Let's say we were visited by aliens and we were able to communicate with them such that it seemed obvious they were conscious.
Then, we discovered that their nervous systems, or whatever the analog of such was, was constituted from silicon, but let's call it organic, wet, and so on, just an alternative chemistry. What then? Are they zombies? What if after talking to them for a while and attributing consciousness to them based on that, they revealed that they were actually robots constructed by an alien race on their home planet. Zombies? On Sat, May 4, 2019, 11:49 AM Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote: > It's not a delusion if you're starting from the same assumptions I am. > Your assumptions involve a delusion from my perspective, which is that > there's something special about biological material that makes it > conscious, but not, potentially, computers. > > Sometimes you invoke panpsychism, but when you do that, you again make it > possible for computers to be conscious. I'm not sure where you stand, but > either way, you're either allowing consciousness in computers or you have > to say what's so special about wetware. > > On Sat, May 4, 2019, 11:25 AM <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> >> But you have contributed to establishing a term: >> >> *cybernetic delusion* - the delusion that software or programming in a >> conventional computer device (even one with many processors) will ever >> achieve consciousness >> >> >> That is useful. >> >> @philipthrift >> >> >> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 9:58:09 AM UTC-5, cloud...@gmail.com wrote: >>> >>> >>> It seems people will remain in the delusion that software or programming >>> in a conventional computer device - even with many processors - will >>> achieve consciousness. Searle's Chinese Room argument still does apply >>> here, as anyone should clearly be able to see. >>> >>> One can wave the magic word "cybernetic" around all one wants, but it is >>> clearly not useful. >>> >>> There are lots of delusions in the world: Ghosts, spirits, gods, and the >>> "cybernetic" one above is among them. >>> >>> >>> @pphilipthrift >>> >>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 9:42:40 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>> >>>> I'm beginning to suspect that you're a chatbot... a pretty good one - >>>> the best I've seen, even. Your responses are syntactically correct and >>>> seemingly relevant semantically, but whenever I or anyone else tries to pin >>>> you down and get you to articulate specifics, your response is inevitably >>>> to quote some article or another. Getting closer to passing the Turing Test >>>> - give your creator my respect. >>>> >>>> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 10:15 AM <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> I understand basically what your idea is, but "cybernetic dynamics" >>>>> reminds me of Norbert Weiner's subject of cybernetics, something I read >>>>> about decades ago: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybernetics:_Or_Control_and_Communication_in_the_Animal_and_the_Machine >>>>> >>>>> One should be able to replace every neural+glial cell with a synthetic >>>>> one, but the technology has to advance: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> https://neo.life/2018/05/the-birth-of-wetware/ >>>>> >>>>> ... >>>>> >>>>> *Pink juice* >>>>> >>>>> Koniku’s chemical sensor is still in development, so what Agabi and >>>>> Sadrian show me is likely to continue evolving for some time. On the >>>>> outside, it sports a globular, gray-green shell with a vaguely alien look, >>>>> about eight inches wide. Inside, metal architecture supports a silicon >>>>> chip >>>>> with spidery wires converging in the center, where networked neurons sit >>>>> inside a clear bubble made of a biocompatible polymer. >>>>> >>>>> When a client tells Koniku what substance it wants to sense, the >>>>> company identifies cellular receptors that would ordinarily bind to that >>>>> substance. Then it creates neurons that have those receptors. To do that, >>>>> it uses gene-editing technology to tweak the DNA of neuron precursors. >>>>> Koniku obtains those from a supplier, which manipulates skin or blood >>>>> cells >>>>> from mice into blank-slate cells known as induced pluripotent stem cells. >>>>> >>>>> Once Koniku has nurtured these engineered precursors into living >>>>> neurons, they could, in theory, smell odors like a drug-sniffing dog >>>>> might. >>>>> Or they could detect any number of substances that have corresponding >>>>> receptors. Some receptors are more sensitive and narrowly tuned to attach >>>>> to one substance. Others are, as Agabi puts it, more “promiscuous,” >>>>> accepting an entire class of chemicals, like nitrates. The Koniku Kore >>>>> contains neurons with both types of receptors. >>>>> >>>>> After they’ve created their mix of customized neurons, Agabi and his >>>>> colleagues use the Death Star laser to build a polymer structure for the >>>>> neurons to sit on. Then they place the cells on that structure and wait >>>>> for >>>>> them to begin to network together among a set of mushroom-shaped >>>>> electrodes. Ultimately, a few “reporter” neurons will serve as the >>>>> essential neuron-silicon connection. This means they are both connected to >>>>> the neuron network and “plugged in” to the chip using the natural process >>>>> of endocytosis, in which a cell gradually engulfs foreign matter. Agabi >>>>> says Koniku has developed a special DNA coating for its electrodes. When a >>>>> neuron tries to engulf the DNA, it creates a seal that will later let the >>>>> electrode pick up electrical signals the neuron produces when its >>>>> receptors >>>>> bind to a given chemical or class of chemicals. >>>>> >>>>> Almost all of this technology was around before Koniku, though not >>>>> exactly in this arrangement. Perhaps the newest element here is what Agabi >>>>> calls “pink juice.” The usual life span of a neuron in a lab is counted in >>>>> days or weeks, but Koniku’s neurons can survive for up to two months. >>>>> That’s because they’re bathed in