> On 10 May 2019, at 07:26, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > From: Jason Resch <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:47 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 10:18 AM Jason Resch <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:02 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 9:36 AM Jason Resch <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 3:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> wrote: >> >> Would it make a difference if they compute the same function? >> >> Not from the perspective of the function. If the computation is truly the >> same, there is no way the software can determine it's hardware. >> >> If so then you might as well say it would make a difference if they were >> run on different hardware. >> >> From the outside it might seem different. E.g. instead of silicon some >> other element, foreign to the chemistry of this universe, might make for a >> more appropriate substrate. >> >> But the computations that comprise a conscious mind also, ipso facto, >> comprise the whole universe. >> >> I don't see how this follows. Is the computer on your desk the whole >> universe? Is it not able to run an isolated computation which is not >> affected by what other parts of the universe are doing? >> >> The computer on my desk is not conscious! >> >> Maybe. I'm not sure we can conclude anything so easily. But in any case it >> can illustrate the point that a computation need not be identical with the >> whole of the universe that contains it. > Not all computations are conscious. But those that are must include a large > part, if not all, of the physical universe. > Most people agree that the brain, and some finite part of its environment is enough. To assume you need the whole physical universe (assuming this makes sense) is equivalent with assuming a very low substitution level.
> >> So if the computations are the same, the conscious, AND THE UNIVERSE in >> which it resides, are the same. There >> can, therefore, be no "outside" from which the consciousnesses and universes >> are different. >> >> Couldn't what we take to be the physical universe be a simulation run in >> computer within a very different universe? Clearly then the outside and >> inside view would be very different. >> >> But the theory is that the physical universe is a statistical construct over >> all computations running through your conscious self. >> >> You're jumping ahead to the final result of the computation, and continue to >> jump back and forth between different levels/definitions of universe. > If the theory is to make any sense, any reference to "the universe" must be > consistent with every other reference to "the universe". > > >> To clarify, let me enumerate stages of the argument such that we can be >> clear which one we are speaking of: >> >> 1. Your brain can be replaced with a functionally equivalent physical >> component which implements its functions digitally (here we change nothing >> about our assumption of what the physical universe is) >> 2. Following from #1, your consciousness can supervene on an appropriately >> programmed digital computer > That implies that my consciousness is just a single computation, potentially > implemented on a linear Turing machine. > > >> 3. Due to Church Turing and #2, the underlying implementation of the >> computer (the programming language, the physical material, the laws of >> physics, the universe it happens to run in) are irrelevant, only the >> functional equivalence at the low-enough level (substitution level) is >> important to preserve consciousness (note that nothing to this point has >> changed anything about our assumption of reality, the ontology, etc.) >> 4. Assuming arithmetical realism (which implies the existence of all >> computations) and #3, this implies all conscious states exist in arithmetic. >> (this makes redundant the assumption of physical universes that are distinct >> from physical universes, here we modify our ontological assumptions about >> what a physical universe is) > Why should we assume arithmetical realism? > > Yes, that is redundant with CT. Without assuming arithmetical realism (AR), CT does not make any sense. Sometimes ago I defined Mechanism by YD + CT + AR, just to insist that from a logical point of view, we need only the very weak AR, believed by all scientists. But so much people put so much in AR, without realising they use it already to make sense of CT, I have suppressed it. AR is the minimum of common sense you need to pass an exam in primary school mathematics, without the feeling you have lied to the teacher. Bruno > >> 5. Given #4, and the fact that an infinite number of indistinguishable >> programs implement your conscious state (e.g. different below your >> substitution level), and given that these programs may diverge in the >> future, then making predictions about future experiences (the focus of >> physics) now becomes a statistical question regarding the distribution of >> unique programs existing below your substitution level. We have now reached >> the "reversal" (the laws of physics can be derived from the arithmetic >> concerning conscious programs which exist arithmetically, here we >> acknowledge that no observer exists in any single universe). > If the programs are indistinguishable, how can they 'diverge in the future'. > It has not been specified what part of the execution stream of any program > gives rise to some conscious moment -- is it short or long; one machine state > or many; in sequence or not? > > I have a real problem understanding what might be meant by the statistical > question that determines your actual future. Statistics applies to the > behaviour of ensembles of individuals. The individuals are not affected by > the statistics. So if there are an infinite number of computations passing > through my current conscious state, diverging in the future (as in the past), > then that corresponds to many individuals that might share some experience -- > there is no single individual that encapsulates the statistics of the > ensemble. > > >> So from the evolution of the view of what is meant by physical universe, we >> see there are at least 3 connotations: >> A) The first view where a universe is a causally isolated physical structure >> which may or may not contain observers >> B) The second view where a universe is a relatively stable (perhaps shared) >> observation in the mind of some