I understand basically what your idea is, but "cybernetic dynamics" reminds 
me of Norbert Weiner's subject of cybernetics, something I read about 
decades ago:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybernetics:_Or_Control_and_Communication_in_the_Animal_and_the_Machine

One should be able to replace every neural+glial cell with a synthetic one, 
but the technology has to advance:


https://neo.life/2018/05/the-birth-of-wetware/

...

*Pink juice*

Koniku’s chemical sensor is still in development, so what Agabi and Sadrian 
show me is likely to continue evolving for some time. On the outside, it 
sports a globular, gray-green shell with a vaguely alien look, about eight 
inches wide. Inside, metal architecture supports a silicon chip with 
spidery wires converging in the center, where networked neurons sit inside 
a clear bubble made of a biocompatible polymer.

When a client tells Koniku what substance it wants to sense, the company 
identifies cellular receptors that would ordinarily bind to that substance. 
Then it creates neurons that have those receptors. To do that, it uses 
gene-editing technology to tweak the DNA of neuron precursors. Koniku 
obtains those from a supplier, which manipulates skin or blood cells from 
mice into blank-slate cells known as induced pluripotent stem cells.

Once Koniku has nurtured these engineered precursors into living neurons, 
they could, in theory, smell odors like a drug-sniffing dog might. Or they 
could detect any number of substances that have corresponding receptors. 
Some receptors are more sensitive and narrowly tuned to attach to one 
substance. Others are, as Agabi puts it, more “promiscuous,” accepting an 
entire class of chemicals, like nitrates. The Koniku Kore contains neurons 
with both types of receptors.

After they’ve created their mix of customized neurons, Agabi and his 
colleagues use the Death Star laser to build a polymer structure for the 
neurons to sit on. Then they place the cells on that structure and wait for 
them to begin to network together among a set of mushroom-shaped 
electrodes. Ultimately, a few “reporter” neurons will serve as the 
essential neuron-silicon connection. This means they are both connected to 
the neuron network and “plugged in” to the chip using the natural process 
of endocytosis, in which a cell gradually engulfs foreign matter. Agabi 
says Koniku has developed a special DNA coating for its electrodes. When a 
neuron tries to engulf the DNA, it creates a seal that will later let the 
electrode pick up electrical signals the neuron produces when its receptors 
bind to a given chemical or class of chemicals.

Almost all of this technology was around before Koniku, though not exactly 
in this arrangement. Perhaps the newest element here is what Agabi calls 
“pink juice.” The usual life span of a neuron in a lab is counted in days 
or weeks, but Koniku’s neurons can survive for up to two months. That’s 
because they’re bathed in pink juice, which feeds them and keeps them alive.

At first, Agabi won’t tell me the exact recipe beyond saying that they’re a 
mix of “vitamins, minerals, and sugars.” But I piece some of it together by 
talking to Thomas DeMarse, a neuroscientist at the University of North 
Carolina.

*Biology is technology, Agabi says. Everything else is a simulation*

DeMarse spent time in the spotlight in the early 2000s for his research 
teaching rat neurons in a dish to fly a virtual plane by connecting them to 
flight simulator software. He also did groundbreaking research on neuron 
survival. He points out that there are a number of similar “juices” already 
on the market, with names like BrainPhys and Neurobasal. Those pink juices 
get their color from a substance called phenol red, which indicates the 
liquid’s pH level. They also contain a carbonate buffer that helps maintain 
acidity and simulates conditions in the brain. Using similar materials, 
DeMarse was able to keep neurons alive on a desk for two years. They would 
have lived longer, he says, but during that time he moved from Caltech to 
Georgia Tech, and the plates started to leak en route.

Later, when I ask Agabi if he’ll at least tell me whether his pink juice 
contains phenol red and a carbonate buffer, he confirms the first and 
denies the second. Academic groups may have needed the carbonate buffer to 
simulate the brain, but unlike those neuroscience labs, Koniku is 
unconcerned with mimicking the brain, Agabi says. “The power of the neuron 
comes from the computational density — as long as we maintain that, we can 
change everything else.”

With the help of Koniku’s pink juice and a new automated pump system that 
will be incorporated into each sensor, Agabi expects to eventually reach 
DeMarse’s record for neuron longevity. Even then, his customers would have 
to swap out their Koniku equipment every two years, but no one has 
requested products with greater neuron longevity — and therefore, Agabi 
says, it has not been a development priority. With the technology at hand, 
he says, he could develop a Koniku Kore that would last five years, were a 
customer to require it.

Improving on evolution
“To me the devil is in the details here,” says DeMarse. What he means is: 
before Koniku, its kind of wetware lived in academic and government labs. 
In addition to DeMarse’s research, scientists at DARPA have worked for a 
long time on an artificial nose to detect cancer. William Ditto, now of the 
Nonlinear Artificial Intelligence Lab at North Carolina State University, 
used leech neurons in a dish to carry out basic computations. Although no 
one has done exactly what Koniku says it’s doing, there’s plenty to back up 
the argument that someone could do it. In fact, DeMarse says he was 
“tickled” to read about Koniku’s innovations. Gabriel A. Silva, director of 
the Center for Engineered Natural Intelligence at the University of 
California, San Diego, is also intrigued by Koniku’s potential. “I never 
underestimate groups like this because they’re trailblazers,” he says.

