> On 23 May 2019, at 05:30, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On 5/22/2019 6:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 21 May 2019, at 20:59, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 5/21/2019 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> 3) I don't even know what it would mean for consciousness to be >>>>> provable, nor why that is relevant. >>>> It is part of the axiomatic definition we search. >>>> >>>> Of course it is the proposition “I am conscious” which is both immediately >>>> true and not provable. >>> Of course whether it is immediately true is what is in question. >> “I am conscious” is the experience, not the 3P description of the brain >> which might make that experience manifestable. >> >> >> >>> When you speak the words, "I am conscious." are you conscious at that >>> moment. >> Yes. Normally. Obviously, we can have fever, get mad, but all this are >> irrelevant for the logical reasoning. >> >> >> >> >> >>> I remember a scifi story in which aliens who communicate telepathically (by >>> EM as I recall) visit Earth. They can "read the minds" of humans but they >>> are frustrated in trying to communicate with humans because the humans keep >>> opening their mouths and producing vibrations and whenever they do this, >>> their "minds" go blank. >> OK. But that is science-fiction. The immediacy factor is subjective. If the >> human say “I am conscious”, its perception of consciousness seems direct. >> Some notorious experience by Libet show that a decision we believe being >> made consciously is actually already done unconsciously before the decision >> is conscious, > > Also the Grey Walter experiments.
Yes. We could say that all this is obvious with mechanism. A machine cannot be directly aware of the happenings leading to his awareness or its decision. I prove this explicitly in my long-texte, and it can be related to “hen kin virus” of Hofstadter and Solovay, and some other theorems in mathematical logic. A machine cannot define God, but, curiously enough, it can define the singleton God. A machine cannot provides the total trace of its computation made to output that trace. Indeed, a machine programmed to do that will either never stop, or stop only on partial incomplete description of the trace, yet a machine can stop on an output which is a program, which when run, will give the entire correct trace. Now, to conclude like many that this shows that we have no free-will is a confusion of level. We are not our body, and our history is not our computations. Everything is in the abstract true relation, and the phenomenologies entailed by the difference between provable and truth (and knowable, observable, …). > >> which is stronger than what I say. The point is the the subject feel that >> consciousness is immediate. > > As Dennett has pointed out your brain synchronizes perceptions by > compensating for the different delays in being processed and reaching > consciousness. I have noted this myself. If something unexpected happens > like a small explosion this synchronization fails and you hear the explosion > before you see it. If you are close enough … I mean, with the lightening, r atomic bombs, You see the explosion quite before the you hear the low frequency thunder of boom. But I guess what you say make sense. Bruno > > Brent > >> That happens in both the []p & <>t and []p & <>t & p self-reference modes. >> The Kripke accessibility relation islets the transitivity in the >> communicable part and incommmunicable parts (handled by G and G* >> respectively). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5afbc28e-2f3c-31ba-7993-968990071f18%40verizon.net. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/bd76cadb-c855-ff33-3a61-f89b6be75270%40verizon.net. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8AF5C7EF-B665-45D3-B434-5A7E02801B6C%40ulb.ac.be.
