On Thursday, January 30, 2020 at 11:26:09 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote: > > > > On 1/30/2020 1:28 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, January 29, 2020 at 6:17:11 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 1/29/2020 11:55 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> Now the human brain IP-power is like 10^whatever times that of a rock. >> >> >> Is it? A rock has a lot of atoms that can be a lot of states, like >> 1e30. Maybe it has to do with connections and signals and sensors and >> environment. Not IIT. >> >> Also, a human brain has more IP-power than that of a chimp - its language >> ability shows that. >> >> >> And your computer has more arithmetical ability than you do. >> >> Brent >> >> >> > If a rock has more information processing power than a brain, and if > consciousness is information processing (a lot of it) then why isn't a rock > conscious? > > But a rock isn't conscious! > > > According to panpsychists (and maybe IIT) it is. > > Brent >
from Ph.D. Thesis - Hedda Hassel Mørch https://www.newdualism.org/papers/H.Morch/Morch-dissertation-Oslo2014.pdf What do defenders of panpsychism normally mean when they say that everything is mental? It seems generally agreed upon that the “pan” of “panpsychism” requires that mentality is to be attributed to at least every fundamental and concrete thing, in addition to humans and other animals. Being concrete means being non-abstract, perhaps in virtue of being spatiotemporal, so numbers and other abstract objects are excluded from the thesis. The fundamental concrete entities are often taken to include at least the ultimate particles of physics, but to exclude most ordinary objects like tables, chairs and rocks. Therefore, panpsychism does not require that such ordinary objects [like tables, chairs and *rocks*] have mentality (as emphasized by Strawson [Realistic Monism*]. The same goes for more esoteric objects sometimes considered by philosophers, such as undetached rabbit parts or the set of my nose and the planet Venus (however, see Goff (forthcoming) for an argument to the contrary). Such presumably non-fundamental things can be regarded as mental only in virtue of having mental parts or constituents, i.e., in the same indirect way that we ordinary think of a society of people as having mentality. * http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s0/Realistic-Monism---Why-Physicalism-Entails-Panpsychism-Galen-Strawson.pdf @philipthfit -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6fbdeae4-1489-44d9-9288-277df284b5bc%40googlegroups.com.
