On 1/29/2020 12:59 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Wednesday, January 29, 2020 at 2:32:36 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Tuesday, January 28, 2020 at 7:31:54 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
On 1/28/2020 3:31 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
Maybe. But the failure I wrote of applies if consciousness
occurs only in brains (or even in just human brains) and IIT
only applies to that. Unless IIT is modified as
Mørch proposes, but then IIT would not be the same IIT that
Aaronson is writing about 6 years ago.
It would still fail though, because Scott's counter example
includes things made of matter:
/
//In my view, IIT fails to solve the Pretty-Hard Problem
because it unavoidably predicts vast amounts of consciousness
in physical systems that no sane person would regard as
particularly “conscious” at all: indeed, systems that do
nothing but apply a low-density parity-check code, or other
simple transformations of their input data. Moreover, IIT
predicts not merely that these systems are “slightly”
conscious (which would be fine), but that they can be
unboundedly more conscious than humans are./
Brent
Hedda negates the /unboundedly more./
/
/
Even rocks have information-processing properties.
Quartz crystal computer rocks
"Irrational Computing" has interlinked a series of untreated
crystals and minerals to create a primitive signal processor.
https://www.cnet.com/news/quartz-crystal-computer-rocks/
<https://www.cnet.com/news/quartz-crystal-computer-rocks/>
/
/
@philipthrift
*Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with
Russellian Panpsychism?*
https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCITI.pdf
The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a leading scientific theory
of consciousness, which implies a kind of panpsychism. In this paper,
I consider whether IIT is compatible with a particular kind of
panpsychism known as Russellian panpsychism, which purports to avoid
the main problems of both physicalism and dualism. I will first show
that if IIT were compatible with Russellian panpsychism, it would
contribute to solving Russellian panpsychism’s combination problem,
which threatens to show that the view does not avoid the main problems
of physicalism and dualism after all. I then show that IIT and
Russellian panpsychism are not compatible as they currently stand,
because of a problem which I will call the coarse-graining problem.
After I explain the coarse-graining problem, I offer two possible
solutions, each involving a small modification of IIT. Given either of
these modifications, IIT and Russellian panpsychism may be fully
compatible after all and jointly enable significant progress on the
mind-body problem.
Conclusion
I have suggested two ways of resolving the coarse-graining problem and
rendering IIT and Russellian panpsychism compatible. These suggestions
involve substantive modifications of some basic principles of IIT,
either the Exclusion postulate or the coarse-graining principle.
Given one of these modifications, IIT would support (significant
progress towards) a solution to the combination problem for Russellian
panpsychism. IIT would support this solution either on its own, in
view of its explanatory claim according to which the principles of
mental combination are a priori deducible from phenomenological
axioms, or on the basis of its purely correlational claim taken
together with either the phenomenal bonding view or the fusion view of
mental combination.
@philipthrift
Her suggested solution relies on an implausible application of her
intutition:
/According to//
//this problem, macro-consciousness has too many qualities. In physics,
we find a limited//
//number of fundamental particles (about 17, according to the standard
model). This suggests a//
//correspondingly limited number of basic microphenomenal qualities. In
our experience,//
//however, we find an apparently endless number of different phenomenal
qualities (colors,//
//sounds, emotions and so on). It is hard to see how all these qualities
can result (without radical//
//emergence) just from combining a small number of basic microphenomenal
qualities in//
//different ways/
I don't know that "radical emergence" means, but I suspect it accounts
for sugar tasting different than starch.
Brent
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