> On 26 Apr 2019, at 02:38, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 9:45 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > >> On 23 Apr 2019, at 01:24, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com >> <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be >> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: >> >>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson <martinabrams...@gmail.com >>> <mailto:martinabrams...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> >>> Consciousness is a program. >> >> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that >> would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a >> glass of bear and its price. >> >> >> >>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that >>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or >>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be >>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death. >> >> >> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its soul >> to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative) >> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing: >> >> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter but >> certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it possible for >> a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from our own, but >> now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that this would be a >> contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely that such >> universes may exist. >> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I >> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and >> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are >> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but >> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is gone >> and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately. > > > This shows also how much Turing was blinded by its belief in some primary > matter. If, he would have understood at once that our consciousness follows > the differentiating computations in arithmetic. > > True, he did not appear to reach the conclusion regarding the primacy of > computation, however, is what he says above all that dissimilar from what you > have said regarding "souls falling" and becoming entangled with matter (the > material/physical) world? > > It appears Turing was a "mechanist" if not a "primitive arithmetical > mechanistic”.
Turing was a “indexical digital mechanist", I agree. But he was also a naturalist, and as such he was inconsistent on this. You can’t have both mechanism and naturalism/materialism/physicalism. > > > Emil Post eventually got the immateriality”, but change its mind after > reading … Turing. > > > I am interested in learning more about what Emil Post said on immateriality. > Do you recall the reference? Yes, it is his famous “anticipation”, that you can find in Martin Davis’s book “The undecidable” (now at Dover, with all key original papers (except for the important contribution of Tarski-Mostowki and Robinson, which is another thin Dover book). Precisely: “Absolutely Unsolvable Problems and Relatively Undecidable propositions, Account of an Anticipation”. Published by Martin Davis in the book “The Undecidable”. Dover 1993, (First edition: Raven Press, 1965). Martin Davis wrote : <<The paper was submitted by Post to a Mathematical Journal in 1941 and was rejected. Certainly the speculative (not to say metaphysical) “Appendix” is not what one ordinarily expects to find in a mathematics paper. So it appears in print for the first time in this anthology>>. > > With mechanism, it is simpler to not assume bodies and primitively material > bodies unless we get some evidences for them. Yet, until now, the evidences > gathered from the observation of nature confirms mechanism, and refute > physicalism. For anyone remembering dreams, seeing is not a valid way to > attribute any ontological existence, others than a subject, which we already > have in arithmetic. > > This seems to be the normal pattern in human science. It was 40-50 years > between QM and the serious consideration of relative state. Likewise the > computational theory of mind began in the 1950s and 1960s, and it wasn't > until your work that the consequences of this idea, when taken seriously, > were fully appreciated. Thanks for telling this. > Perhaps there are times it takes a new generation growing up with the > problems uncovered by the previous generation, to make significant leaps. Yes, we perish if we don’t publish, but publishing does not make you immune to perishing, especially if the finding does not fit the mentality of your epoch, and changing the mentality can take time, even millennia. It is normal. Sad, but normal. Bruno > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
