> On 3 May 2019, at 21:00, [email protected] wrote: > > > > If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or material] computation" > then does that mean there is realm for (A) consciousness and one for (B) > physical [or material] computation?
I assume mechanism all along. There is only one realm: elementary arithmetical truth, that you can conceive as the set of true arithmetical proposition. That contains the fact that 2+2=4, but also existential and universal proposition, like Ex(x+2=4) or Ax(x+y=y+x). That contains all elementary statement of computer science, like the machine I on input j stop after k steps with output y, or like: the 6789th register of machine 8789754300346662309 on input 67 is not-empty at its 83333453504th step of computation, etc. The computation is in the true relation between the number, not in the syntactical description (number) describing a computation. A computation is not the same as a description of a computation. That is a key point to understand Mechanism. Consciousness too belongs to the arithmetical truth, but unlike computations, does not admit any definition of or description in arithmetic, like the arithmetical truth itself, it is not a syntactical being, it has to refer to some reality (a non syntactical notion), but with mechanism, the arithmetical TRUTH, as opposed to anything syntactical does matter. Then the material phenomenology emerges from the differentiation of consciousness on the infinities of history realised (syntactically and semantically) in the arithmetical reality. > > Is A like some spirit or ghost that invades the domain of B? Or does B invade > A? Nobody invades anything. There is the arithmetical reality (which after Gödel has to be understood as something beyond all theories, all syntaxes, all machines, all words, all numbers), which can be see from inside, in 8 different modes, three of them contributing to the material lasting" hallucination”. The physical realm can be seen as the surface of a sphere? The mind is the interior of the sphere, but the sphere is infinite, as its border is an internal projection, like rails which joint ad the infinite, although they never really cross. There is only numbers, and the mind of the numbers is associated with the truth related to some of its relation with other (universal) numbers. Adding matter makes no sense if we assume mechanism, and makes sense only for those who want mechanism to be false. Yet, doing an ontological commitment to avoid some entities, which behaves as if they have a soul, to deprive them of a soul, is not quite scientific. It is like inventing a new particle that nobody has seen to contradict a theory. That is very not convincing. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 1:44:34 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: > > On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 1:10 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > I think that is right. But when you consider some simplified cases, e.g. a > computation written out on paper (or Bruno's movie graph) it becomes apparent > that consciousness must ultimately refer to other things. > > Right, the movie graph argument shows that consciousness doesn't supervene on > physical computation. Nevertheless, the character of my consciousness still > corresponds with the kind of cybernetic system implemented by e.g. my brain > and body, as instantiated by the infinity of programs going through my state. > > Much is made of "self-awareness" but this is usually just having an internal > model of one's body, or social standing or some other model of the self. It > is not consciousness of consciousness...that is only a temporal reflection: > "I was conscious just now." > > I see it a little differently. The self-model/ego is a higher-order construct > that organizes the system in a holistic way. We take this for granted - it's > the water we swim in - but our minds are radically re-organized as children > by the taught narrative that we have an identity and this unitary identity is > the cause of our behavior (when the evidence shows that we merely rationalize > our behavior in terms of that narrative). Point being, the way the cybernetic > system is organized takes a quantum leap in complexity as a result - and this > is responsible for the subjective awareness of ourselves as people. > > In the dream state (except for lucid dreaming), our self-model is not > energized - ongoing experience in dreams is not organized in terms of that > narrative of being someone. When lucid dreaming begins, it is because we can > say "I am dreaming", which is to say that the self-model becomes active. In > that moment, the character of that dream consciousness changes dramatically. > > In general terms we could say consciousness is awareness of the evironment, > where that includes one's body. Damasio identifies emotions as awareness of > the bodies state. The point is that the stuff of which we are aware and > which we find agreement with other people's awareness is what we infer to be > the physical world. It might be possible to be conscious in some sense > without a physical world, but it would be qualitatively different. > > Yes. However, it's not clear what it would mean for a conscious agent to > experience something that wasn't a "physical" world, even if the environment > was completely virtual. The Matrix illustrates that nicely. > > Terren > > > Brent > > On 5/3/2019 6:27 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: >> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated with >> the way information is processed. This is substrate independent - the fact >> that a brain is physical is beside the point. You could implement a brain in >> software, and insofar as the same kinds of information processing occur, it >> would be conscious in the same kind of way. >> >> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and >> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for >> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines. All that's >> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to occur. >> >> Terren >> >> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 2:26 AM <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> >> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, [email protected] <> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, [email protected] <> wrote: >>>> >>>> Apparently matter is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of >>>> particles. >>> >>> Then you're not a materialist. You think there is matter plus something >>> else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" and >>> add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call yourself a >>> materialist. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as >>> physicalism (not materialism): >>> Physicalism and materialism >>> >>> Reductive physicalism >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductive_physicalism>...is normally assumed >>> to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism>, if held to be distinct from >>> physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental properties >>> >> >> What mental properties? intention? reflection? remembering? That's what I >> mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled >> half-measure. >> >> Brent >> >> >> Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets, >> planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria .. are matter. >> >> Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... . >> >> So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties. >> >> The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body, is >> perhaps the worst idea ever invented. >> >> @philipthrift >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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