> On 3 May 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/3/2019 12:00 PM, [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: >> >> >> If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or material] computation" >> then does that mean there is realm for (A) consciousness and one for (B) >> physical [or material] computation? > > No, the theory is that all possible computations (the UD) exist and they > instantiate all conscious thoughts, including those we call perception of an > external reality. There isn't anymore to reality; it's just the statistical > regularities among the different threads of the UD. At least that's Bruno's > idea.
To be sure, the existence of the UD is a logical consequence of elementary arithmetic with Church's thesis or Turing’s thesis. Peano arithmetic can prove that it emulates Robinson Arithmetic, and that such an emulation is a universal dovetailing. You would not say that Riemann’s conjecture requires the assumption that an infinity of prime numbers exist. You will just refer to Euclide’s proof that there is an infinity or primes. Same for the UD. That the UD instantiates thought follows from the mechanist assumption. That entails the necessity to derive physics from a statistics on all computation (actually on all relative first person experience supported by all computation continuing us) is also a logical consequence of mechanism. Anyone can say that a computation in arithmetic cannot be conscious, because it has not been blessed with Holy Matter, but then it has to abandon Mechanism, because the digitalist surgeon does not mention any role of matter in the digital computation which is supposed to support the mind of the candidate. Bruno > > Brent >> >> Is A like some spirit or ghost that invades the domain of B? Or does B >> invade A? >> >> @philipthrift >> >> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 1:44:34 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >> >> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 1:10 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >> I think that is right. But when you consider some simplified cases, e.g. a >> computation written out on paper (or Bruno's movie graph) it becomes >> apparent that consciousness must ultimately refer to other things. >> >> Right, the movie graph argument shows that consciousness doesn't supervene >> on physical computation. Nevertheless, the character of my consciousness >> still corresponds with the kind of cybernetic system implemented by e.g. my >> brain and body, as instantiated by the infinity of programs going through my >> state. >> >> Much is made of "self-awareness" but this is usually just having an internal >> model of one's body, or social standing or some other model of the self. It >> is not consciousness of consciousness...that is only a temporal reflection: >> "I was conscious just now." >> >> I see it a little differently. The self-model/ego is a higher-order >> construct that organizes the system in a holistic way. We take this for >> granted - it's the water we swim in - but our minds are radically >> re-organized as children by the taught narrative that we have an identity >> and this unitary identity is the cause of our behavior (when the evidence >> shows that we merely rationalize our behavior in terms of that narrative). >> Point being, the way the cybernetic system is organized takes a quantum leap >> in complexity as a result - and this is responsible for the subjective >> awareness of ourselves as people. >> >> In the dream state (except for lucid dreaming), our self-model is not >> energized - ongoing experience in dreams is not organized in terms of that >> narrative of being someone. When lucid dreaming begins, it is because we can >> say "I am dreaming", which is to say that the self-model becomes active. In >> that moment, the character of that dream consciousness changes dramatically. >> >> In general terms we could say consciousness is awareness of the evironment, >> where that includes one's body. Damasio identifies emotions as awareness of >> the bodies state. The point is that the stuff of which we are aware and >> which we find agreement with other people's awareness is what we infer to be >> the physical world. It might be possible to be conscious in some sense >> without a physical world, but it would be qualitatively different. >> >> Yes. However, it's not clear what it would mean for a conscious agent to >> experience something that wasn't a "physical" world, even if the environment >> was completely virtual. The Matrix illustrates that nicely. >> >> Terren >> >> >> Brent >> >> On 5/3/2019 6:27 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: >>> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated with >>> the way information is processed. This is substrate independent - the fact >>> that a brain is physical is beside the point. You could implement a brain >>> in software, and insofar as the same kinds of information processing occur, >>> it would be conscious in the same kind of way. >>> >>> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and >>> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for >>> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines. All that's >>> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to >>> occur. >>> >>> Terren >>> >>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 2:26 AM <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, [email protected] <> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, [email protected] <> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Apparently matter is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of >>>>> particles. >>>> >>>> Then you're not a materialist. You think there is matter plus something >>>> else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" and >>>> add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call yourself a >>>> materialist. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as >>>> physicalism (not materialism): >>>> Physicalism and materialism >>>> >>>> Reductive physicalism >>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductive_physicalism>...is normally >>>> assumed to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism >>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism>, if held to be distinct from >>>> physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental properties >>>> >>> >>> What mental properties? intention? reflection? remembering? That's what >>> I mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled >>> half-measure. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets, >>> planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria .. are matter. >>> >>> Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... . >>> >>> So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties. >>> >>> The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body, is >>> perhaps the worst idea ever invented. >>> >>> @philipthrift >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>> <javascript:>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>> <javascript:>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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