> On 17 May 2019, at 08:56, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sat, May 11, 2019, at 00:02, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to prove: >> all computations are realised in all models of arithmetic. >> >> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and mechanism >> is manifestly a pipe dream. >> >> >> You sound certain. What is your evidence? >> >> Jason >> >> The is no evidence for mathematical realism, > > There is plenty of evidence, informally known as "the unreasonable > effectiveness of math". Does this mean that mathematical realism is true? No, > but then again the same applies to all promising ideas. > >> and mechanism is a failed idea because it cannot account for our experience. > > Nothing so far can account for our experience, this is why we keep having all > these discussions.
It seems to me that the mathematics of the first person self-referential modes of the machine (those with “& p”) does account of our experience. And up to now, it does account of the “matter appearances”. The universal machine can be said to know that she has a soul, and that she knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything third person describable. Do you agree that consciousness is what is, from the 1p view of the machine: 1) true 2) immediately knowable and indubitable 3) non provable 4) non definable (but still meta-definable using “mechanism”) + 5) invariant for some digital substitution Then it is a theorem that the Mechanist Universal machine can prove: "consciousness is true for me”. We get a science, extended into a theology, and in particular, we get a theory of quanta, extended by a theory of qualia, making this theory of consciousness testable, by testing its quanta part with nature. Thanks to QM, it fits. I am aware that you don’t seem convince by this, but I am not sure what it is that you are missing, or what you think the explanation above is missing. Of course, all what I say comes from the theorems of Gödel, Löb and Solovay about the logic of self-reference of the Löbian machines (PA, ZF, ZFC, …). Knowing is also defined axiomatically. It is given by the modal logic S4. With the Theaetetus’ definition applied on Gödel’s beweisbar, we get an extension of S4, (S4Grz), making sense for the definition of consciousness. Bruno > > Telmo. > >> >> Bruce >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRON3vdt4GwUdvbCFnhp98Ges2OyXFAD7dgoThNomJv3w%40mail.gmail.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRON3vdt4GwUdvbCFnhp98Ges2OyXFAD7dgoThNomJv3w%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e991a7e6-c30c-4726-b53d-ed7e68184783%40www.fastmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e991a7e6-c30c-4726-b53d-ed7e68184783%40www.fastmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/30D8F4DE-EC5F-4533-B864-6AFAB6197684%40ulb.ac.be.
