On 1/29/2020 11:55 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Wednesday, January 29, 2020 at 1:32:06 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
On 1/29/2020 12:59 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Wednesday, January 29, 2020 at 2:32:36 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift
wrote:
On Tuesday, January 28, 2020 at 7:31:54 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
On 1/28/2020 3:31 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
Maybe. But the failure I wrote of applies if
consciousness occurs only in brains (or even in just
human brains) and IIT only applies to that. Unless IIT
is modified as Mørch proposes, but then IIT would not be
the same IIT that Aaronson is writing about 6 years ago.
It would still fail though, because Scott's counter
example includes things made of matter:
/
//In my view, IIT fails to solve the Pretty-Hard Problem
because it unavoidably predicts vast amounts of
consciousness in physical systems that no sane person
would regard as particularly “conscious” at all: indeed,
systems that do nothing but apply a low-density
parity-check code, or other simple transformations of
their input data. Moreover, IIT predicts not merely that
these systems are “slightly” conscious (which would be
fine), but that they can be unboundedly more conscious
than humans are./
Brent
Hedda negates the /unboundedly more./
/
/
Even rocks have information-processing properties.
Quartz crystal computer rocks
"Irrational Computing" has interlinked a series of untreated
crystals and minerals to create a primitive signal processor.
https://www.cnet.com/news/quartz-crystal-computer-rocks/
<https://www.cnet.com/news/quartz-crystal-computer-rocks/>
/
/
@philipthrift
*Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible
with Russellian Panpsychism?*
https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCITI.pdf
<https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCITI.pdf>
The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a leading scientific
theory of consciousness, which implies a kind of panpsychism. In
this paper, I consider whether IIT is compatible with a
particular kind of panpsychism known as Russellian panpsychism,
which purports to avoid the main problems of both physicalism and
dualism. I will first show that if IIT were compatible with
Russellian panpsychism, it would contribute to solving Russellian
panpsychism’s combination problem, which threatens to show that
the view does not avoid the main problems of physicalism and
dualism after all. I then show that IIT and Russellian
panpsychism are not compatible as they currently stand, because
of a problem which I will call the coarse-graining problem. After
I explain the coarse-graining problem, I offer two possible
solutions, each involving a small modification of IIT. Given
either of these modifications, IIT and Russellian panpsychism may
be fully compatible after all and jointly enable significant
progress on the mind-body problem.
Conclusion
I have suggested two ways of resolving the coarse-graining
problem and rendering IIT and Russellian panpsychism compatible.
These suggestions involve substantive modifications of some basic
principles of IIT, either the Exclusion postulate or the
coarse-graining principle.
Given one of these modifications, IIT would support (significant
progress towards) a solution to the combination problem for
Russellian panpsychism. IIT would support this solution either on
its own, in view of its explanatory claim according to which the
principles of mental combination are a priori deducible from
phenomenological axioms, or on the basis of its purely
correlational claim taken together with either the phenomenal
bonding view or the fusion view of mental combination.
@philipthrift
Her suggested solution relies on an implausible application of her
intutition:
/According to//
//this problem, macro-consciousness has too many qualities. In
physics, we find a limited//
//number of fundamental particles (about 17, according to the
standard model). This suggests a//
//correspondingly limited number of basic microphenomenal
qualities. In our experience,//
//however, we find an apparently endless number of different
phenomenal qualities (colors,//
//sounds, emotions and so on). It is hard to see how all these
qualities can result (without radical//
//emergence) just from combining a small number of basic
microphenomenal qualities in//
//different ways/
I don't know that "radical emergence" means, but I suspect it
accounts for sugar tasting different than starch.
Brent
Mørch's "fusion"(of information and experiential constituents) is that
the more*information-processing *(IP) power there is (like a human
brain being on top) the more experientiality it is capable of.
So IP-power would be a measure of consciousness potential.
Fine. So why not base consciousness on information processing power?
Panpsychism then adds nothing by mysticism.
Now the human brain IP-power is like 10^whatever times that of a rock.
Is it? A rock has a lot of atoms that can be a lot of states, like
1e30. Maybe it has to do with connections and signals and sensors and
environment. Not IIT.
Also, a human brain has more IP-power than that of a chimp - its
language ability shows that.
And your computer has more arithmetical ability than you do.
Brent
A chimp can write the alphabet, so why can't it write stories with them?
@philipthrift
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