I'm beginning to suspect that you're a chatbot... a pretty good one - the best I've seen, even. Your responses are syntactically correct and seemingly relevant semantically, but whenever I or anyone else tries to pin you down and get you to articulate specifics, your response is inevitably to quote some article or another. Getting closer to passing the Turing Test - give your creator my respect.
On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 10:15 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > > I understand basically what your idea is, but "cybernetic dynamics" > reminds me of Norbert Weiner's subject of cybernetics, something I read > about decades ago: > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybernetics:_Or_Control_and_Communication_in_the_Animal_and_the_Machine > > One should be able to replace every neural+glial cell with a synthetic > one, but the technology has to advance: > > > https://neo.life/2018/05/the-birth-of-wetware/ > > ... > > *Pink juice* > > Koniku’s chemical sensor is still in development, so what Agabi and > Sadrian show me is likely to continue evolving for some time. On the > outside, it sports a globular, gray-green shell with a vaguely alien look, > about eight inches wide. Inside, metal architecture supports a silicon chip > with spidery wires converging in the center, where networked neurons sit > inside a clear bubble made of a biocompatible polymer. > > When a client tells Koniku what substance it wants to sense, the company > identifies cellular receptors that would ordinarily bind to that substance. > Then it creates neurons that have those receptors. To do that, it uses > gene-editing technology to tweak the DNA of neuron precursors. Koniku > obtains those from a supplier, which manipulates skin or blood cells from > mice into blank-slate cells known as induced pluripotent stem cells. > > Once Koniku has nurtured these engineered precursors into living neurons, > they could, in theory, smell odors like a drug-sniffing dog might. Or they > could detect any number of substances that have corresponding receptors. > Some receptors are more sensitive and narrowly tuned to attach to one > substance. Others are, as Agabi puts it, more “promiscuous,” accepting an > entire class of chemicals, like nitrates. The Koniku Kore contains neurons > with both types of receptors. > > After they’ve created their mix of customized neurons, Agabi and his > colleagues use the Death Star laser to build a polymer structure for the > neurons to sit on. Then they place the cells on that structure and wait for > them to begin to network together among a set of mushroom-shaped > electrodes. Ultimately, a few “reporter” neurons will serve as the > essential neuron-silicon connection. This means they are both connected to > the neuron network and “plugged in” to the chip using the natural process > of endocytosis, in which a cell gradually engulfs foreign matter. Agabi > says Koniku has developed a special DNA coating for its electrodes. When a > neuron tries to engulf the DNA, it creates a seal that will later let the > electrode pick up electrical signals the neuron produces when its receptors > bind to a given chemical or class of chemicals. > > Almost all of this technology was around before Koniku, though not exactly > in this arrangement. Perhaps the newest element here is what Agabi calls > “pink juice.” The usual life span of a neuron in a lab is counted in days > or weeks, but Koniku’s neurons can survive for up to two months. That’s > because they’re bathed in pink juice, which feeds them and keeps them alive. > > At first, Agabi won’t tell me the exact recipe beyond saying that they’re > a mix of “vitamins, minerals, and sugars.” But I piece some of it together > by talking to Thomas DeMarse, a neuroscientist at the University of North > Carolina. > > *Biology is technology, Agabi says. Everything else is a simulation* > > DeMarse spent time in the spotlight in the early 2000s for his research > teaching rat neurons in a dish to fly a virtual plane by connecting them to > flight simulator software. He also did groundbreaking research on neuron > survival. He points out that there are a number of similar “juices” already > on the market, with names like BrainPhys and Neurobasal. Those pink juices > get their color from a substance called phenol red, which indicates the > liquid’s pH level. They also contain a carbonate buffer that helps maintain > acidity and simulates conditions in the brain. Using similar materials, > DeMarse was able to keep neurons alive on a desk for two years. They would > have lived longer, he says, but during that time he moved from Caltech to > Georgia Tech, and the plates started to leak en route. > > Later, when I ask Agabi if he’ll at least tell me whether his pink juice > contains phenol red and a carbonate buffer, he confirms the first and > denies the second. Academic groups may have needed the carbonate buffer to > simulate the brain, but unlike those neuroscience labs, Koniku is > unconcerned with mimicking the brain, Agabi says. “The power of the neuron > comes from the computational density — as long as we maintain that, we can > change everything else.” > > With the help of Koniku’s pink juice and a new automated pump system that > will be incorporated into each sensor, Agabi expects to eventually reach > DeMarse’s record for neuron longevity. Even then, his customers would have > to swap out their Koniku equipment every two years, but no one has > requested products with greater neuron longevity — and therefore, Agabi > says, it has not been a development priority. With the technology at hand, > he says, he could develop a Koniku Kore that would last five years, were a > customer to require it. > > Improving on evolution > “To me the devil is in the details here,” says DeMarse. What he means is: > before Koniku, its kind of wetware lived in academic and government labs. > In addition to DeMarse’s research, scientists at DARPA have worked for a > long time on an artificial nose to detect cancer. William Ditto, now of the > Nonlinear Artificial Intelligence Lab at North Carolina State University, > used leech neurons in a dish to carry out basic computations. Although no > one has done exactly what Koniku says it’s doing, there’s plenty to back up > the argument that someone could do it. In fact, DeMarse says he was > “tickled” to read about Koniku’s