On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 2:28 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 5/13/2019 4:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 10 May 2019, at 17:36, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 1:02 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 5/9/2019 7:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:47 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 10:18 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:02 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 9:36 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 3:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Would it make a difference if they compute the same function? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Not from the perspective of the function. If the computation is >>>>>> truly the same, there is no way the software can determine it's hardware. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> If so then you might as well say it would make a difference if they >>>>>>> were run on different hardware. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> From the outside it might seem different. E.g. instead of silicon >>>>>> some other element, foreign to the chemistry of this universe, might make >>>>>> for a more appropriate substrate. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But the computations that comprise a conscious mind also, ipso facto, >>>>> comprise the whole universe. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I don't see how this follows. Is the computer on your desk the whole >>>> universe? Is it not able to run an isolated computation which is not >>>> affected by what other parts of the universe are doing? >>>> >>> >>> The computer on my desk is not conscious! >>> >> >> Maybe. I'm not sure we can conclude anything so easily. But in any case >> it can illustrate the point that a computation need not be identical with >> the whole of the universe that contains it. >> >> >>> >>> >>>> So if the computations are the same, the conscious, AND THE UNIVERSE in >>>>> which it resides, are the same. There can, therefore, be no "outside" from >>>>> which the consciousnesses and universes are different. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Couldn't what we take to be the physical universe be a simulation run >>>> in computer within a very different universe? Clearly then the outside and >>>> inside view would be very different. >>>> >>> >>> But the theory is that the physical universe is a statistical construct >>> over all computations running through your conscious self. >>> >> >> You're jumping ahead to the final result of the computation, and continue >> to jump back and forth between different levels/definitions of universe. >> To clarify, let me enumerate stages of the argument such that we can be >> clear which one we are speaking of: >> >> 1. Your brain can be replaced with a functionally equivalent physical >> component which implements its functions digitally (here we change nothing >> about our assumption of what the physical universe is) >> >> >> But what are its functions? Do they include quantum level >> entanglements? Dissipation of heat in erasure of information? Does it >> have the ability to perceive and act in the world? >> > > I don't know. This is a matter you would need to discuss with your doctor > and take on some level of faith, perhaps from user reviews of others that > have taken the same leap of faith before you. I think Bruno has a result > that this necessarily requires some act of faith, regardless of how far > neuroscience advances. > > >> >> 2. Following from #1, your consciousness can supervene on an >> appropriately programmed digital computer >> >> >> To what accuracy over what domain? Does it matter whether the accuracy >> is 99% or 10%? >> > > Let's say functional equivalence at 100%, the indecision is how much of > the low-level to capture. At the highest level you might have a lookup > table and nothing below is the same (this was Ned Block's "Blockhead" > argument against functionalism--he missed the notion of a substitution > level), at a lower level you might simulate the neurons, again, 100% > accurately, but you might miss some computational step that is important > for your consciousness, and so on. For example, the steps your brain goes > through when I ask you to add 2 and 3 is very different and results in very > different conscious states than when I ask a pocket calculator to do the > same. If I substituted the part of your brain that does arithmetic with a > pocket calculator, this would alter your conscious perception, even if it > left you outwardly, functionally identical. > > > Exactly. So how do you know it wouldn't do it without conscious > perception at all, i.e. alter it to nothing? And in fact isn't that what > learning the multiplication table does, it eliminates computation for > single digit numbers. So that's the point of my question. What do > "functional equivalence" really mean. Does it just mean "no noticeable > difference in behavior", i.e. third person equivalence? But then it seems > the theory talks about "preserving consciousness", a first-person...what? > perception that I'm me? What perception could you have that told you your > consciousness had changed or been lost? > Scary thoughts indeed. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUiaUy2z%3DddwdKHT25_Zpn3hrTvd60VtJexuPhxT9cBOGw%40mail.gmail.com.
