On 5/3/2019 11:44 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 1:10 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    I think that is right.  But when you consider some simplified
    cases, e.g. a computation written out on paper (or Bruno's movie
    graph) it becomes apparent that consciousness must ultimately
    refer to other things.


Right, the movie graph argument shows that consciousness doesn't supervene on physical computation. Nevertheless, the character of my consciousness still corresponds with the kind of cybernetic system implemented by e.g. my brain and body, as instantiated by the infinity of programs going through my state.

What makes it "your state"?  It's just a bunch of programs. Why those programs and not others?

    Much is made of "self-awareness" but this is usually just having
    an internal model of one's body, or social standing or some other
    model of the self. It is not consciousness of consciousness...that
    is only a temporal reflection: "I was conscious just now."


I see it a little differently. The self-model/ego is a higher-order construct that organizes the system in a holistic way.

? That sounds like a kind of dualism.  You're postulating something that creates a "higher-order construct".  If you're following Bruno's idea things have to just come out of the UD threads. There's nothing to create anything more.

We take this for granted - it's the water we swim in - but our minds are radically re-organized as children by the taught narrative that we have an identity

You don't have teach a kid he has an identity.  He knows who's hungry.  He has a view point.

Brent

and this unitary identity is the /cause/ of our behavior (when the evidence shows that we merely rationalize our behavior in terms of that narrative). Point being, the way the cybernetic system is organized takes a quantum leap in complexity as a result - and this is responsible for the subjective awareness of ourselves as people.

In the dream state (except for lucid dreaming), our self-model is not energized - ongoing experience in dreams is not organized in terms of that narrative of being someone. When lucid dreaming begins, it is because we can say "I am dreaming", which is to say that the self-model becomes active. In that moment, the character of that dream consciousness changes dramatically.

    In general terms we could say consciousness is awareness of the
    evironment, where that includes one's body.  Damasio identifies
    emotions as awareness of the bodies state.  The point is that the
    stuff of which we are aware and which we find agreement with other
    people's awareness is what we infer to be the physical world.  It
    might be possible to be conscious in some sense without a physical
    world, but it would be qualitatively different.


Yes. However, it's not clear what it would mean for a conscious agent to experience something that wasn't a "physical" world, even if the environment was completely virtual. The Matrix illustrates that nicely.

Terren


    Brent

    On 5/3/2019 6:27 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
    One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is
    associated with the way information is processed. This is
    substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is
    beside the point. You could implement a brain in software, and
    insofar as the same kinds of information processing occur, it
    would be conscious in the same kind of way.

    I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between
    brains and consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a
    framework for understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of
    machines.  All that's required is to assume there is something it
    is like for computation to occur.

    Terren

    On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 2:26 AM <[email protected]
    <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:



        On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



            On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, [email protected] wrote:


            On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



                On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, [email protected] wrote:

                Apparently *matter* is not "reducible" to just the
                physics a couple of particles.

                Then you're not a materialist.  You think there is
                matter plus something else, that everyone calls
                "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" and add
                it to everyone else's list of matter so you can
                still call yourself a materialist.

                Brent




            But everything reducing to the physics of particles is
            thought of as *physicalism* (not materialism):


                  *Physicalism and materialism*

            Reductive physicalism
            <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductive_physicalism>...is
            normally assumed to be incompatible with panpsychism.
            Materialism <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism>,
            if held to be distinct from physicalism, is compatible
            with panpsychism insofar as mental properties


            What mental properties?  intention? reflection?
            remembering?  That's what I mean by saying attributing
            "experience" to matter is an unprincipled half-measure.

            Brent


        Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables,
        rocks, comets, planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies,
        bacteria  .. are matter.

        Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... .

        So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical
        (mental) properties.

        The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate
        from body, is perhaps the worst idea ever invented.

        @philipthrift
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