On 5/9/2019 7:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:47 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 10:18 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:02 PM Bruce Kellett
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 9:36 AM Jason Resch
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 3:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Would it make a difference if they compute the
same function?
Not from the perspective of the function. If the
computation is truly the same, there is no way the
software can determine it's hardware.
If so then you might as well say it would make a
difference if they were run on different hardware.
From the outside it might seem different. E.g.
instead of silicon some other element, foreign to the
chemistry of this universe, might make for a more
appropriate substrate.
But the computations that comprise a conscious mind also,
ipso facto, comprise the whole universe.
I don't see how this follows. Is the computer on your desk the
whole universe? Is it not able to run an isolated computation
which is not affected by what other parts of the universe are
doing?
The computer on my desk is not conscious!
Maybe. I'm not sure we can conclude anything so easily. But in any
case it can illustrate the point that a computation need not be
identical with the whole of the universe that contains it.
So if the computations are the same, the conscious, AND
THE UNIVERSE in which it resides, are the same. There can,
therefore, be no "outside" from which the consciousnesses
and universes are different.
Couldn't what we take to be the physical universe be a
simulation run in computer within a very different universe?
Clearly then the outside and inside view would be very different.
But the theory is that the physical universe is a statistical
construct over all computations running through your conscious self.
You're jumping ahead to the final result of the computation, and
continue to jump back and forth between different levels/definitions
of universe. To clarify, let me enumerate stages of the argument such
that we can be clear which one we are speaking of:
1. Your brain can be replaced with a functionally equivalent physical
component which implements its functions digitally (here we change
nothing about our assumption of what the physical universe is)
But what are its functions? Do they include quantum level
entanglements? Dissipation of heat in erasure of information? Does it
have the ability to perceive and act in the world?
2. Following from #1, your consciousness can supervene on an
appropriately programmed digital computer
To what accuracy over what domain? Does it matter whether the accuracy
is 99% or 10%?
3. Due to Church Turing and #2, the underlying implementation of the
computer (the programming language, the physical material, the laws of
physics, the universe it happens to run in) are irrelevant, only the
functional equivalence at the low-enough level (substitution level) is
important to preserve consciousness (note that nothing to this point
has changed anything about our assumption of reality, the ontology, etc.)
4. Assuming arithmetical realism (which implies the existence of all
computations) and #3, this implies all conscious states exist in
arithmetic. (this makes redundant the assumption of physical universes
that are distinct from physical universes, here we modify our
ontological assumptions about what a physical universe is)
It does not make redundant the assumption of physical universes because
you have not defined the "functional equivalence" and how it relates to
the world outside the brain. The brain presumably is receiving and
processing information and action in this world...otherwise its
computations will be just arithmetic and have no referents. It will be
like the rock that computes everything.
5. Given #4, and the fact that an infinite number of indistinguishable
programs implement your conscious state (e.g. different below your
substitution level), and given that these programs may diverge in the
future, then making predictions about future experiences
Future experiences of...what? You have relations among states of
Turing machine or similar computer, and you claim they are conscious.
But you are helping yourself to a picture in which this computer is
embedded in your head which is embedded in a physical world which gives
meaning to the computations.
(the focus of physics) now becomes a statistical question regarding
the distribution of unique programs existing below your substitution
level.
Statistics refers to samples from a probability distribution. How is a
probability distribution relevant to these programs
We have now reached the "reversal" (the laws of physics can be derived
from the arithmetic concerning conscious programs which exist
arithmetically, here we acknowledge that no observer exists in any
single universe).
So from the evolution of the view of what is meant by physical
universe, we see there are at least 3 connotations:
A) The first view where a universe is a causally isolated physical
structure which may or may not contain observers
B) The second view where a universe is a relatively stable (perhaps
shared) observation in the mind of some observer(s)
C) The third view where there exists a unified set of metaphysical
laws, applicable to all observers, and in principle these laws can be
derived from the arithmetic of self-reference, there is no longer the
notion of an observer which belongs to a universe as each observer is
supported by an infinity of similar, but distinct computations
How similar do they have to be in order to be the same observer?
So when you say "the theory is that the physical universe is a
statistical construct over all the computations running through your
conscious self", you are correct that this is the logical end and
conclusion of the theory of computationalism. But when I said you
could implement any consciousness in any universe where it is possible
to build a Turing machine, I am talking about the "level A" type
universe. (which I acknowledge to be redundant and eventually
eliminated in the theory, but use this example for pedagogical purposes).
So any external universe is part of that construct through your
consciousness. So appealing to an external universe running a
simulation does not help at all.
Remember, consciousness is the sum over all computation
that pass through that particular conscious state, so in
this theory your AI, be it in silicon or the Game of Life,
cannot be conscious, because it is a single computation.
That all subjectively indistinguishable computations going
through that state are a possibility means the consciousness
cannot identify itself with any one particular thread of
computation. In this sense that consciousness is not the same
as one of the programs passing through that state. But to say
the consciousness is not identical with one of the
computations is different from saying that computation is not
conscious.
The trouble here is that that is an unproven assumption.
It follows from there being a level of digital substitution (the
computationalist assumption). Let's say we can substitute your
consciousness with a computer that emulates each atom in your neuron
to a precision of 20 decimal places. This means we could also
substitute your consciousness with a computer that emulates each atom
using a precision of 50 decimal places, or 100. Your consciousness
would be no different. However, given enough time these simulations
would eventually diverge.
You are still helping yourself to an external physical world in which
this artificial brain is embedded. Suppose instead it is embedded in
nothing, in a perfect void? Or suppose it is embedded in a world of
Newtonian physics? Or suppose it is embedded in a random world in
which only things that are improbable in our world are realized? Will
it still function as your consciousness? If so, what makes it "yours"?
If the future of any conscious moment depends on the statistics
over the infinite number of computations running through that
state, then a single computation gives a conscious moment that
does not have a coherent future.
I think we are in agreement here. The experiences of a single
computation would/could eventually discover it has deviated from the
normal expected statistics.
Neither does a single computation exist in a coherent world, since
physics, and the appearance of matter, is also the result of the
statistics over the infinite number of computations.
Once we replace our "level A" view of physics, with the realization in
"level C" that there is no physical world,
That isn't what "C" says. What this says, "The third view where there
exists a unified set of metaphysical laws, applicable to all observers,
and in principle these laws can be derived from the arithmetic of
self-reference" is that there is no difference between metaphysics and
physics. It is the dream Einstein that he discovers that the Creator
had no choice.
Brent
then it becomes another question altogether where we can really
perform computations or not, or just create the appearance in our own
minds of running computations. However I believe that physical
universes exist as programs which themselves contain sub-programs
which are observers. Otherwise I am not sure how we would explain our
apparently shared reality. Who am I e-mailing if not some other
conscious observer with which is connected somehow as part of a larger
structure? This also implies that if I, as an actor in this larger
program, fashion a computer, it can implement another sub-program
which may also be an observer. True our infinite diverging paths of
consciousness will diverge and split and recombine, etc., but in each
case we can expect to find ourselves to be a computation that is
consistent with our existence. To be conscious as a human generally
would imply a sub program that has existed in a much larger program
which has been on going for long enough and with the right conditions
for human beings to evolve and arise. For this reason, I believe the
local physical laws (not global) are strongly dependent/correlated
with the mind in question.
And consciousness must be embedded in a coherent "world" in order
to exist.
Does it? I am not so sure.
This makes one suspect that YD + CT, leading to computationalism,
is not a coherent theory.
Based on your questions and objections I can tell you have put a lot
of good thought into these matters. I look forward to our future
discussions on the topic.
Jason
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