Hi Ham and All, As I read your post I wondered where you could go. IMO your ontology of immutable essence, nothingness, unchangeable existence leaves an individual playing with himself for delight.
Compare that to the delight to be found in playing with an undefined conscious experience, defined experience, existence of different levels, and the joy of discovery. Joe On 4/12/08 11:25 PM, "Ham Priday" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > David -- > > In my haste to present the Essentialist view, I may have given your > composite concept of the individual short shrift. This wasn't my intention. > > [DM]: >> For me, subjectivity is what DQ looks like when you >> mix it with 4 levels of SQ. So its a composite thing, >> that's why it disappears or dis-emerges when you >> run it over. Of course DQ can't be run over! > > Actually, your "4-level mix" analogy is quite brilliant in the MoQ context, > and I believe Pirsig would be pleased with it. If this levels tetrology is > considered the fundamental reality, whether euphemistically or > metaphysically, one must resort to a composite subject made up of (perhaps) > equal measures of inorganic, organic, cultural, and intellectual "stuff". > My objection to such an amalgamated man has to do with the principle of the > concept rather than the analogy used to explain it. > > In the first place, the reduction of existential reality to four > compartmental levels is arbitrary at best and awkward to the point of clumsy > when compared to the traditional mind/matter construct. Some might argue > that "dimensionality" ought to be a level, since time and space are > necessary for change and form in physical reality. Others would complain > that feelings or "emotional sensibility" are not accounted for in the > four-level paradigm, unless the emotions are encompassed by DQ. > > Secondly, it appears to me that Pirsig has traded a duality for a tetrology, > making it twice as difficult to resolve existence into its prime unity. > You'll have to admit that four levels contesting for supremacy sets a whole > new differentiated system on top of reality as we experience it. (Such > unnecessary complexity again brings Occam's razor to mind.) > > But my major objection to the author's hypothesis is that it completely (and > I think deliberately) misses the essence of subjectivity, which is > proprietary awareness. One can divide the content of conscious awareness > into inorganic, biological, and social phenomena (whether ordered by > intellection or not), but awareness itself is none of these things. > Awareness is knowing or feeling as related to oneself, or what in > pre-Kantian epistemology was called 'Nous' or 'Psyche'. > > When you dismiss the Knower you deny experience, which in Pirsig's formula > equates to Reality. To make this work epistemically, consciousness must be > relegated to objective reality, which is illogical because a subject cannot > be an object. Thus, although Pirsig doesn't deny subjectivity, he simply > denies its proprietary nature -- man's most precious asset. And that > sleight-of-hand trick is what makes the MoQ thesis in its present form > untenable for me. > > I hope the above clarifies my position on the 'Individual=Subjective' issue > without demeaning your analysis of the "official doctrine". Although I'm a > heretic in this forum, I suspect there are others here who feel that the > individuated subject (self-awareness) has been slighted in Pirsig's > philosophy and are looking for a way to acknowledge it as an existent on its > own merits. You may even be one of them. > > Thanks, David. > Ham > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