observer(s) >> C) The third view where there exists a unified set of metaphysical laws, >> applicable to all observers, and in principle these laws can be derived from >> the arithmetic of self-reference, there is no longer the notion of an >> observer which belongs to a universe as each observer is supported by an >> infinity of similar, but distinct computations > > These concepts of 'the universe' are not consistent. If you are claiming that > notion C) can be obtained by an argument starting with A), then your > argument is incoherent. > > >> So when you say "the theory is that the physical universe is a statistical >> construct over all the computations running through your conscious self", >> you are correct that this is the logical end and conclusion of the theory of >> computationalism. But when I said you could implement any consciousness in >> any universe where it is possible to build a Turing machine, I am talking >> about the "level A" type universe. (which I acknowledge to be redundant and >> eventually eliminated in the theory, but use this example for pedagogical >> purposes). > Any concept introduced for pedagogical purposes must be consistent with the > endpoint of the argument. That is not the case here. You start with an > independent physical universe and claim to derive a universe based on an > infinity of conscious computations. This is a reductio. > > >> So any external universe is part of that construct through your >> consciousness. So appealing to an external universe running a simulation >> does not help at all. >> >> Remember, consciousness is the sum over all computation that pass through >> that particular conscious state, so in this theory your AI, be it in silicon >> or the Game of Life, cannot be conscious, because it is a single computation. >> >> That all subjectively indistinguishable computations going through that >> state are a possibility means the consciousness cannot identify itself with >> any one particular thread of computation. In this sense that consciousness >> is not the same as one of the programs passing through that state. But to >> say the consciousness is not identical with one of the computations is >> different from saying that computation is not conscious. >> >> The trouble here is that that is an unproven assumption. >> >> It follows from there being a level of digital substitution (the >> computationalist assumption). Let's say we can substitute your >> consciousness with a computer that emulates each atom in your neuron to a >> precision of 20 decimal places. This means we could also substitute your >> consciousness with a computer that emulates each atom using a precision of >> 50 decimal places, or 100. Your consciousness would be no different. >> However, given enough time these simulations would eventually diverge. > That relates to substrate independence: it says nothing about different > threads of computation. You take one thing to imply something completely > different -- which is illogical. > > >> If the future of any conscious moment depends on the statistics over the >> infinite number of computations running through that state, then a single >> computation gives a conscious moment that does not have a coherent future. >> >> I think we are in agreement here. The experiences of a single computation >> would/could eventually discover it has deviated from the normal expected >> statistics. > Taking statistics of individual conscious moments is not a meaningful > exercise. > > >> Neither does a single computation exist in a coherent world, since physics, >> and the appearance of matter, is also the result of the statistics over the >> infinite number of computations. >> >> Once we replace our "level A" view of physics, with the realization in >> "level C" that there is no physical world, then it becomes another question >> altogether where we can really perform computations or not, or just create >> the appearance in our own minds of running computations. > So answering "Yes" to the doctor is merely a mental aberration? > > >> However I believe that physical universes exist as programs which themselves >> contain sub-programs which are observers. Otherwise I am not sure how we >> would explain our apparently shared reality. > The existence of an independent third person world is certainly a problem for > computationalism. You have not solved that problem here. > > >> Who am I e-mailing if not some other conscious observer with which is >> connected somehow as part of a larger structure? This also implies that if >> I, as an actor in this larger program, fashion a computer, it can implement >> another sub-program which may also be an observer. True our infinite >> diverging paths of consciousness will diverge and split and recombine, etc., >> but in each case we can expect to find ourselves to be a computation that is >> consistent with our existence. > That is probably the biggest leap of faith of them all -- how can you > possible ensure this? Most computations do not correspond to anything useful > for our existence. > >> To be conscious as a human generally would imply a sub program that has >> existed in a much larger program which has been on going for long enough and >> with the right conditions for human beings to evolve and arise. For this >> reason, I believe the local physical laws (not global) are strongly >> dependent/correlated with the mind in question. > Why do local physical laws differ from the global laws? If the laws are mind > independent at the start of the argument, they cannot become dependent on > your mind, or anyone else's, through the course of the argument. > > >> And consciousness must be embedded in a coherent "world" in order to exist. >> >> Does it? I am not so sure. > What are you conscious of? Consciousness itself? Or of the qualia of > experience of an external world? > > Bruce > >> This makes one suspect that YD + CT, leading to computationalism, is not a >> coherent theory. >> >> Based on your questions and objections I can tell you have put a lot of good >> thought into these matters. I look forward to our future discussions on the >> topic. >> >> Jason > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/146da7b0-950d-c620-9dd1-462766179669%40optusnet.com.au > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/146da7b0-950d-c620-9dd1-462766179669%40optusnet.com.au?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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