On Wednesday, January 29, 2020 at 1:32:06 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: > > > > On 1/29/2020 12:59 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, January 29, 2020 at 2:32:36 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, January 28, 2020 at 7:31:54 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 1/28/2020 3:31 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Maybe. But the failure I wrote of applies if consciousness occurs only >>> in brains (or even in just human brains) and IIT only applies to that. >>> Unless IIT is modified as Mørch proposes, but then IIT would not be the >>> same IIT that Aaronson is writing about 6 years ago. >>> >>> >>> It would still fail though, because Scott's counter example includes >>> things made of matter: >>> >>> *In my view, IIT fails to solve the Pretty-Hard Problem because it >>> unavoidably predicts vast amounts of consciousness in physical systems that >>> no sane person would regard as particularly “conscious” at all: indeed, >>> systems that do nothing but apply a low-density parity-check code, or other >>> simple transformations of their input data. Moreover, IIT predicts not >>> merely that these systems are “slightly” conscious (which would be fine), >>> but that they can be unboundedly more conscious than humans are.* >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> >> Hedda negates the *unboundedly more.* >> >> Even rocks have information-processing properties. >> >> Quartz crystal computer rocks >> "Irrational Computing" has interlinked a series of untreated crystals and >> minerals to create a primitive signal processor. >> https://www.cnet.com/news/quartz-crystal-computer-rocks/ >> >> @philipthrift >> > > > *Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with > Russellian Panpsychism?* > > https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCITI.pdf > > The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a leading scientific theory of > consciousness, which implies a kind of panpsychism. In this paper, I > consider whether IIT is compatible with a particular kind of panpsychism > known as Russellian panpsychism, which purports to avoid the main problems > of both physicalism and dualism. I will first show that if IIT were > compatible with Russellian panpsychism, it would contribute to solving > Russellian panpsychism’s combination problem, which threatens to show that > the view does not avoid the main problems of physicalism and dualism after > all. I then show that IIT and Russellian panpsychism are not compatible as > they currently stand, because of a problem which I will call the > coarse-graining problem. After I explain the coarse-graining problem, I > offer two possible solutions, each involving a small modification of IIT. > Given either of these modifications, IIT and Russellian panpsychism may be > fully compatible after all and jointly enable significant progress on the > mind-body problem. > > Conclusion > > I have suggested two ways of resolving the coarse-graining problem and > rendering IIT and Russellian panpsychism compatible. These suggestions > involve substantive modifications of some basic principles of IIT, either > the Exclusion postulate or the coarse-graining principle. > Given one of these modifications, IIT would support (significant progress > towards) a solution to the combination problem for Russellian panpsychism. > IIT would support this solution either on its own, in view of its > explanatory claim according to which the principles of mental combination > are a priori deducible from phenomenological axioms, or on the basis of its > purely correlational claim taken together with either the phenomenal > bonding view or the fusion view of mental combination. > > @philipthrift > > > Her suggested solution relies on an implausible application of her > intutition: > > *According to* > *this problem, macro-consciousness has too many qualities. In physics, we > find a limited* > *number of fundamental particles (about 17, according to the standard > model). This suggests a* > *correspondingly limited number of basic microphenomenal qualities. In our > experience,* > *however, we find an apparently endless number of different phenomenal > qualities (colors,* > *sounds, emotions and so on). It is hard to see how all these qualities > can result (without radical* > *emergence) just from combining a small number of basic microphenomenal > qualities in* > *different ways* > > I don't know that "radical emergence" means, but I suspect it accounts for > sugar tasting different than starch. > > Brent >
Mørch's "fusion"(of information and experiential constituents) is that the more* information-processing *(IP) power there is (like a human brain being on top) the more experientiality it is capable of. So IP-power would be a measure of consciousness potential. Now the human brain IP-power is like 10^whatever times that of a rock. Also, a human brain has more IP-power than that of a chimp - its language ability shows that. A chimp can write the alphabet, so why can't it write stories with them? @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a2378afe-26ea-479a-8e2d-4dc3179ed1cb%40googlegroups.com.
