This is more than the 20th time I have said here there could be conscious beings made of *biochemical alternatives*:
Hypothetical types of biochemistry https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry cf: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organosilicon This obviously has nothing to do with *Searle's argument* or your *cybernetic delusion*. @philipthrift On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 11:10:33 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: > > Let's say we were visited by aliens and we were able to communicate with > them such that it seemed obvious they were conscious. > > Then, we discovered that their nervous systems, or whatever the analog of > such was, was constituted from silicon, but let's call it organic, wet, and > so on, just an alternative chemistry. > > What then? Are they zombies? > > What if after talking to them for a while and attributing consciousness to > them based on that, they revealed that they were actually robots > constructed by an alien race on their home planet. Zombies? > > On Sat, May 4, 2019, 11:49 AM Terren Suydam <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> It's not a delusion if you're starting from the same assumptions I am. >> Your assumptions involve a delusion from my perspective, which is that >> there's something special about biological material that makes it >> conscious, but not, potentially, computers. >> >> Sometimes you invoke panpsychism, but when you do that, you again make it >> possible for computers to be conscious. I'm not sure where you stand, but >> either way, you're either allowing consciousness in computers or you have >> to say what's so special about wetware. >> >> On Sat, May 4, 2019, 11:25 AM <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> But you have contributed to establishing a term: >>> >>> *cybernetic delusion* - the delusion that software or programming in a >>> conventional computer device (even one with many processors) will ever >>> achieve consciousness >>> >>> >>> That is useful. >>> >>> @philipthrift >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 9:58:09 AM UTC-5, [email protected] wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> It seems people will remain in the delusion that software or >>>> programming in a conventional computer device - even with many processors >>>> - >>>> will achieve consciousness. Searle's Chinese Room argument still does >>>> apply >>>> here, as anyone should clearly be able to see. >>>> >>>> One can wave the magic word "cybernetic" around all one wants, but it >>>> is clearly not useful. >>>> >>>> There are lots of delusions in the world: Ghosts, spirits, gods, and >>>> the "cybernetic" one above is among them. >>>> >>>> >>>> @pphilipthrift >>>> >>>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 9:42:40 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I'm beginning to suspect that you're a chatbot... a pretty good one - >>>>> the best I've seen, even. Your responses are syntactically correct and >>>>> seemingly relevant semantically, but whenever I or anyone else tries to >>>>> pin >>>>> you down and get you to articulate specifics, your response is inevitably >>>>> to quote some article or another. Getting closer to passing the Turing >>>>> Test >>>>> - give your creator my respect. >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 10:15 AM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I understand basically what your idea is, but "cybernetic dynamics" >>>>>> reminds me of Norbert Weiner's subject of cybernetics, something I read >>>>>> about decades ago: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybernetics:_Or_Control_and_Communication_in_the_Animal_and_the_Machine >>>>>> >>>>>> One should be able to replace every neural+glial cell with a >>>>>> synthetic one, but the technology has to advance: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> https://neo.life/2018/05/the-birth-of-wetware/ >>>>>> >>>>>> ... >>>>>> >>>>>> *Pink juice* >>>>>> >>>>>> Koniku’s chemical sensor is still in development, so what Agabi and >>>>>> Sadrian show me is likely to continue evolving for some time. On the >>>>>> outside, it sports a globular, gray-green shell with a vaguely alien >>>>>> look, >>>>>> about eight inches wide. Inside, metal architecture supports a silicon >>>>>> chip >>>>>> with spidery wires converging in the center, where networked neurons sit >>>>>> inside a clear bubble made of a biocompatible polymer. >>>>>> >>>>>> When a client tells Koniku what substance it wants to sense, the >>>>>> company identifies cellular receptors that would ordinarily bind to that >>>>>> substance. Then it creates neurons that have those receptors. To do >>>>>> that, >>>>>> it uses gene-editing technology to tweak the DNA of neuron precursors. >>>>>> Koniku obtains those from a supplier, which manipulates skin or blood >>>>>> cells >>>>>> from mice into blank-slate cells known as induced pluripotent stem cells. >>>>>> >>>>>> Once Koniku has nurtured these engineered precursors into living >>>>>> neurons, they could, in theory, smell odors like a drug-sniffing dog >>>>>> might. >>>>>> Or they could detect any number of substances that have corresponding >>>>>> receptors. Some receptors are more sensitive and narrowly tuned to >>>>>> attach >>>>>> to one substance. Others are, as Agabi puts it, more “promiscuous,” >>>>>> accepting an entire class of chemicals, like nitrates. The Koniku Kore >>>>>> contains neurons with both types of receptors. >>>>>> >>>>>> After they’ve created their mix of customized neurons, Agabi and his >>>>>> colleagues use the Death Star laser to build a polymer structure for the >>>>>> neurons to sit on. Then they place the cells on that structure and wait >>>>>> for >>>>>> them to begin to network together among a set of mushroom-shaped >>>>>> electrodes. Ultimately, a few “reporter” neurons will serve as the >>>>>> essential neuron-silicon connection. This means they are both connected >>>>>> to >>>>>> the neuron network and “plugged in” to the chip using the natural >>>>>> process >>>>>> of endocytosis, in which a cell gradually engulfs foreign matter. Agabi >>>>>> says Koniku has developed a special DNA coating for its electrodes. When >>>>>> a >>>>>> neuron tries to engulf the DNA, it creates a seal that will later let >>>>>> the >>>>>> electrode pick up electrical signals the neuron produces when its >>>>>> receptors >>>>>> bind to a given chemical or class of