Still, Agabi’s colleagues in the academic world maintain some skepticism 
about whether his technology can live up to his grand ambitions and radical 
vision for the future of machine intelligence.

For one thing, neurons have evolutionary baggage that might be unnecessary 
for a computer. As an example, Rajesh Rao, director of the Center for 
Neural Engineering at the University of Washington, points to myelin, the 
fatty sheath that insulates nerve fibers and helps signals propagate in the 
brain. It’s not clear, Rao says, that the optimal computer would have to 
mimic that method of communication. Or consider dendrites, the branches 
that stretch out from the body of a neuron. Neuroscientists aren’t sure 
whether dendrites actually participate in information processing or are 
just wires that pass information from cell to cell. Does moving information 
in a computer really demand some version of dendrites?

With issues like this in mind, all the scientists I spoke with for this 
article said that while looking to biology for inspiration will be 
essential for the development of AI, they were not entirely convinced by 
Agabi’s argument that it will require biology itself. Just as planes use 
the same principles of lift as birds do without feathers or hollow bones, 
“we can extract the computational principles of how the brain processes 
information” and use them in a manner “independent of actual implementation 
in biological tissue,” Rao says.

For example, neuromorphic chips are silicon chips designed using biological 
principles, attempting to mimic some ways that the brain processes 
information while leaving some of its baggage behind. Ditto, the researcher 
who once made a computer out of leech neurons, is now working on a “chaotic 
chip,” which constantly changes from analog to digital processing — as 
often as a billion times a second — in order to solve problems more 
efficiently. He argues that AI will require the plasticity and adaptive 
capacity of biology, but that the biological element is optional.

After all, coaxing neurons in a dish into computation isn’t so easy, 
either. Even making sure they grow successfully is difficult; Silva 
remembers struggling during graduate school with neurons that had suddenly 
stopped growing, seemingly for no reason. “It turned out that the 
manufacturer of the coverslips we used had changed the formulation of the 
glass,” he says. “That alone was enough to make the neurons unhappy.” Even 
when they do grow, a group of neurons, however well networked and 
organized, do not automatically make a brain. The distance from chemical 
sensing to cognition is awfully long, and the slippery nature of even the 
idea of cognition complicates this question. A basic system that uses 
reward or punishment to teach things to computers “is going to give you 
some behavior that will look intelligent,” Rao says. But isn’t there more 
to cognition than that, more ingredients and sensory inputs that help us 
react to, interact with, and make sense of the world? The wetware recipe 
for that is far from clear.

...