innovations. Gabriel A. Silva, director of > the Center for Engineered Natural Intelligence at the University of > California, San Diego, is also intrigued by Koniku’s potential. “I never > underestimate groups like this because they’re trailblazers,” he says. > > Still, Agabi’s colleagues in the academic world maintain some skepticism > about whether his technology can live up to his grand ambitions and radical > vision for the future of machine intelligence. > > For one thing, neurons have evolutionary baggage that might be unnecessary > for a computer. As an example, Rajesh Rao, director of the Center for > Neural Engineering at the University of Washington, points to myelin, the > fatty sheath that insulates nerve fibers and helps signals propagate in the > brain. It’s not clear, Rao says, that the optimal computer would have to > mimic that method of communication. Or consider dendrites, the branches > that stretch out from the body of a neuron. Neuroscientists aren’t sure > whether dendrites actually participate in information processing or are > just wires that pass information from cell to cell. Does moving information > in a computer really demand some version of dendrites? > > With issues like this in mind, all the scientists I spoke with for this > article said that while looking to biology for inspiration will be > essential for the development of AI, they were not entirely convinced by > Agabi’s argument that it will require biology itself. Just as planes use > the same principles of lift as birds do without feathers or hollow bones, > “we can extract the computational principles of how the brain processes > information” and use them in a manner “independent of actual implementation > in biological tissue,” Rao says. > > For example, neuromorphic chips are silicon chips designed using > biological principles, attempting to mimic some ways that the brain > processes information while leaving some of its baggage behind. Ditto, the > researcher who once made a computer out of leech neurons, is now working on > a “chaotic chip,” which constantly changes from analog to digital > processing — as often as a billion times a second — in order to solve > problems more efficiently. He argues that AI will require the plasticity > and adaptive capacity of biology, but that the biological element is > optional. > > After all, coaxing neurons in a dish into computation isn’t so easy, > either. Even making sure they grow successfully is difficult; Silva > remembers struggling during graduate school with neurons that had suddenly > stopped growing, seemingly for no reason. “It turned out that the > manufacturer of the coverslips we used had changed the formulation of the > glass,” he says. “That alone was enough to make the neurons unhappy.” Even > when they do grow, a group of neurons, however well networked and > organized, do not automatically make a brain. The distance from chemical > sensing to cognition is awfully long, and the slippery nature of even the > idea of cognition complicates this question. A basic system that uses > reward or punishment to teach things to computers “is going to give you > some behavior that will look intelligent,” Rao says. But isn’t there more > to cognition than that, more ingredients and sensory inputs that help us > react to, interact with, and make sense of the world? The wetware recipe > for that is far from clear. > > ... > > > @philipthrift > > > > > On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 8:33:09 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >> >> I should add that the cybernetic description of a system is entirely >> functional, but the emphasis is on the holistic perspective. Functionalism >> tends to be reductive, but the consciousness identified with a given >> cybernetic description is the system as a whole. That's why replacing a >> neuron with an artificial replacement does not change the consciousness. >> >> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:30 AM Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> What I'm suggesting draws on both functionalism and identity theory. >>> It's functional in the sense that the constitutive aspect of cybernetics is >>> entirely functional. There is nothing in a cybernetic description beyond >>> the functional relationships between the parts of that system. It draws on >>> identity theory in the sense that I'm claiming that consciousness *is* >>> cybernetic >>> dynamics. What I'm adding is the same move that panpsychism makes - that >>> there is something it is like to be any cybernetic system, and this >>> includes many more things than brains, and crucially, does not depend on a >>> specific substrate. >>> >>> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:13 AM <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I must assume you have already studied (hopefully over many years) in >>>> philosophy the difference between >>>> >>>> *functionalism*: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ >>>> >>>> and >>>> >>>> *identity theory*: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/ >>>> >>>> A short way of expressing identity theory over functionalism is >>>> >>>> *A simulation is not a synthesis.* >>>> >>>> >>>> *Experiential materialism* is a variant of identity theory in which >>>> >>>> • psychical properties, as well as physical ones, are attributed to >>>> matter, which is the only basic substance >>>> >>>> so that >>>> >>>> • the material composition of the brain has both physical and psychical >>>> aspects. >>>> >>>> @philipthrift >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 7:38:46 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Maybe you could tell me what specific criticism you have rather than >>>>> quoting a wikipedia article. >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 7:50 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't believe in the "*functional* equivalence" principle >>>>>> >>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind) >>>>>> >>>>>> as it does not capture the nature of what is needed for consciousness >>>>>> (as many critics - some listed there - have pointed out). >>>>>> >>>>>> If I had to pick something vs. "cybernetic dynamics" it would be >>>>>> "neurochemical dynamics". That seems closer to me. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>> >>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 5:31:56 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Then you're missing the point of the alternative I've been offering. >>>>>>> It's not about the *matter itself*, it's about the cybernetic >>>>>>> dynamics implemented in the matter. So I would predict that you could >>>>>>> replace your brain neuron by neuron with functional equivalents and your >>>>>>> consciousness wouldn't change, so long as the cybernetics were >>>>>>> unchanged. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019, 6:08 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well we know *some* matter has a psychical aspect: *human brains*. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Unless one is a consciousness denier. >>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 4:58:04 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Panpsychism of any flavor that identifies matter with a psychic >>>>>>>>> aspect is subject to the problems I described earlier. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It never occurred to me to google something like "theoretical >>>>>>>>> psychology" >>>>>>>>> <https://www.google.com/search?q=theoretical+psychology> but >>>>>>>>> there's a lot there. How much of it is interesting, I don't know. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think as we flesh out the connectome, theoretical psychology >>>>>>>>> will take on more legitimacy and importance. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 5:16 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> There is a whole spectrum of panpsychisms (plural) - from >>>>>>>>>> micropsychism to cosmophychism: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ >>>>>>>>>> cf. https://www.iep.utm.edu/panpsych/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> That is not a "real science" yet is its basic problem of course. >>>>>>>>>> But consciousness science in general really isn't yet either. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> One would think there would be a group of theoretical >>>>>>>>>> psychologists - there is theoretical physics, chemistry, and >>>>>>>>>> biology, but >>>>>>>>>> theoretical psychology is in a much weirder state - who would be >>>>>>>>>> involved. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 3:48:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> My question for panpsychists is similar to my question for >>>>>>>>>>> Cosmin: what does it buy you in terms of explanations or >>>>>>>>>>> predictions? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Just blanket-asserting that all matter is conscious doesn't tell >>>>>>>>>>> me anything about consciousness itself. For example, what would it >>>>>>>>>>> mean for >>>>>>>>>>> my fingernails to be conscious? Does my fingernail consciousness >>>>>>>>>>> factor in >>>>>>>>>>> somehow to my own experience of consciousness? If so, how? What >>>>>>>>>>> about all >>>>>>>>>>> the other parts of my body, about individual cells? Does the >>>>>>>>>>> bacteria >>>>>>>>>>> living in my body contribute its consciousness somehow? It quickly >>>>>>>>>>> runs >>>>>>>>>>> aground on the same rocks that arguments about "soul" do - there's >>>>>>>>>>> no >>>>>>>>>>> principled way to talk about it that elucidates relationships >>>>>>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>> brains, bodies, and minds. Panpsychism does nothing to explain the >>>>>>>>>>> effect >>>>>>>>>>> of drugs on consciousness, or brain damage. Like Cosmin's ideas, >>>>>>>>>>> it's all >>>>>>>>>>> just post-hoc rationalization. Panpsychism is the philosophical >>>>>>>>>>> equivalent >>>>>>>>>>> of throwing your hands up and saying "I dunno, I guess it's all >>>>>>>>>>> conscious >>>>>>>>>>> somehow!" >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> What I'm suggesting posits that consciousness arises from the >>>>>>>>>>> cybernetic organization of a system, that what the system >>>>>>>>>>> experiences, as a >>>>>>>>>>> whole, is identified with the informational-dynamics captured by >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> organization. This yields explanations for the character of a given >>>>>>>>>>> system's consciousness... something panpsychism cannot do. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Terren >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:57 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I see the coin made (as the ones lying on my desk right now >>>>>>>>>>>> made of metal) of matter. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The two sides of the coin (of matter) are *physical *and >>>>>>>>>>>> *psychical*: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> If ὕ – the first Greek letter for “hyle”, upsilon (υ) with >>>>>>>>>>>> diacritics dasia and oxia (U+1F55) – is used for the symbol of >>>>>>>>>>>> matter, φ >>>>>>>>>>>> (phi) for physical, + ψ (psi) for psychical, then >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ὕ = φ + ψ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (i.e., the combination of *physical* and *psychical* properties >>>>>>>>>>>> is a more complete view of what matter is). The physical is the >>>>>>>>>>>> (quantitative) behavioral aspect of matter – the kind that is >>>>>>>>>>>> formulated in >>>>>>>>>>>> mathematical language in current physics, for example – whereas the >>>>>>>>>>>> psychical is the (qualitative) experiential aspect of matter, at >>>>>>>>>>>> various >>>>>>>>>>>> levels, from brains on down. There is no reason in principle for >>>>>>>>>>>> only φ to >>>>>>>>>>>> the considered by science and for ψ to be ignored by science. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 2:10:05 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I see them as two sides of the same coin - as in, you don't >>>>>>>>>>>>> get one without the other. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:00 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or material] >>>>>>>>>>>>>> computation" then does that mean there is realm for (A) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> one for (B) physical [or material] computation? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is A like some spirit or ghost that invades the domain of B? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Or does B invade A? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>> >>>> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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