pink juice, which feeds them and keeps >>>>> them alive. >>>>> >>>>> At first, Agabi won’t tell me the exact recipe beyond saying that >>>>> they’re a mix of “vitamins, minerals, and sugars.” But I piece some of it >>>>> together by talking to Thomas DeMarse, a neuroscientist at the University >>>>> of North Carolina. >>>>> >>>>> *Biology is technology, Agabi says. Everything else is a simulation* >>>>> >>>>> DeMarse spent time in the spotlight in the early 2000s for his >>>>> research teaching rat neurons in a dish to fly a virtual plane by >>>>> connecting them to flight simulator software. He also did groundbreaking >>>>> research on neuron survival. He points out that there are a number of >>>>> similar “juices” already on the market, with names like BrainPhys and >>>>> Neurobasal. Those pink juices get their color from a substance called >>>>> phenol red, which indicates the liquid’s pH level. They also contain a >>>>> carbonate buffer that helps maintain acidity and simulates conditions in >>>>> the brain. Using similar materials, DeMarse was able to keep neurons alive >>>>> on a desk for two years. They would have lived longer, he says, but during >>>>> that time he moved from Caltech to Georgia Tech, and the plates started to >>>>> leak en route. >>>>> >>>>> Later, when I ask Agabi if he’ll at least tell me whether his pink >>>>> juice contains phenol red and a carbonate buffer, he confirms the first >>>>> and >>>>> denies the second. Academic groups may have needed the carbonate buffer to >>>>> simulate the brain, but unlike those neuroscience labs, Koniku is >>>>> unconcerned with mimicking the brain, Agabi says. “The power of the neuron >>>>> comes from the computational density — as long as we maintain that, we can >>>>> change everything else.” >>>>> >>>>> With the help of Koniku’s pink juice and a new automated pump system >>>>> that will be incorporated into each sensor, Agabi expects to eventually >>>>> reach DeMarse’s record for neuron longevity. Even then, his customers >>>>> would >>>>> have to swap out their Koniku equipment every two years, but no one has >>>>> requested products with greater neuron longevity — and therefore, Agabi >>>>> says, it has not been a development priority. With the technology at hand, >>>>> he says, he could develop a Koniku Kore that would last five years, were a >>>>> customer to require it. >>>>> >>>>> Improving on evolution >>>>> “To me the devil is in the details here,” says DeMarse. What he means >>>>> is: before Koniku, its kind of wetware lived in academic and government >>>>> labs. In addition to DeMarse’s research, scientists at DARPA have worked >>>>> for a long time on an artificial nose to detect cancer. William Ditto, now >>>>> of the Nonlinear Artificial Intelligence Lab at North Carolina State >>>>> University, used leech neurons in a dish to carry out basic computations. >>>>> Although no one has done exactly what Koniku says it’s doing, there’s >>>>> plenty to back up the argument that someone could do it. In fact, DeMarse >>>>> says he was “tickled” to read about Koniku’s innovations. Gabriel A. >>>>> Silva, >>>>> director of the Center for Engineered Natural Intelligence at the >>>>> University of California, San Diego, is also intrigued by Koniku’s >>>>> potential. “I never underestimate groups like this because they’re >>>>> trailblazers,” he says. >>>>> >>>>> Still, Agabi’s colleagues in the academic world maintain some >>>>> skepticism about whether his technology can live up to his grand ambitions >>>>> and radical vision for the future of machine intelligence. >>>>> >>>>> For one thing, neurons have evolutionary baggage that might be >>>>> unnecessary for a computer. As an example, Rajesh Rao, director of the >>>>> Center for Neural Engineering at the University of Washington, points to >>>>> myelin, the fatty sheath that insulates nerve fibers and helps signals >>>>> propagate in the brain. It’s not clear, Rao says, that the optimal >>>>> computer >>>>> would have to mimic that method of communication. Or consider dendrites, >>>>> the branches that stretch out from the body of a neuron. Neuroscientists >>>>> aren’t sure whether dendrites actually participate in information >>>>> processing or are just wires that pass information from cell to cell. Does >>>>> moving information in a computer really demand some version of dendrites? >>>>> >>>>> With issues like this in mind, all the scientists I spoke with for >>>>> this article said that while looking to biology for inspiration will be >>>>> essential for the development of AI, they were not entirely convinced by >>>>> Agabi’s argument that it will require biology itself. Just as planes use >>>>> the same principles of lift as birds do without feathers or hollow bones, >>>>> “we can extract the computational principles of how the brain processes >>>>> information” and use them in a manner “independent of actual >>>>> implementation >>>>> in biological tissue,” Rao says. >>>>> >>>>> For example, neuromorphic chips are silicon chips designed using >>>>> biological principles, attempting to mimic some ways that the brain >>>>> processes information while leaving some of its baggage behind. Ditto, the >>>>> researcher who once made a computer out of leech neurons, is now working >>>>> on >>>>> a “chaotic chip,” which constantly changes from analog to digital >>>>> processing — as often as a billion times a second — in order to solve >>>>> problems more efficiently. He argues that AI will require the plasticity >>>>> and adaptive capacity of biology, but that the biological element is >>>>> optional. >>>>> >>>>> After all, coaxing neurons in a dish into computation isn’t so easy, >>>>> either. Even making sure they grow successfully is difficult; Silva >>>>> remembers struggling during graduate school with neurons that had suddenly >>>>> stopped growing, seemingly for no reason. “It turned out that the >>>>> manufacturer of the coverslips we used had changed the formulation of the >>>>> glass,” he says. “That alone was enough to make the neurons unhappy.” Even >>>>> when they do grow, a group of neurons, however well networked and >>>>> organized, do