@philipthrift




On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 8:33:09 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
> I should add that the cybernetic description of a system is entirely 
> functional, but the emphasis is on the holistic perspective. Functionalism 
> tends to be reductive, but the consciousness identified with a given 
> cybernetic description is the system as a whole. That's why replacing a 
> neuron with an artificial replacement does not change the consciousness.
>
> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:30 AM Terren Suydam <[email protected] 
> <javascript:>> wrote:
>
>> What I'm suggesting draws on both functionalism and identity theory. It's 
>> functional in the sense that the constitutive aspect of cybernetics is 
>> entirely functional. There is nothing in a cybernetic description beyond 
>> the functional relationships between the parts of that system. It draws on 
>> identity theory in the sense that I'm claiming that consciousness *is* 
>> cybernetic 
>> dynamics. What I'm adding is the same move that panpsychism makes - that 
>> there is something it is like to be any cybernetic system, and this 
>> includes many more things than brains, and crucially, does not depend on a 
>> specific substrate.
>>
>> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:13 AM <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I must assume you have already studied (hopefully over many years) in 
>>> philosophy the difference between 
>>>
>>> *functionalism*: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/
>>>
>>>     and
>>>
>>> *identity theory*: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/
>>>
>>> A short way of expressing identity theory over functionalism is
>>>
>>>     *A simulation is not a synthesis.*
>>>
>>>
>>> *Experiential materialism* is a variant of identity theory in which 
>>>
>>> • psychical properties, as well as physical ones, are attributed to 
>>> matter, which is the only basic substance
>>>
>>>      so that
>>>
>>> • the material composition of the brain has both physical and psychical 
>>> aspects.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 7:38:46 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Maybe you could tell me what specific criticism you have rather than 
>>>> quoting a wikipedia article. 
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 7:50 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't believe in the "*functional* equivalence" principle
>>>>>
>>>>>    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)
>>>>>
>>>>> as it does not capture the nature of what is needed for consciousness 
>>>>> (as many critics - some listed there - have pointed out).
>>>>>
>>>>> If I had to pick something vs. "cybernetic dynamics" it would be 
>>>>> "neurochemical dynamics". That seems closer to me.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>
>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 5:31:56 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then you're missing the point of the alternative I've been offering. 
>>>>>> It's not about the *matter itself*, it's about the cybernetic 
>>>>>> dynamics implemented in the matter. So I would predict that you could 
>>>>>> replace your brain neuron by neuron with functional equivalents and your 
>>>>>> consciousness wouldn't change, so long as the cybernetics were unchanged.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019, 6:08 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Well we know *some* matter has a psychical aspect: *human brains*.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Unless one is a consciousness denier.
>>>>>>> - 
>>>>>>> https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 4:58:04 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Panpsychism of any flavor that identifies matter with a psychic 
>>>>>>>> aspect is subject to the problems I described earlier. 
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It never occurred to me to google something like "theoretical 
>>>>>>>> psychology" 
>>>>>>>> <https://www.google.com/search?q=theoretical+psychology> but 
>>>>>>>> there's a lot there. How much of it is interesting, I don't know. 
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think as we flesh out the connectome, theoretical psychology will 
>>>>>>>> take on more legitimacy and importance.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 5:16 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There is a whole spectrum of panpsychisms (plural) - from 
>>>>>>>>> micropsychism to cosmophychism:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/
>>>>>>>>> cf. https://www.iep.utm.edu/panpsych/
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That is not a "real science" yet is its basic problem of course. 
>>>>>>>>> But consciousness science in general really isn't yet either.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> One would think there would be a group of theoretical 
>>>>>>>>> psychologists - there is theoretical physics, chemistry, and biology, 
>>>>>>>>> but 
>>>>>>>>> theoretical psychology is in a much weirder state - who would be 
>>>>>>>>> involved.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 3:48:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> My question for panpsychists is similar to my question for 
>>>>>>>>>> Cosmin: what does it buy you in terms of explanations or predictions?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Just blanket-asserting that all matter is conscious doesn't tell 
>>>>>>>>>> me anything about consciousness itself. For example, what would it 
>>>>>>>>>> mean for 
>>>>>>>>>> my fingernails to be conscious?  Does my fingernail consciousness 
>>>>>>>>>> factor in 
>>>>>>>>>> somehow to my own experience of consciousness?  If so, how? What 
>>>>>>>>>> about all 
>>>>>>>>>> the other parts of my body, about individual cells?  Does the 
>>>>>>>>>> bacteria 
>>>>>>>>>> living in my body contribute its consciousness somehow? It quickly 
>>>>>>>>>> runs 
>>>>>>>>>> aground on the same rocks that arguments about "soul" do - there's 
>>>>>>>>>> no 
>>>>>>>>>> principled way to talk about it that elucidates relationships 
>>>>>>>>>> between 
>>>>>>>>>> brains, bodies, and minds. Panpsychism does nothing to explain the 
>>>>>>>>>> effect 
>>>>>>>>>> of drugs on consciousness, or brain damage. Like Cosmin's ideas, 
>>>>>>>>>> it's all 
>>>>>>>>>> just post-hoc rationalization. Panpsychism is the philosophical 
>>>>>>>>>> equivalent 
>>>>>>>>>> of throwing your hands up and saying "I dunno, I guess it's all 
>>>>>>>>>> conscious 
>>>>>>>>>> somehow!"
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> What I'm suggesting posits that consciousness arises from the 
>>>>>>>>>> cybernetic organization of a system, that what the system 
>>>>>>>>>> experiences, as a 
>>>>>>>>>> whole, is identified with the informational-dynamics captured by 
>>>>>>>>>> that 
>>>>>>>>>> organization. This yields explanations for the character of a given 
>>>>>>>>>> system's consciousness... something panpsychism cannot do.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Terren
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:57 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I see the coin made (as the ones lying on my desk right now made 
>>>>>>>>>>> of metal) of matter.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The two sides of the coin (of matter) are *physical *and 
>>>>>>>>>>> *psychical*:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If ὕ – the first Greek letter for “hyle”, upsilon (υ) with 
>>>>>>>>>>> diacritics dasia and oxia (U+1F55) – is used for the symbol of 
>>>>>>>>>>> matter, φ 
>>>>>>>>>>> (phi) for physical, + ψ (psi) for psychical, then
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>            ὕ = φ + ψ
>>>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> (i.e., the combination of *physical* and *psychical* properties 
>>>>>>>>>>> is a more complete view of what matter is). The physical is the 
>>>>>>>>>>> (quantitative) behavioral aspect of matter – the kind that is 
>>>>>>>>>>> formulated in 
>>>>>>>>>>> mathematical language in current physics, for example – whereas the 
>>>>>>>>>>> psychical is the (qualitative) experiential aspect of matter, at 
>>>>>>>>>>> various 
>>>>>>>>>>> levels, from brains on down. There is no reason in principle for 
>>>>>>>>>>> only φ to 
>>>>>>>>>>> the considered by science and for ψ to be ignored by science.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 2:10:05 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I see them as two sides of the same coin - as in, you don't get 
>>>>>>>>>>>> one without the other.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:00 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or material] 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> computation" then does that mean there is realm for (A) 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness and 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> one for (B) physical [or material] computation?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is A like some spirit or ghost that invades the domain of B? 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Or does B invade A?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>
>>>>> -- 
>>>
>>>

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