> On 20 Jul 2019, at 13:26, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Saturday, July 20, 2019 at 2:58:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 19 Jul 2019, at 14:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 6:28:10 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> ... >> >> By assuming the existence of (primary) Matter, you lose the possibility to >> explain it, and you loss the mean to use the mechanist theory of mind, >> without providing a conceptually clear non-mechanist theory of mind. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> If a mathematical/logical theory can explain experience (the catchall for >> consciousness, selfness, qualia, etc.) then that is that and we an all go >> home. > > The experience is explained in the CTM. It is a semantical fixed point. It > explains why machine will introduce a word to describe a truth that they know > but cannot prove to others or even define in any 3p way. > > > > >> >> (If we didn't have experience, then we wouldn't be worrying about in the >> first place!) >> >> But if it can't, then it is something itself needs a home, and that home is >> matter, > > But the whole point is that it can. Machines have already a quite rich theory > of consciousness, and even God when taken in the original large sense (not in > the fairy tales sense which is con artistry). > > Bruno > > >> >> (Unless experiences are ghosts from an immaterial realm.) > > > The "machinist" approach to (theory of) consciousness is the one taken at > MIRI and CSAIL/MIT, with higher-order (modal) programming language theory, > theorem provers, and fixed-point (monadic) semantics. > > I think it's ultimately incomplete.
But even on elementary arithmetic (and still less on anything less elementary) all effective theories are incomplete. Incompleteness is rather reassuring, as it play a role for making the machine able to refute a large class of reductionist conception (on machine and numbers). Bruno > > @philiptrhift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ab46777f-d052-4d52-b723-16745d728641%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ab46777f-d052-4d52-b723-16745d728641%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/86B7842E-018F-445F-A2CD-B3146B52EFF9%40ulb.ac.be.
