Jorge and Chris
On 3 Feb. Jorge wrote:
> Bo, thanks very much for supplying additional examples about the
> question of the Greeks and S/O. They, together with some of your latest
> remarks to Ivarsson, do indeed throw more light into the linking of
> 'intellect', 'SOM', ' S/O distinction', 'the Greeks', etc. in the
> context of SOL.
Good, and thanks for your well laid out posts and well-founded &
expressed opinions.
> I have been following with interest your exchange with Chris Ivarsson
> because the question of the appearance of the distinction between S and
> O intrigues me very much. I'd venture to say that the disagreement
> between both of you is only apparent, as I hope to show in the
> following.
> Ivarsson wrote: " I have to say, as I see History, from an MOQ
> perspective, I don't see how the Intellectual level should be credited
> to the Greeks only, if Pirsig says so I will have to disagree".
> It seems to flow, from the various Pirsig quotes pointed out by Bo,
> that Pirsig 'did' say so. However, no need to disagree because Bo is
> using a "stipulative definition" of intellect and 'intellectual
> level'; on the basis of that definition, the rest follows logically. A
> stipulative definition is one "where a term is given a new meaning for
> the purposes of argument or discussion in a given field. This sort of
> definition may differ or even contradict the dictionary or lexical
> definition of the word currently in vogue".
No doubt I argue from the premises of the 4th. level = the S/O
distinction (or aggregate) but this again emanated from Pirsig's
writings.
> The currently in vogue lexical defs.of 'intellect' are of the sort:
> The ability to learn and reason; the capacity for knowledge and
> understanding or the ability to think abstractly or profoundly. Using
> these ...
My Oxford Advanced defines "Intellect" as: "The power of mind
to reason in contrast to emotions and instinct" i.e:
reason=objectivity while emotions=subjectivity (instincts even
more "subjective"). I think this expresses the S/O distinction.
> Chris is IMO quite right in asserting that it looks wrong to assume
> that intellect started suddenly 1000 years BC instead of 5000 or
> more
just a matter of meanings.
Of course it looks wrong. If Pirsig just had numbered the levels it
would have been easier, but the thing is that Pirsig isn't all clear
to say the least. In ZAMM the first Quality divide is "Pre-intellect
versus Intellect" where the latter half is the SOM (a subject
confronted with an objective world) and in the first proto-moq
intellect still is the S/O divide. Why Pirsig didn't carry this on into
the final MOQ - making the 4th level the S/O divide - is a
mystery, but the result is a lame MOQ. For years the discussion
circled round this issue until one Paul Turner wrote to Pirsig who
delivered the letter of september 2003. In it he admits the
ambiguity and rejects the "thinking" interpretation, but the new
definition - that of manipulating symbols - is merely language and
the ambiguity remains.
> Moreover, Bo says: "It's not "crediting the Greeks", it may have been a
> coincidence that it emerged there (in the then known world) there may
> have been a similar development in the East,
"
> Since the civilizations and cultures of Mesopotamia and Egypt, are
> strictly 'East', then, no contradiction at all. Bo admits that it could
> have happened previously outside the Western world. Actually it appears
> that the S/O distinction was in place at least between 3000 and 4000
> years BC; I say, 'at least' because there seems to be little documented
> evidence before that and History is mute in the absence of documents
> or artifacts. There is quite a lot of documentary evidence to support
> the contention that objective notions and properties are at least that
> old and if any of you are interested I'll expound on them. Perhaps no
> need, because Bo must be aware that it all depends on the meaning
> ascribed to intellect, since he says: "but I can't for the life of me
> understand what intellect was before the Greeks .. lest one reverts to
> the 'thinking' definition."
In the said letter Pirsig wrote:
The argument that Oriental cultures would not be
classified as intellectual is avoided by pointing out that
the Oriental cultures developed an intellectual level
independently of the Greeks during the Upanishadic
period of India at about 1000 to 600 B.C. (These dates
may be off.)
I am very interested in your expanding on "...the S/O distinction
in place at least between 3000 and 4000 years BC" because I
doubt that the said cultures had arrived at the S/O distinction in a
SOM (MOQ) sense. In the same letter Pirsig says:
Just when the evolution of the intellectual level from the
social level took place in history can only be speculated
on. I certainly wasn't there when it happened. Julian
Jaynes', "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown
of the Bicameral Mind," has impressed me, but other
speculation seems valid. Solon, the Athenian lawgiver,
could be the pivotal point. Maybe Solomon. Maybe the
early Greek philosophers. Who knows? But if one studies
the early books of the Bible or if one studies the sayings
of primitive tribes today, the intellectual level is
conspicuously absent. The world is ruled by Gods who
follow social and biological patterns and nothing else.
This is outrageous, he says that "the intellectual level was
conspicuously absent" (in the times that must be 3-4000 BC) but
why not tell WHAT was absent. It's clear to me that it's SOM, but
when I wrote him he eeled out of it with a remark that SOM was
things like "Beware of crocodiles" and such nonsense. This from
the author who wrote so convincingly about the emergence of
SOM.
> Of a more fundamental nature is the observation of
> Bo: "However, the 4th. level can't be lurking under the social level;
> it would be like life being present before the earth"
> Within the context of the MOQ the 4th level "could be lurking under the
> 3rd", if it were to distance itself from the assumption that the levels
> are "discrete, not continuous". If the levels were thought as fuzzy (in
> the sense of fuzzy sets), so that some patterns could be jointly social
> to some extent and intellectual to some extent, then Ivarsson's
> argument concerning the Sumerian cultures (and many other
> common-sense-ones) would be a valid one.
I can't forswear that there were Sumerian, Babylonian or Egyptian
individuals who asked (silently) skeptical questions about their
world views, but I doubt it. The SOM began with the Greek
"thinkers" searching for principles that transcended the old
mythology. i.e. a deeper reality than the gods. This search ended
up with Socrates' "truth" (which is "objectivity") and this is
nowhere to be found in the said cultures.
Conclusion: In this sense of a possible "skepticism" occurring
long before the Greek thinkers, intellect may be seen as lurking
under the social level. But as said I even doubt this possibility.
My favourite example is the Stone Ager (but I think it goes for the
Sumerian) listening to the tales about their myths and saying:
"Look, are we sure that this is objectively true and not some
subjective nonsense?" There surely were intelligent and brave
individuals around, but the objective as contrasted to subjective
was not yet conceived.
In my opinion
Bo
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