> On 21 May 2019, at 13:06, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Mon, May 20, 2019, at 11:06, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 17 May 2019, at 08:56, Telmo Menezes <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Sat, May 11, 2019, at 00:02, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to >>>> prove: all computations are realised in all models of arithmetic. >>>> >>>> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and >>>> mechanism is manifestly a pipe dream. >>>> >>>> >>>> You sound certain. What is your evidence? >>>> >>>> Jason >>>> >>>> The is no evidence for mathematical realism, >>> >>> There is plenty of evidence, informally known as "the unreasonable >>> effectiveness of math". Does this mean that mathematical realism is true? >>> No, but then again the same applies to all promising ideas. >>> >>>> and mechanism is a failed idea because it cannot account for our >>>> experience. >>> >>> Nothing so far can account for our experience, this is why we keep having >>> all these discussions. >> >> >> It seems to me that the mathematics of the first person self-referential >> modes of the machine (those with “& p”) does account of our experience. And >> up to now, it does account of the “matter appearances”. >> >> The universal machine can be said to know that she has a soul, and that she >> knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything third person >> describable. >> >> Do you agree that consciousness is what is, from the 1p view of the machine: >> >> 1) true >> 2) immediately knowable and indubitable >> 3) non provable >> 4) non definable (but still meta-definable using “mechanism”) >> + >> 5) invariant for some digital substitution > > I agree.
Good, so, given the fact that I show that any universal machine discover something obeying those quasi-axioms when looking inward, that explains consciousness? > >> >> Then it is a theorem that the Mechanist Universal machine can prove: >> "consciousness is true for me”. >> >> We get a science, extended into a theology, and in particular, we get a >> theory of quanta, extended by a theory of qualia, making this theory of >> consciousness testable, by testing its quanta part with nature. Thanks to >> QM, it fits. >> >> I am aware that you don’t seem convince by this, but I am not sure what it >> is that you are missing, or what you think the explanation above is missing. >> > > To say that your theory accounts for our experience, you have to make some > connection to apples at some point. How do the laws of physics arise when > seeing the computations from the inside? We know this before we do the math. Physics appears through the first person statistic on all computations (i.e. sigma_1 sentences). So physics is the logic of the bets or prediction available in arithmetic. []p cannot work, despite it entails p is true in all consistent extensions, because it is only trivially true on the cul-de-sac worlds or extensions. So to get a probability or a credibility, we have to add “manually”, so to speak, either the trueness of p, or at least its consistency, and, thank to incompleteness we get intuitionist logic for the subject, and quantum logic for matter, confirming that the above conclusion makes sense. > I mean specifically, in the same way that Einstein had to show how his theory > swallowed Newton’s, You can’t ask this. The physics extracted from the theory of consciousness is not propose to do physics, just to solve the mind-body problem. To use it for physics would be like telling to a string theory to do a better pizza using it, but that will not happen for obvious reason. > you also have to swallow the current theories in such a convincing way But the “simple argument”, without the math, shows that there is no choice, if we want to solve the mind -body problem. > that we can say that you have the TOE Yes, but not a TOE in the physicists sense of the word. Physics + physicalism+mechanism just fails on *all* predictions, once you understand that it relies on an identity thesis which is inconsistent with mechanism. > . I don't think you have done that so far. I understand your point that QM > appears to confirm mechanism, but I am asking for more than that. Not just QM. The very existence of a physical reality confirms computationalism, and refute physicalism + mechanism. I don’t expect physicist to say “you are right we must predict with computationalism”. That will never happen. But today, the TOE provided by the universal machine looking inward is, to my knowledge, the only coherent theory of consciousness and of matter. No doubt a lot of work remains to be done, even an infinity of works, forever. The question I asked is “do you see that it solves the following problem already: -it explains consciousness and the psychological time -it explains why consciousness and subjective time is unavoidable for “enough rich” creature in arithmetic, -it explains why there is an appearance of a physical reality. -It explains why that observable appearance is not Boolean, but quantum-like What it does not yet explained, and which might still be purely geographical is - the existence of invariant hamiltonian (if that exists) - the existence of a physical time (if that exists) - the tensors (all of them, that is a bigger miss, it is easy to add it, using linear combinatory algebra, but that is still cheating. The linear structure must be deduce completely from G*, and that is a difficult task). Feel free to be as critical and skeptical as possible. Bruno > > Telmo. > >> >> >> Of course, all what I say comes from the theorems of Gödel, Löb and Solovay >> about the logic of self-reference of the Löbian machines (PA, ZF, ZFC, …). >> >> Knowing is also defined axiomatically. It is given by the modal logic S4. >> With the Theaetetus’ definition applied on Gödel’s beweisbar, we get an >> extension of S4, (S4Grz), making sense for the definition of consciousness. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Telmo. >>> >>>> >>>> Bruce >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRON3vdt4GwUdvbCFnhp98Ges2OyXFAD7dgoThNomJv3w%40mail.gmail.com >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRON3vdt4GwUdvbCFnhp98Ges2OyXFAD7dgoThNomJv3w%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e991a7e6-c30c-4726-b53d-ed7e68184783%40www.fastmail.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e991a7e6-c30c-4726-b53d-ed7e68184783%40www.fastmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/30D8F4DE-EC5F-4533-B864-6AFAB6197684%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/30D8F4DE-EC5F-4533-B864-6AFAB6197684%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/88fcff07-bdaa-44ba-ae76-f935a6d0d331%40www.fastmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/88fcff07-bdaa-44ba-ae76-f935a6d0d331%40www.fastmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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