not automatically make a brain. The distance from chemical >>>>> sensing to cognition is awfully long, and the slippery nature of even the >>>>> idea of cognition complicates this question. A basic system that uses >>>>> reward or punishment to teach things to computers “is going to give you >>>>> some behavior that will look intelligent,” Rao says. But isn’t there more >>>>> to cognition than that, more ingredients and sensory inputs that help us >>>>> react to, interact with, and make sense of the world? The wetware recipe >>>>> for that is far from clear. >>>>> >>>>> ... >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> @philipthrift >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 8:33:09 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I should add that the cybernetic description of a system is entirely >>>>>> functional, but the emphasis is on the holistic perspective. >>>>>> Functionalism >>>>>> tends to be reductive, but the consciousness identified with a given >>>>>> cybernetic description is the system as a whole. That's why replacing a >>>>>> neuron with an artificial replacement does not change the consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:30 AM Terren Suydam <terren...@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> What I'm suggesting draws on both functionalism and identity theory. >>>>>>> It's functional in the sense that the constitutive aspect of >>>>>>> cybernetics is >>>>>>> entirely functional. There is nothing in a cybernetic description beyond >>>>>>> the functional relationships between the parts of that system. It draws >>>>>>> on >>>>>>> identity theory in the sense that I'm claiming that consciousness >>>>>>> *is* cybernetic dynamics. What I'm adding is the same move that >>>>>>> panpsychism makes - that there is something it is like to be any >>>>>>> cybernetic >>>>>>> system, and this includes many more things than brains, and crucially, >>>>>>> does >>>>>>> not depend on a specific substrate. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:13 AM <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I must assume you have already studied (hopefully over many years) >>>>>>>> in philosophy the difference between >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *functionalism*: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *identity theory*: >>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> A short way of expressing identity theory over functionalism is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *A simulation is not a synthesis.* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Experiential materialism* is a variant of identity theory in >>>>>>>> which >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> • psychical properties, as well as physical ones, are attributed to >>>>>>>> matter, which is the only basic substance >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> so that >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> • the material composition of the brain has both physical and >>>>>>>> psychical aspects. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 7:38:46 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Maybe you could tell me what specific criticism you have rather >>>>>>>>> than quoting a wikipedia article. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 7:50 PM <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I don't believe in the "*functional* equivalence" principle >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> as it does not capture the nature of what is needed for >>>>>>>>>> consciousness (as many critics - some listed there - have pointed >>>>>>>>>> out). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> If I had to pick something vs. "cybernetic dynamics" it would be >>>>>>>>>> "neurochemical dynamics". That seems closer to me. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 5:31:56 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Then you're missing the point of the alternative I've been >>>>>>>>>>> offering. It's not about the *matter itself*, it's about the >>>>>>>>>>> cybernetic dynamics implemented in the matter. So I would predict >>>>>>>>>>> that you >>>>>>>>>>> could replace your brain neuron by neuron with functional >>>>>>>>>>> equivalents and >>>>>>>>>>> your consciousness wouldn't change, so long as the cybernetics were >>>>>>>>>>> unchanged. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019, 6:08 PM <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Well we know *some* matter has a psychical aspect: *human >>>>>>>>>>>> brains*. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Unless one is a consciousness denier. >>>>>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 4:58:04 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Panpsychism of any flavor that identifies matter with a >>>>>>>>>>>>> psychic aspect is subject to the problems I described earlier. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> It never occurred to me to google something like "theoretical >>>>>>>>>>>>> psychology" >>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.google.com/search?q=theoretical+psychology> but >>>>>>>>>>>>> there's a lot there. How much of it is interesting, I don't know. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think as we flesh out the connectome, theoretical psychology >>>>>>>>>>>>> will take on more legitimacy and importance. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 5:16 PM <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is a whole spectrum of panpsychisms (plural) - from >>>>>>>>>>>>>> micropsychism to cosmophychism: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> cf. https://www.iep.utm.edu/panpsych/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is not a "real science" yet is its basic problem of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> course. But consciousness science in general really isn't yet >>>>>>>>>>>>>> either. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> One would think there would be a group of theoretical >>>>>>>>>>>>>> psychologists - there is theoretical physics, chemistry, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> biology, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretical psychology is in a much weirder state - who would be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> involved. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 3:48:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My question for panpsychists is similar to my question for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cosmin: what does it buy you in terms of explanations or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predictions? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just blanket-asserting that all matter is conscious doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tell me anything about consciousness itself. For example, what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean for my fingernails to be conscious? Does my fingernail >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> factor in somehow to my own experience of consciousness? If >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so, how? What >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about all the other parts of my body, about individual cells? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bacteria living in my body contribute its consciousness >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> somehow? It quickly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> runs aground on the same rocks that arguments about "soul" do - >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> principled way to talk about it that elucidates relationships >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> brains, bodies, and minds. Panpsychism does nothing to explain >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the effect >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of drugs on consciousness, or brain damage. Like Cosmin's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ideas, it's all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just post-hoc rationalization. Panpsychism is the philosophical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equivalent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of throwing your hands up and saying "I dunno, I guess it's all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conscious >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> somehow!" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I'm suggesting posits that consciousness arises from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the cybernetic organization of a system, that what the system >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experiences, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as a whole, is identified with the informational-dynamics >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> captured by that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> organization. This yields explanations for the character of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> given >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system's consciousness... something panpsychism cannot do. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Terren >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:57 PM <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I see the coin made (as the ones lying on my desk right now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made of metal) of matter. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The two sides of the coin (of matter) are *physical *and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *psychical*: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If ὕ – the first Greek letter for “hyle”, upsilon (υ) with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diacritics dasia and oxia (U+1F55) – is used for the symbol of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> matter, φ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (phi) for physical, + ψ (psi) for psychical, then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ὕ = φ + ψ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (i.e., the combination of *physical* and *psychical* properties >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a more complete view of what matter is). The physical is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (quantitative) behavioral aspect of matter – the kind that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formulated in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematical language in current physics, for example – >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whereas the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> psychical is the (qualitative) experiential aspect of matter, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at various >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels, from brains on down. There is no reason in principle >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for only φ to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the considered by science and for ψ to be ignored by science. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 2:10:05 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I see them as two sides of the same coin - as in, you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't get one without the other. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:00 PM <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> material] computation" then does that mean there is realm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for (A) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness and one for (B) physical [or material] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computation? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is A like some spirit or ghost that invades the domain of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> B? Or does B invade A? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - >>>>> >>>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 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