> On 20 May 2019, at 20:25, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/20/2019 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 17 May 2019, at 08:56, Telmo Menezes <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, May 11, 2019, at 00:02, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to >>>> prove: all computations are realised in all models of arithmetic. >>>> >>>> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and >>>> mechanism is manifestly a pipe dream. >>>> >>>> >>>> You sound certain. What is your evidence? >>>> >>>> Jason >>>> >>>> The is no evidence for mathematical realism, >>> >>> There is plenty of evidence, informally known as "the unreasonable >>> effectiveness of math". Does this mean that mathematical realism is true? >>> No, but then again the same applies to all promising ideas. >>> >>>> and mechanism is a failed idea because it cannot account for our >>>> experience. >>> >>> Nothing so far can account for our experience, this is why we keep having >>> all these discussions. >> >> >> It seems to me that the mathematics of the first person self-referential >> modes of the machine (those with “& p”) does account of our experience. And >> up to now, it does account of the “matter appearances”. >> >> The universal machine can be said to know that she has a soul, and that she >> knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything third person >> describable. >> >> Do you agree that consciousness is what is, from the 1p view of the machine: >> >> 1) true >> 2) immediately knowable and indubitable >> 3) non provable >> 4) non definable (but still meta-definable using “mechanism”) >> + >> 5) invariant for some digital substitution >> >> Then it is a theorem that the Mechanist Universal machine can prove: >> "consciousness is true for me”. > > First, it is a fallacy to infer from "X has properties P" and "Y has > properties P" to "X is Y”.
I gave an axiomatic definition. I do not claim that consciousness is defined by above, just that it obeys the above. It is a Sufi-definition, like RA or PA can be seen as quasi-definition of natural numbers. > > 1) It is not the case that whatever I am conscious of I think is true. For > one, I am generally conscious of many things that are not propositions. The true is about the fact of consciousness, not on the consciousness content. 1) says only that “I am conscious” is true. Not that what I am conscious of is true. And yes, indeed, “I am conscious” is not being conscious of some proposition other than the fact that I am conscious. > 2) I don't think conscious is immediately knowable. One is not conscious > of being conscious immediately. I takes reflection. Your idea of the 1p > view of the machine is what is CT provable by the machine. ? Not at all. “I am conscious” is typically not provable, if only because it is not definable, like truth and knowledge. Only the beliefs are communicable ([]p), not the knowledge ([]p & p, []p & <>t & p). Consciousness is in the semantic, in the truth, not in the provability. Consciousness is immediately knowable means that you don’t have think to be conscious. Sensations + “automatic processing” are enough. If someone hurt you, you don’t have to believe or prove anything, you know it “quickly”. > Which is certainly not the human view of consciousness. There are many > things provable from PA by me which I will never even consider, much less be > immediately aware of. > 3) I don't even know what it would mean for consciousness to be provable, > nor why that is relevant. It is part of the axiomatic definition we search. Of course it is the proposition “I am conscious” which is both immediately true and not provable. > Proof applies to propositions. The Moon isn't provable. But we can study > the Moon and predict things about the Moon. Straw man. > 4) Under the plausible hypothesis that one is not unique, consciousness is > ostensively definable: "Did you feel that pinch?” That is not a definition in the sense used here. Definition use only the language of the machine, like CL and the symbol s, 0, + and *. But you can use induction (mathematical induction). > If it were not definable we wouldn't know what we're talking about when we > say it's not definable. But we know very well in this case, as your pinch illustrates. But that is not a definition. > Of course Bertrand Russell once quipped that,"As mathematicians we never know > what we're talking about, or whether what we say is true.” Good point. > 5) Is just a working hypothesis and since the "level of substitution" could > be anything from one e-neuron to ones past light cone, it's not very clear > what is it's significance. Whatever the level is, if it exists, the consequence is that the foundation of physics relies in the theology of the universal machine, which is itself a part of the arithmetical reality. We get as gift a theory of qualia extending the theory of quanta. We get The apperance of materialism, without its dismissing of persons. One significance here is some help in respecting persons, instead of eliminating them. > > >> >> We get a science, extended into a theology, and in particular, we get a >> theory of quanta, extended by a theory of qualia, making this theory of >> consciousness testable, by testing its quanta part with nature. Thanks to >> QM, it fits. > > It fits like my overcoat fits my grandson...nothing is left sticking out. Lol. (But you might need to elaborate on this). Physics is not the problem, it has to confirmed or refute mechanism, and up to now physics confirms the metaphysics of mechanism, and since long, it does not work in any metaphysics in which “I am conscious” has some meaning. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> I am aware that you don’t seem convince by this, but I am not sure what it >> is that you are missing, or what you think the explanation above is missing. >> >> Of course, all what I say comes from the theorems of Gödel, Löb and Solovay >> about the logic of self-reference of the Löbian machines (PA, ZF, ZFC, …). >> >> Knowing is also defined axiomatically. It is given by the modal logic S4. >> With the Theaetetus’ definition applied on Gödel’s beweisbar, we get an >> extension of S4, (S4Grz), making sense for the definition of consciousness. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Telmo. >>> >>>> >>>> Bruce >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRON3vdt4GwUdvbCFnhp98Ges2OyXFAD7dgoThNomJv3w%40mail.gmail.com >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRON3vdt4GwUdvbCFnhp98Ges2OyXFAD7dgoThNomJv3w%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e991a7e6-c30c-4726-b53d-ed7e68184783%40www.fastmail.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e991a7e6-c30c-4726-b53d-ed7e68184783%40www.fastmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/30D8F4DE-EC5F-4533-B864-6AFAB6197684%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/30D8F4DE-EC5F-4533-B864-6AFAB6197684%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/616856f0-57ce-8865-cef7-5606391b3330%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/616856f0-57ce-8865-cef7-5606391b3330%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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