chemicals. >>>>>> >>>>>> Almost all of this technology was around before Koniku, though not >>>>>> exactly in this arrangement. Perhaps the newest element here is what >>>>>> Agabi >>>>>> calls “pink juice.” The usual life span of a neuron in a lab is counted >>>>>> in >>>>>> days or weeks, but Koniku’s neurons can survive for up to two months. >>>>>> That’s because they’re bathed in pink juice, which feeds them and keeps >>>>>> them alive. >>>>>> >>>>>> At first, Agabi won’t tell me the exact recipe beyond saying that >>>>>> they’re a mix of “vitamins, minerals, and sugars.” But I piece some of >>>>>> it >>>>>> together by talking to Thomas DeMarse, a neuroscientist at the >>>>>> University >>>>>> of North Carolina. >>>>>> >>>>>> *Biology is technology, Agabi says. Everything else is a simulation* >>>>>> >>>>>> DeMarse spent time in the spotlight in the early 2000s for his >>>>>> research teaching rat neurons in a dish to fly a virtual plane by >>>>>> connecting them to flight simulator software. He also did groundbreaking >>>>>> research on neuron survival. He points out that there are a number of >>>>>> similar “juices” already on the market, with names like BrainPhys and >>>>>> Neurobasal. Those pink juices get their color from a substance called >>>>>> phenol red, which indicates the liquid’s pH level. They also contain a >>>>>> carbonate buffer that helps maintain acidity and simulates conditions in >>>>>> the brain. Using similar materials, DeMarse was able to keep neurons >>>>>> alive >>>>>> on a desk for two years. They would have lived longer, he says, but >>>>>> during >>>>>> that time he moved from Caltech to Georgia Tech, and the plates started >>>>>> to >>>>>> leak en route. >>>>>> >>>>>> Later, when I ask Agabi if he’ll at least tell me whether his pink >>>>>> juice contains phenol red and a carbonate buffer, he confirms the first >>>>>> and >>>>>> denies the second. Academic groups may have needed the carbonate buffer >>>>>> to >>>>>> simulate the brain, but unlike those neuroscience labs, Koniku is >>>>>> unconcerned with mimicking the brain, Agabi says. “The power of the >>>>>> neuron >>>>>> comes from the computational density — as long as we maintain that, we >>>>>> can >>>>>> change everything else.” >>>>>> >>>>>> With the help of Koniku’s pink juice and a new automated pump system >>>>>> that will be incorporated into each sensor, Agabi expects to eventually >>>>>> reach DeMarse’s record for neuron longevity. Even then, his customers >>>>>> would >>>>>> have to swap out their Koniku equipment every two years, but no one has >>>>>> requested products with greater neuron longevity — and therefore, Agabi >>>>>> says, it has not been a development priority. With the technology at >>>>>> hand, >>>>>> he says, he could develop a Koniku Kore that would last five years, were >>>>>> a >>>>>> customer to require it. >>>>>> >>>>>> Improving on evolution >>>>>> “To me the devil is in the details here,” says DeMarse. What he means >>>>>> is: before Koniku, its kind of wetware lived in academic and government >>>>>> labs. In addition to DeMarse’s research, scientists at DARPA have worked >>>>>> for a long time on an artificial nose to detect cancer. William Ditto, >>>>>> now >>>>>> of the Nonlinear Artificial Intelligence Lab at North Carolina State >>>>>> University, used leech neurons in a dish to carry out basic >>>>>> computations. >>>>>> Although no one has done exactly what Koniku says it’s doing, there’s >>>>>> plenty to back up the argument that someone could do it. In fact, >>>>>> DeMarse >>>>>> says he was “tickled” to read about Koniku’s innovations. Gabriel A. >>>>>> Silva, >>>>>> director of the Center for Engineered Natural Intelligence at the >>>>>> University of California, San Diego, is also intrigued by Koniku’s >>>>>> potential. “I never underestimate groups like this because they’re >>>>>> trailblazers,” he says. >>>>>> >>>>>> Still, Agabi’s colleagues in the academic world maintain some >>>>>> skepticism about whether his technology can live up to his grand >>>>>> ambitions >>>>>> and radical vision for the future of machine intelligence. >>>>>> >>>>>> For one thing, neurons have evolutionary baggage that might be >>>>>> unnecessary for a computer. As an example, Rajesh Rao, director of the >>>>>> Center for Neural Engineering at the University of Washington, points to >>>>>> myelin, the fatty sheath that insulates nerve fibers and helps signals >>>>>> propagate in the brain. It’s not clear, Rao says, that the optimal >>>>>> computer >>>>>> would have to mimic that method of communication. Or consider dendrites, >>>>>> the branches that stretch out from the body of a neuron. Neuroscientists >>>>>> aren’t sure whether dendrites actually participate in information >>>>>> processing or are just wires that pass information from cell to cell. >>>>>> Does >>>>>> moving information in a computer really demand some version of dendrites? >>>>>> >>>>>> With issues like this in mind, all the scientists I spoke with for >>>>>> this article said that while looking to biology for inspiration will be >>>>>> essential for the development of AI, they were not entirely convinced by >>>>>> Agabi’s argument that it will require biology itself. Just as planes use >>>>>> the same principles of lift as birds do without feathers or hollow >>>>>> bones, >>>>>> “we can extract the computational principles of how the brain processes >>>>>> information” and use them in a manner “independent of actual >>>>>> implementation >>>>>> in biological tissue,” Rao says. >>>>>> >>>>>> For example, neuromorphic chips are silicon chips designed using >>>>>> biological principles, attempting to mimic some ways that the brain >>>>>> processes information while leaving some of its baggage behind. Ditto, >>>>>> the >>>>>> researcher who once made a computer out of leech neurons, is now working >>>>>> on >>>>>> a “chaotic chip,” which constantly changes from analog to digital >>>>>> processing — as often as a billion times a second — in order to solve >>>>>> problems more efficiently. He argues that AI will require the plasticity >>>>>> and adaptive capacity of biology, but that the biological element is >>>>>> optional. >>>>>> >>>>>> After all, coaxing neurons in a dish into computation isn’t so easy, >>>>>> either. Even making sure they grow successfully is difficult; Silva >>>>>> remembers struggling during graduate school with neurons that had >>>>>> suddenly >>>>>> stopped growing, seemingly for no reason. “It turned out that the >>>>>> manufacturer of the coverslips we used had changed the formulation of >>>>>> the >>>>>> glass,” he says. “That alone was enough to make the neurons unhappy.” >>>>>> Even >>>>>> when they do grow, a group of neurons, however well networked and >>>>>> organized, do not automatically make a brain. The distance from chemical >>>>>> sensing to cognition is awfully long, and the slippery nature of even >>>>>> the >>>>>> idea of cognition complicates this question. A basic system that uses >>>>>> reward or punishment to teach things to computers “is going to give you >>>>>> some behavior that will look intelligent,” Rao says. But isn’t there >>>>>> more >>>>>> to cognition than that, more ingredients and sensory inputs that help us >>>>>> react to, interact with, and make sense of the world? The wetware recipe >>>>>> for that is far from clear. >>>>>> >>>>>> ... >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 8:33:09 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I should add that the cybernetic description of a system is entirely >>>>>>> functional, but the emphasis is on the holistic perspective. >>>>>>> Functionalism >>>>>>> tends to be reductive, but the consciousness identified with a given >>>>>>> cybernetic description is the system as a whole. That's why replacing a >>>>>>> neuron with an artificial replacement does not change the consciousness. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:30 AM Terren Suydam <[email protected]> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What I'm suggesting draws on both functionalism and identity >>>>>>>> theory. It's functional in the sense that the constitutive aspect of >>>>>>>> cybernetics is entirely functional. There is nothing in a cybernetic >>>>>>>> description beyond the functional relationships between the parts of >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> system. It draws on identity theory in the sense that I'm claiming >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> consciousness *is* cybernetic dynamics. What I'm adding is the >>>>>>>> same move that panpsychism makes - that there is something it is like >>>>>>>> to be >>>>>>>> any cybernetic system, and this includes many more things than brains, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> crucially, does not depend on a specific substrate. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:13 AM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I must assume you have already studied (hopefully over many years) >>>>>>>>> in philosophy the difference between >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *functionalism*: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *identity theory*: >>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> A short way of expressing identity theory over functionalism is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *A simulation is not a synthesis.* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *Experiential materialism* is a variant of identity theory in >>>>>>>>> which >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> • psychical properties, as well as physical ones, are attributed >>>>>>>>> to matter, which is the only basic substance >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> so that >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> • the material composition of the brain has both physical and >>>>>>>>> psychical aspects. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 7:38:46 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Maybe you could tell me what specific criticism you have rather >>>>>>>>>> than quoting a wikipedia article. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 7:50 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't believe in the "*functional* equivalence" principle >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> as it does not capture the nature of what is needed for >>>>>>>>>>> consciousness (as many critics - some listed there - have pointed >>>>>>>>>>> out). >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> If I had to pick something vs. "cybernetic dynamics" it would be >>>>>>>>>>> "neurochemical dynamics". That seems closer to me. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 5:31:56 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Then you're missing the point of the alternative I've been >>>>>>>>>>>> offering. It's not about the *matter itself*, it's about the >>>>>>>>>>>> cybernetic dynamics implemented in the matter. So I would predict >>>>>>>>>>>> that you >>>>>>>>>>>> could replace your brain neuron by neuron with functional >>>>>>>>>>>> equivalents and >>>>>>>>>>>> your consciousness wouldn't change, so long as the cybernetics >>>>>>>>>>>> were >>>>>>>>>>>> unchanged. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019, 6:08 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Well we know *some* matter has a psychical aspect: *human >>>>>>>>>>>>> brains*. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Unless one is a consciousness denier. >>>>>>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/ >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 4:58:04 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Panpsychism of any flavor that identifies matter with a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> psychic aspect is subject to the problems I described earlier. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> It never occurred to me to google something like "theoretical >>>>>>>>>>>>>> psychology" >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.google.com/search?q=theoretical+psychology> but >>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's a lot there. How much of it is interesting, I don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>> know. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think as we flesh out the connectome, theoretical >>>>>>>>>>>>>> psychology will take on more legitimacy and importance. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 5:16 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is a whole spectrum of panpsychisms (plural) - from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> micropsychism to cosmophychism: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cf. https://www.iep.utm.edu/panpsych/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is not a "real science" yet is its basic problem of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> course. But consciousness science in general really isn't yet >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> either. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One would think there would be a group of theoretical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> psychologists - there is theoretical physics, chemistry, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> biology, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretical psychology is in a much weirder state - who would >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be involved. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 3:48:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My question for panpsychists is similar to my question for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cosmin: what does it buy you in terms of explanations or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predictions? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just blanket-asserting that all matter is conscious doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tell me anything about consciousness itself. For example, what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean for my fingernails to be conscious? Does my fingernail >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> factor in somehow to my own experience of consciousness? If >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so, how? What >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about all the other parts of my body, about individual cells? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bacteria living in my body contribute its consciousness >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> somehow? It quickly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> runs aground on the same rocks that arguments about "soul" do >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - there's no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> principled way to talk about it that elucidates relationships >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> brains, bodies, and minds. Panpsychism does nothing to explain >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the effect >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of drugs on consciousness, or brain damage. Like Cosmin's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ideas, it's all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just post-hoc rationalization. Panpsychism is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophical equivalent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of throwing your hands up and saying "I dunno, I guess it's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all conscious >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> somehow!" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I'm suggesting posits that consciousness arises from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the cybernetic organization of a system, that what the system >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experiences, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as a whole, is identified with the informational-dynamics >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> captured by that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> organization. This yields explanations for the character of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> given >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system's consciousness... something panpsychism cannot do. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Terren >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:57 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I see the coin made (as the ones lying on my desk right >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now made of metal) of matter. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The two sides of the coin (of matter) are *physical *and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *psychical*: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If ὕ – the first Greek letter for “hyle”, upsilon (υ) with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diacritics dasia and oxia (U+1F55) – is used for the symbol >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of matter, φ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (phi) for physical, + ψ (psi) for psychical, then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ὕ = φ + ψ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (i.e., the combination of *physical* and *psychical* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a more complete view of what matter is). The physical is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (quantitative) behavioral aspect of matter – the kind that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formulated in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematical language in current physics, for example – >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whereas the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> psychical is the (qualitative) experiential aspect of matter, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at various >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels, from brains on down. There is no reason in principle >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for only φ to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the considered by science and for ψ to be ignored by science. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 2:10:05 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I see them as two sides of the same coin - as in, you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't get one without the other. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:00 PM <[email protected]> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> material] computation" then does that mean there is realm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for (A) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness and one for (B) physical [or material] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computation? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is A like some spirit or ghost that invades the domain >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of B? Or does B invade A? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> - >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>> >>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
