Hi Craig
19 Nov.
[Ham on Bodvar]
> > "LILA" changes Pirsig's original SODV paradigm
Craig on Ham:
> The correct chronology is ZMM (1974), "Lila" (1991) & SODV (1995).
> "Lila" could have changed ZMM but not SODV.
Craig is correct on the chronology, but the SOM "encasement" that
Ham speaks about was first presented in LILA (page 305 in Bantam
Press' hardcover)
> [Ham]
> > Pirsig didn't really resolve subject/object duality. In his SODV
> > presentation paper he labeled Intellectual & Social levels
> > "subjective static patterns" and Organic & Inorganic levels
> > "objective static patterns."
About THIS I agree with Ham. The said encasement does not resolve
or dissolve SOM's platypis. Had he (Pirsig) said that ... seen from
SOM ... matter and living things are tangible, while social ranks and
ideas are intangibleit would have made some sense, but he actually
says that the two lower levels BELONG to the material world and the
two upper to the mental world as if these categories exist and the
MOQ must fit them. Horrible!!
> It seems you are assuming that the Subject/Object distinction is the
> same as the Subjective/Objective one. But isn´t the law, for
> instance, subjective but not a subject?
??????????????????
[Ham]
> > human beings as biological patterns of a socio-intellectual level.
Despite Ham's peculiar phrasing he is right. Humans is a biological
species that - first - rose to the social level and then (necessarily
because they were the sole social level "inhabitants") rose to the
intellectual level. But NB! it wasn't biological "man" who rose to
intellect but "social man".
Craig:
> There are, of course, no biological patterns at the social or
> intellectual level, each level being discrete.
That's plain, but each upper level includes all the lower ones
Pirsig: (letter to Paul Turner)
When getting into a definition of the intellectual level much
clarity can be gained by recognizing a parallel with the lower
levels. Just as every biological pattern is also inorganic, but not
all inorganic patterns are biological; and just as every social
level is also biological, although not all biological patterns are
social; so every intellectual pattern is social although not all
social patterns are intellectual.
[Ham]
> > If we lived in a moral universe, there would be no need for value
> > preferences or morality systems, and life would be meaningless.
Ham is correct here too, but this requires a little clearing up. To say
that reality IS something is meaningless, even more so is the assertion
that it can be split and remain, and it's here things goes wrong. Pirsig
says that SOM splits reality S/O while it postulates one subjective and
one objective reality. Likewise the MOQ postulates one Dynamic
reality and one Static reality the Quality lies in this classification and
makes them DQ/SQ.
I have often used the water/wave metaphor for the
dynamic/static dichotomy. The waves ARE water, no question
there, but it is its wave form that constitutes the MOQ. The first
swell the biological, then some lesser organic wave imposed
on that ...and so on.
> This argument is invalid without supplying some missing premises.
> Craig
It's quite ironic that Ham is the one to see, but then according to my
analysis his philosophy is identical to Phaedrus' original insight, before
Pirsig (in an effort to make the MOQ "house clean" inside SOM)
diluted it.
Bo
Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
Archives:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
