Greetings Ham, It's all analogy, every last bit of it. So what is an analogy? No-thing. Inside and outside, it's no-thing. Individual=Subjective=no-thing. But you are correct. David's composite analogy is great!
Marsha At 02:25 AM 4/13/2008, you wrote: >David -- > >In my haste to present the Essentialist view, I may have given your >composite concept of the individual short shrift. This wasn't my intention. > >[DM]: > > For me, subjectivity is what DQ looks like when you > > mix it with 4 levels of SQ. So its a composite thing, > > that's why it disappears or dis-emerges when you > > run it over. Of course DQ can't be run over! > >Actually, your "4-level mix" analogy is quite brilliant in the MoQ context, >and I believe Pirsig would be pleased with it. If this levels tetrology is >considered the fundamental reality, whether euphemistically or >metaphysically, one must resort to a composite subject made up of (perhaps) >equal measures of inorganic, organic, cultural, and intellectual "stuff". >My objection to such an amalgamated man has to do with the principle of the >concept rather than the analogy used to explain it. > >In the first place, the reduction of existential reality to four >compartmental levels is arbitrary at best and awkward to the point of clumsy >when compared to the traditional mind/matter construct. Some might argue >that "dimensionality" ought to be a level, since time and space are >necessary for change and form in physical reality. Others would complain >that feelings or "emotional sensibility" are not accounted for in the >four-level paradigm, unless the emotions are encompassed by DQ. > >Secondly, it appears to me that Pirsig has traded a duality for a tetrology, >making it twice as difficult to resolve existence into its prime unity. >You'll have to admit that four levels contesting for supremacy sets a whole >new differentiated system on top of reality as we experience it. (Such >unnecessary complexity again brings Occam's razor to mind.) > >But my major objection to the author's hypothesis is that it completely (and >I think deliberately) misses the essence of subjectivity, which is >proprietary awareness. One can divide the content of conscious awareness >into inorganic, biological, and social phenomena (whether ordered by >intellection or not), but awareness itself is none of these things. >Awareness is knowing or feeling as related to oneself, or what in >pre-Kantian epistemology was called 'Nous' or 'Psyche'. > >When you dismiss the Knower you deny experience, which in Pirsig's formula >equates to Reality. To make this work epistemically, consciousness must be >relegated to objective reality, which is illogical because a subject cannot >be an object. Thus, although Pirsig doesn't deny subjectivity, he simply >denies its proprietary nature -- man's most precious asset. And that >sleight-of-hand trick is what makes the MoQ thesis in its present form >untenable for me. > >I hope the above clarifies my position on the 'Individual=Subjective' issue >without demeaning your analysis of the "official doctrine". Although I'm a >heretic in this forum, I suspect there are others here who feel that the >individuated subject (self-awareness) has been slighted in Pirsig's >philosophy and are looking for a way to acknowledge it as an existent on its >own merits. You may even be one of them. > >Thanks, David. >Ham > >Moq_Discuss mailing list >Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >Archives: >http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ Shoot for the moon. Even if you miss, you'll land among the stars... Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
