> On 13 May 2019, at 21:28, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/13/2019 4:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 10 May 2019, at 17:36, Jason Resch <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 1:02 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 5/9/2019 7:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:47 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 10:18 AM Jason Resch <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:02 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 9:36 AM Jason Resch <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 3:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>> <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Would it make a difference if they compute the same function? >>>> >>>> Not from the perspective of the function. If the computation is truly the >>>> same, there is no way the software can determine it's hardware. >>>> >>>> If so then you might as well say it would make a difference if they were >>>> run on different >>>> hardware. >>>> >>>> From the outside it might seem different. E.g. instead of silicon some >>>> other element, foreign to the chemistry of this universe, might make for a >>>> more appropriate substrate. >>>> >>>> But the computations that comprise a conscious mind also, ipso facto, >>>> comprise the whole universe. >>>> >>>> I don't see how this follows. Is the computer on your desk the whole >>>> universe? Is it not able to run >>>> an isolated computation which is not affected by what other parts of the >>>> universe are doing? >>>> >>>> The computer on my desk is not conscious! >>>> >>>> Maybe. I'm not sure we can conclude anything so easily. But in any case >>>> it can illustrate the point that a computation need not be identical with >>>> the whole of the universe that contains it. >>>> >>>> >>>> So if the computations are the same, the conscious, AND THE UNIVERSE in >>>> which it resides, are the same. There can, therefore, be no "outside" from >>>> which the consciousnesses and universes are different. >>>> >>>> Couldn't what we take to be the physical universe be a simulation run in >>>> computer within a very different universe? Clearly then the outside and >>>> inside view would be very different. >>>> >>>> But the theory is that the physical universe is a statistical construct >>>> over all computations running through your conscious self. >>>> >>>> You're jumping ahead to the final result of the computation, and continue >>>> to jump back and forth between different levels/definitions of universe. >>>> To clarify, let me enumerate stages of the argument such that we can be >>>> clear which one we are speaking of: >>>> >>>> 1. Your brain can be replaced with a functionally equivalent physical >>>> component which implements its functions digitally (here we change nothing >>>> about our assumption of what the physical universe is) >>> >>> But what are its functions? Do they include quantum level entanglements? >>> Dissipation of heat in erasure of information? Does it have the ability to >>> perceive and act in the world? >>> >>> I don't know. This is a matter you would need to discuss with your doctor >>> and take on some level of faith, perhaps from user reviews of others that >>> have taken the same leap of faith before you. I think Bruno has a result >>> that this necessarily requires some act of faith, regardless of how far >>> neuroscience advances. >>> >>> >>>> 2. Following from #1, your consciousness can supervene on an appropriately >>>> programmed digital computer >>> >>> To what accuracy over what domain? Does it matter whether the accuracy is >>> 99% or 10%? >>> >>> Let's say functional equivalence at 100%, the indecision is how much of the >>> low-level to capture. At the highest level you might have a lookup table >>> and nothing below is the same (this was Ned Block's "Blockhead" argument >>> against functionalism--he missed the notion of a substitution level), at a >>> lower level you might simulate the neurons, again, 100% accurately, but you >>> might miss some computational step that is important for your >>> consciousness, and so on. For example, the steps your brain goes through >>> when I ask you to add 2 and 3 is very different and results in very >>> different conscious states than when I ask a pocket calculator to do the >>> same. If I substituted the part of your brain that does arithmetic with a >>> pocket calculator, this would alter your conscious perception, even if it >>> left you outwardly, functionally identical. > > Exactly.
OK. I agree too, with Jason. (I have not written the text above, but it makes sense). > So how do you know it wouldn't do it without conscious perception at all, > i.e. alter it to nothing? And in fact isn't that what learning the > multiplication table does, it eliminates computation for single digit > numbers. So that's the point of my question. What do "functional > equivalence" really mean. Good question. I would avoid functional equivalence at this level. The “computational equivalence” is conceptually simpler, although provably highly not constructive: two computation are equivalent if the first person experience is the same. By definition of the substitution level, all computations “below” that level are equivalent, and the consciousness flux will be multiplied by the consistent extensions differentiating “continuously”, with the topology given by the semantics of the relevant modes of self (in this case []p & <>t & p). > Does it just mean "no