> On 6 May 2019, at 22:41, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/5/2019 11:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 12:59 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> wrote: >> >> >> On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>> <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>>> How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only suspect >>>>>> it). >>>>>> >>>>>> Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly >>>>>> visible behaviors). >>>>>> >>>>>> Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed >>>>>> computer can replicate any finitely describable behavior. Therefore a >>>>>> person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's >>>>>> skill, and wired into the nervous system of a human could perfectly >>>>>> mimic the behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person >>>>>> you have ever met. >>>>>> >>>>>> Do you dispute any of the above? >>>>> >>>>> It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem to obtain the necessary >>>>> program. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You could find the program by chance or by iteration (for the purposes of >>>>> the thought experiment). >>>> >>>> In those cases you could never know that you had been successful. >>>> >>>> >>>> The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed, but given that we >>>> know it is possible to succeed, given there ezists a program that could >>>> convince you it was your friend, why doubt it is consciousness? >>> >>> I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it just acted as >>> intelligent as some stranger. But note that it would have to be >>> interactive. So I think Wegner's point is that makes its computations not >>> finitely describable. >>> >>> Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point? >>> >>> I don't see how any computation could be not finitely describable, given >>> that any programs can be expressed as a finite integer. >> >> This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly. >> http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf >> <http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf> His point is that >> human consciousness is an interactive program that receives arbitrary and >> unknown inputs from the environment and is modified by those inputs. He >> calls this model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a memory >> and doesn't overwrite it. Of course you can say that whatever the >> environmental input is, it can be included in the TM code, but then it is >> potentially inifinite. >> >> >> Even if true, this doesn't preclude the thought experiment I defined, where >> the program takes in inputs from the environment via the senses and feeds >> those inputs to the program. > > But those inputs modify the program (what you do depends on your memory). I > was just reacting to you statement that a person can be defined as a finitely > describable TM. And there is also the point that whatever TM you use to > model a person, physics says it will be entangled with the environment and > effectively random at a low level. Even Bruno agrees that the physics of the > world is not TM emulable.
Yes. It is an “easy" consequence of mechanism, and some knowledge in computer science. It shows that Digital Physicalism is contradictory, with or without Mechanism. Digital Physicalism entails mechanism, but mechanism entails the falsity of Digital physicalism, so Digital physicalism refutes itself. With or without mechanism the physical reality is not Turing emulable, although most of its aspects used by evolution and life can be. Consciousness is also not Turing emulable. In fact the logic of the first person ([]p & p) is itself not Turing emulable, nor even definable, due to the “& p”. Consciousness, unlike a digital body, need the notion of (arithmetical) truth, which is not definable by any machine, although they are interesting partially computable transfinite approximation of it. A super-nice book around this is the book by Torkel Franzen “Inexhaustibility”. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/BF5E8021-AEFF-405D-BA9D-5C34667C302F%40ulb.ac.be. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
