> On 9 May 2019, at 19:40, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/9/2019 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 4 May 2019, at 02:28, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 5/3/2019 1:35 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 4:19 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>> <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5/3/2019 11:44 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 1:10 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> I think that is right. But when you consider some simplified cases, e.g. >>>>> a computation written out on paper (or Bruno's movie graph) it becomes >>>>> apparent that consciousness must ultimately refer to other things. >>>>> >>>>> Right, the movie graph argument shows that consciousness doesn't >>>>> supervene on physical computation. Nevertheless, the character of my >>>>> consciousness still corresponds with the kind of cybernetic system >>>>> implemented by e.g. my brain and body, as instantiated by the infinity of >>>>> programs going through my state. >>>> >>>> What makes it "your state"? It's just a bunch of programs. Why those >>>> programs and not others? >>>> >>>> It's the set of programs that implements the body/brain used to construct >>>> my inner world. >>> >>> But that doesn't explain why there is such a thing as "your inner world" >>> that is separate from "my inner world". Why don't the programs produce >>> overlapping or mixing "inner worlds". >>> >>>>> >>>>> Much is made of "self-awareness" but this is usually just having an >>>>> internal model of one's body, or social standing or some other model of >>>>> the self. It is not consciousness of consciousness...that is only a >>>>> temporal reflection: "I was conscious just now." >>>>> >>>>> I see it a little differently. The self-model/ego is a higher-order >>>>> construct that organizes the system in a holistic way. >>>> >>>> ? That sounds like a kind of dualism. You're postulating something that >>>> creates a "higher-order construct". If you're following Bruno's idea >>>> things have to just come out of the UD threads. There's nothing to create >>>> anything more. >>>> >>>> For the self-image construct, I mean 'construct' in the same way that >>>> anything we learn is a construct. The self-image represents a higher-order >>>> construct on top of the types of constructs that, say, a dog might employ. >>>> A dog has a self-image of a certain type, but with humans (for whom I'll >>>> call the self-image 'ego' to differentiate from animal self-image), the >>>> ego's construction is conceptual and requires language. The ego is a >>>> narrative, and that narrative acts to organize the system as a whole. >>>> >>>> >>>>> We take this for granted - it's the water we swim in - but our minds are >>>>> radically re-organized as children by the taught narrative that we have >>>>> an identity >>>> >>>> You don't have teach a kid he has an identity. He knows who's hungry. He >>>> has a view point. >>>> >>>> >>>> Just like a dog. But a kid knows his name (learned) and can answer the >>>> question, "why did you do that?". The answer to that question is also >>>> largely learned. We are told who to be, what's right, wrong, appropriate, >>>> taboo, etc., for the culture we grow up in. IOW why I do something is >>>> filtered through learned cultural constructs. Most of the time the answer >>>> amounts to a justification in terms of what's appropriate, logical, or >>>> some other descriptor that benefits me in some way relative to the >>>> implicit values I'm socialized to. This form of self-image is of a higher >>>> order than whatever self-image my dog has. >>> >>> I don't disagree with any of that, but I don't see that any of it is >>> entailed by there being the infinite programs of the UD. > > Doesn't the UD include all it's computations, which are not only infinite but > uncountable.
The UD is a finite program, and some of its branch dovetails on the reals, so consciousness might differentiate on continuum, but all that is in the phenomenologies. What exists are just 0, 1, 2, 3, … and nothing else, but we have a language, and there are many special sort of number and relations,. But keep in mind that the “soul” is supported by infinitely many programs, plausibly dovetailing on the reals or the complex numbers. The uncountability is lived from inside arithmetic, but the ultimate “outside” is just the cardinal omega (aleph_0, the enumerable, the countable). It is just the the soul is invariant for the delay of the universal dovetailer making its first person indeterminacy applying, in principle, on a continuum of differentiating consciousness flux. If phi_i^s(j) represents the sth sth step of the computation of phi_i on j, a universal dovetailing procedure is given roughly by for all i, j, s compute phi_i^s(j). That program emulates also the version of that program in company to all (real) oracles (in Turing sense of oracle). But their role might only appear in some “phase randomisation elimination of the white rabbits”. It would be astonishing that some oracle, different from the random one (related to the first person indeterminacy) plays some role; though. Inoking an oracle in an explanation of consciousness or nature would be not much better than invoking an ontological commitment. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> Just to be precise, all programs are finite. The universal >> programs/machine/number are finite. The UD is a finite object, a number >> itself. >> >> The computations can be infinite. Like "being prime” has an infinite >> extension (meaning). >> >> Whatever 3-p things does the UD, is provable in Robinson arithmetic. The >> 1p-things of the machine do escape the ontological realities. Arithmetic >> seen from inside is infinitely bigger and complex than the 3p arithmetic. >> The Löbian machine all know this already. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6D072486-E78C-4164-938B-AAC75C56DC81%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6D072486-E78C-4164-938B-AAC75C56DC81%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f3470b9d-6629-1e81-ccb3-4f8fb2d826f0%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f3470b9d-6629-1e81-ccb3-4f8fb2d826f0%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/D38CB329-57BE-4257-815E-B8E30AFA873E%40ulb.ac.be.
