? Does my fingernail >>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness >>>>>>>>>>>>> factor in somehow to my own experience of consciousness? If so, >>>>>>>>>>>>> how? What >>>>>>>>>>>>> about all the other parts of my body, about individual cells? >>>>>>>>>>>>> Does the >>>>>>>>>>>>> bacteria living in my body contribute its consciousness somehow? >>>>>>>>>>>>> It quickly >>>>>>>>>>>>> runs aground on the same rocks that arguments about "soul" do - >>>>>>>>>>>>> there's no >>>>>>>>>>>>> principled way to talk about it that elucidates relationships >>>>>>>>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>>>> brains, bodies, and minds. Panpsychism does nothing to explain >>>>>>>>>>>>> the effect >>>>>>>>>>>>> of drugs on consciousness, or brain damage. Like Cosmin's ideas, >>>>>>>>>>>>> it's all >>>>>>>>>>>>> just post-hoc rationalization. Panpsychism is the philosophical >>>>>>>>>>>>> equivalent >>>>>>>>>>>>> of throwing your hands up and saying "I dunno, I guess it's all >>>>>>>>>>>>> conscious >>>>>>>>>>>>> somehow!" >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> What I'm suggesting posits that consciousness arises from the >>>>>>>>>>>>> cybernetic organization of a system, that what the system >>>>>>>>>>>>> experiences, as a >>>>>>>>>>>>> whole, is identified with the informational-dynamics captured by >>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>> organization. This yields explanations for the character of a >>>>>>>>>>>>> given >>>>>>>>>>>>> system's consciousness... something panpsychism cannot do. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Terren >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:57 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I see the coin made (as the ones lying on my desk right now >>>>>>>>>>>>>> made of metal) of matter. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The two sides of the coin (of matter) are *physical *and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *psychical*: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> If ὕ – the first Greek letter for “hyle”, upsilon (υ) with >>>>>>>>>>>>>> diacritics dasia and oxia (U+1F55) – is used for the symbol of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> matter, φ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (phi) for physical, + ψ (psi) for psychical, then >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ὕ = φ + ψ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (i.e., the combination of *physical* and *psychical* properties >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a more complete view of what matter is). The physical is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (quantitative) behavioral aspect of matter – the kind that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> formulated in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematical language in current physics, for example – whereas >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> psychical is the (qualitative) experiential aspect of matter, at >>>>>>>>>>>>>> various >>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels, from brains on down. There is no reason in principle for >>>>>>>>>>>>>> only φ to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the considered by science and for ψ to be ignored by science. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 2:10:05 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I see them as two sides of the same coin - as in, you don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get one without the other. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:00 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> material] computation" then does that mean there is realm for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (A) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness and one for (B) physical [or material] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computation? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is A like some spirit or ghost that invades the domain of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> B? Or does B invade A? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> - >>> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