noticeable difference in behavior", i.e. third person > equivalence? Usually “functional equivalence” is an extensional 3p notion in computer science, and then you have a zoo of syntactical weaker equivalence. I said two words about this in the combinators thread. Pure functional equivalence is equal to having the same input output, even if one is run by a quantum computer using a quantum algorithm and the other is run by a Babbage machine. But with mention to the level of substitution, computational equivalence requires not only to compute the right local function, but also the way that function is computed (above the substitution level). Now, when you have that right loop in place, it will not matter if you compute it in this or that way, in a physical reality, or in the arithmetical reality, or in the fortranical reality, or in a (rich) combinatory algebra, etc. > But then it seems the theory talks about "preserving consciousness", a > first-person...what? perception that I'm me? What perception could you have > that told you your consciousness had changed or been lost? It is the difference between going out of the hospital, feeling alive and well, or dying (whatever that means for the 1p). Of course, in “reality” you will have intermediate, like feeling alive, but not so well, …, needing many post arraignment, discovering new consciousness state pleasant or unpleasant, etc. Accident happens, like the guy who said, when asked if he was happy with his artificial brain: “- I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic (cf Britannia Hospital). Please note that the provable ethic of mechanism consists in the right to say “no” to the doctor, at least for adults. Bruno > > Brent > >>> >>> >>>> 3. Due to Church Turing and #2, the underlying implementation of the >>>> computer (the programming language, the physical material, the laws of >>>> physics, the universe it happens to run in) are irrelevant, only the >>>> functional equivalence at the low-enough level (substitution level) is >>>> important to preserve consciousness (note >>>> that nothing to this point has changed anything about our assumption of >>>> reality, the ontology, etc.) >>>> 4. Assuming arithmetical realism (which implies the existence of all >>>> computations) and #3, this implies all conscious states exist in >>>> arithmetic. (this makes redundant the assumption of physical universes >>>> that are distinct from physical universes, here we modify our ontological >>>> assumptions about what a physical universe is) >>> >>> It does not make redundant the assumption of physical universes because you >>> have not defined the "functional equivalence" and how it relates to the >>> world outside the brain. The brain presumably is receiving and processing >>> information and action in this world...otherwise its computations will be >>> just arithmetic and have no referents. It will be like the rock that >>> computes everything. >>> >>> I noticed a typo in what I wrote, I meant to say "this makes redundant the >>> assumption of physical universes that are distinct from arithmetical >>> universes". Hopefully this addresses your point. >>> >>> >>>> 5. Given #4, and the fact that an infinite number of indistinguishable >>>> programs implement your conscious state (e.g. different below your >>>> substitution level), and given that these programs may diverge in the >>>> future, then making predictions about future experiences >>> >>> Future experiences of...what? >>> >>> Observers. >>> >>> You have relations among states of Turing machine or similar computer, >>> and you claim they are conscious. But you are helping yourself to a >>> picture in which this computer is embedded in your head which is embedded >>> in a physical world which gives meaning to the computations. >>> >>> But with step #5 our head is embedded in an ensemble of similar but >>> distinct universes. >>> >>> >>>> (the focus of physics) now becomes a statistical question regarding the >>>> distribution of unique programs existing below your substitution level. >>> >>> Statistics refers to samples from a probability distribution. How is a >>> probability distribution relevant to these programs >>> >>> Given that teleportation is possible, there is a distribution of future >>> states which any of those observers might become (where they could next >>> find themselves). >>> >>> >>>> We have now reached the "reversal" (the laws of physics can be derived >>>> from the arithmetic concerning conscious programs which exist >>>> arithmetically, here we acknowledge that no observer exists in any single >>>> universe). >>>> >>>> So from the evolution of the view of what is meant by physical universe, >>>> we see there are at least 3 connotations: >>>> A) The first view where a universe is a causally isolated physical >>>> structure which may or may not contain observers >>>> B) The second view where a universe is a relatively stable (perhaps >>>> shared) observation in the mind of some observer(s) >>>> C) The third view where there exists a unified set of metaphysical laws, >>>> applicable to all observers, and in principle these laws can be derived >>>> from the arithmetic of self-reference, there is no longer the notion of an >>>> observer which belongs to a universe as each observer is supported by an >>>> infinity of similar, but distinct computations >>> >>> How similar do they have to be in order to be the same observer? >>> >>> >>> I believe this is undefinable according to Bruno, though I am not sure on >>> what basis he reached this conclusion. >> >> >> The first person similarity is obtained for those who are happy with the >> artificial brain. It is a personal matter that nobody can enclose in a >> theory. >> >> It means run by the same relevant program, or by programs written at the >> right substitution level, which cannot be deduced from anything empirical. >> That is why, indeed, some leap of faith is required, and mechanism is >> theological. >> >> IF Mechanism gives the right QM, similar means probably with the right >> energy of the each electrons, but the position of election in each energy >> orbital does not matter. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> So when you say "the theory is that the physical universe is a statistical >>>> construct over all the computations running through your conscious self", >>>> you are correct that this is the logical end and conclusion of the theory >>>> of computationalism. But when I said you could implement any >>>> consciousness in any universe where it is possible to build a Turing >>>> machine, I am talking about the "level A" type universe. (which I >>>> acknowledge to be redundant and eventually eliminated in the theory, but >>>> use this example for pedagogical purposes). >>>> >>>> So any external universe is part of that construct through your >>>> consciousness. So appealing to an external universe running a simulation >>>> does not help at all. >>>> >>>> Remember, consciousness is the sum over all computation that pass through >>>> that particular conscious state, so in this theory your AI, be it in >>>> silicon or the Game of Life, cannot be conscious, because it is a single >>>> computation. >>>> >>>> That all subjectively indistinguishable computations going through that >>>> state are a possibility means the consciousness cannot identify itself >>>> with any one particular thread of computation. In this sense that >>>> consciousness is not the same as one of the programs passing through that >>>> state. But to say the consciousness is not identical with one of the >>>> computations is different from saying that computation is not conscious. >>>> >>>> The trouble here is that that is an unproven assumption. >>>> >>>> It follows from there being a level of digital substitution (the >>>> computationalist assumption). Let's say we can substitute your >>>> consciousness with a computer that emulates each atom in your neuron to a >>>> precision of 20 decimal places. This means we could also substitute your >>>> consciousness with a computer that emulates each atom using a precision of >>>> 50 decimal places, or 100. Your consciousness would be no different. >>>> However, given enough time these simulations would eventually diverge. >>> >>> You are still helping yourself to an external physical world in which this >>> artificial brain is embedded. Suppose instead it is embedded in nothing, >>> in a perfect void? Or suppose it is embedded in a world of Newtonian >>> physics? Or suppose it is embedded in a random world in which only things >>> that are improbable in our world are realized? Will it still function as >>> your consciousness? If so, what makes it "yours"? >>> >>> That it is subjectively indistinguishable. I think Saibal Mitra explain >>> this in "Changing the past by forgetting" ( https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825 >>> <https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825> ) >>> >>> >>>> >>>> If the future of any conscious moment depends on the statistics over the >>>> infinite number of computations running through that state, then a single >>>> computation gives a conscious moment that does not have a coherent future. >>>> >>>> I think we are in agreement here. The experiences of a single computation >>>> would/could eventually discover it has deviated from the normal expected >>>> statistics. >>>> >>>> Neither does a single computation exist in a coherent world, since >>>> physics, and the appearance of matter, is also the result of the >>>> statistics over the infinite number of computations. >>>> >>>> Once we replace our "level A" view of physics, with the realization in >>>> "level C" that there is no physical world, >>> >>> That isn't what "C" says. >>> >>> There are still worlds, and there the appearance of a physical world, but >>> the appearance falls out of arithmetic, rather than physics. (assuming >>> computationalism and arithemtical realism). >>> >>> What this says, "The third view where there exists a unified set of >>> metaphysical laws, applicable to all observers, and in principle these laws >>> can be derived from the arithmetic of self-reference" is that there is no >>> difference between metaphysics and physics. It is the dream Einstein that >>> he discovers that the Creator had no choice. >>> >>> The creator having no choice you get to with just arithmetical realism. >>> >>> Jason >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhXCcNZAtZ4m_VOG6y6iwqGEPTTJNz5U5EPEEj9_S8S_g%40mail.gmail.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhXCcNZAtZ4m_VOG6y6iwqGEPTTJNz5U5EPEEj9_S8S_g%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3598EFFA-3E29-437E-A2B3-CD011A9FB2FF%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3598EFFA-3E29-437E-A2B3-CD011A9FB2FF%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9e35e4d3-47cb-2aa9-7ae0-bc5fbdf3476f%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9e35e4d3-47cb-2aa9-7ae0-bc5fbdf3476f%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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