On 5/9/2019 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 4 May 2019, at 02:32, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 5/3/2019 2:00 PM, [email protected] wrote:
On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 3:26:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 5/3/2019 12:00 PM, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote:
If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or material]
computation" then does that mean there is realm for (A)
consciousness and one for (B) physical [or material] computation?
No, the theory is that all possible computations (the UD) exist
and they instantiate all conscious thoughts, including those we
call perception of an external reality. There isn't anymore to
reality; it's just the statistical regularities among the
different threads of the UD. At least that's Bruno's idea.
Brent
There could be *UD-computing* that is being executed by the brain.
One can't rule this out a priori.
I just say if so, it is being executed in a material substrate -
*the brain!*
There is no heavenly realm where UD-computing is churning away.
The question is whether there is a realm consisting of arithmetic.
If there is none, then there is no more physical science at all. To
have any physical science capable of explaining brains, or even my
laptop, you need to assume that 2+2=4 and its consequences.
But you don't have to assume "primitive arithmetic". You adduce all you
need empirically.
Primary matter is not something observable, in any direct way.
Neither is arithmetic.
Brent
We can only asses or refute it by meaning numbers, that is,
experimental physics.
Now, with just a bit more than arithmetic, we can define the realm of
arithmetic: it is the structure (N, 0, +, x). It is used in the
definition of real and complex numbers, which are assumed in most
physical theories.
Bruno
Brent
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