> On 10 May 2019, at 15:16, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:51 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On 7 May 2019, at 01:04, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Tue, May 7, 2019 at 7:02 AM Jason Resch <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> wrote: >> >> >> I am not following where this point is going. Do you dispute the idea that >> you could put a finite program in your friend's head and you wouldn't not be >> able to tell the difference? >> >> I was just reacting to you statement that a person can be defined as a >> finitely describable TM. >> >> If by person you mean body, then perhaps not. But if by person you mean >> mind, this is the assumption of the computational theory of mind. >> >> That is the claim that is in dispute; Goedel and Turing find it unproven at >> best. >> >> And there is also the point that whatever TM you use to model a person, >> physics says it will be entangled with the environment and effectively >> random at a low level. Even Bruno agrees that the physics of the world is >> not TM emulable. >> >> Quantum physics is emulable. It's the first person viewpoints of the >> apparent randomness are not. (but this randomness is subjective, not >> objective). >> >> That is idea stems from a confusion in your (Bruno's) definition of first >> person and third person views. In Bruno's person-duplication thought >> experiments, there is a distinction between 1p and 3p that makes sense in >> that context. But this does not carry over to QM, where there is no >> viewpoint that sees fully unitary quantum evolution. Bruno seeks to avoid >> this fact this by defining a first person-plural (1pp) point of view. But >> that is just another name for what is normally considered the third person >> perspective. > > That is impossible. The first person plural is when two persons enter the > annihilation box. They will share the indeterminacy, but that indeterminacy > is still 1p. The “3p” see only two guys being duplicated. > > In your duplication experiments, but not in QM; no one 'sees' the quantum > superposition continuing after a measurement has been made.
Which duplication experiments. The one is step 3, or the one in step seven? The whole point is that the second one should give the entanglement, and that is why I study the modes of self-reference corresponding to it, and there, we do find a quantum formalism. > > The mechanist definition of the first person plural correspond to the quantum > notion of entanglement, or what I describe often as the contagion of > superposition, due to the linearity of the tensor product. > > That is totally meaningless; your 1pp has nothing to do with entanglement. If you prove this, and assuming QM correct, you refute Mechanism (modulo a logical possible malevolent “bostromian” simulation). > > The unitary quantum evolution explains why the observer feels like there as > been a reduction, but also make them impossible to occur in the 3p global > picture. > > The 3p notion coming from classical person duplication experiments does not > apply to QM. 3p in QM is simply what can be objectively agreed on by > independent observers -- the common sense grammatical notion of the third > person. I do not assume QM, of course. > >> Changing the name does not change the substance..... The randomness of QM is >> third person and objective. > > Then you introduce a collapse, and QM is simply false globally. All the > attempts to make sense of this have led to difficulties. So your assertion > seems to be wishful thinking. > > There is no necessity for collapse. It is just that there is no external > observer who can see fully unitary evolution. Good. > > Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to prove: > all computations are realised in all models of arithmetic. > > But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and mechanism > is manifestly a pipe dream. 2+2+4 is far easiest to believe and explain that the existence of the human mind. Assuming real numbers and waves is equivalent or stronger than assuming the elementary axiom of arithmetic. You might formalise your theory so that we can compare them. Bruno PS I have already to go. Will read the many posts in this thread later. > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQG5Ok2%2B6e2WWaV_qP1mjG23dGxCG097CzYXjWtruyemw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQG5Ok2%2B6e2WWaV_qP1mjG23dGxCG097CzYXjWtruyemw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FB4DA6A4-BDAD-42F6-8900-E77C5E23F7EB%40ulb.ac.be.
