Steve said:
Where I disagree with dmb is in that I think the MOQ reformulation of the
question of freedom DOES significantly alter the basic definitions of free will
and determinism. The MOQ rejects both horns of the traditional dilemma and
reformulates the problem in a way that is incompatible with the traditional
formulation rather than being some middle ground or saying that both sides are
partially right. ...The only similarity is that we have freedom on one side
and constraint on the other. ..."To the extent that one's behavior is
controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the
extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior
is free."
dmb says:
I think your explanation is confused. The MOQ's reformulation says one's
behavior is CONTROLLED to some extent. The meaning of Pirsig sentence is going
to be exactly the same if we replace "controlled" with "determined". The same
is true for Pirsig's second sentence. The MOQ denies the Cartesian self AND
also asserts that one's behavior is free to some extent. But clearly, you are
insisting that one particular ANSWER to the question of free will and
determinism forever defines the QUESTION of whether human action is free or
determined. I mean, don't we all understand that the MOQ's reformulation is
first and foremost predicated on a rejection of SOM. And doesn't that
necessarily mean that the "one" who is free to some and extent and controlled
to some extent is NOT an uncaused causer and that "one" is not determined by
the mechanical laws of cause and effect? Doesn't that mean we are talking about
the extent to which the MOQ's self is free or controlled? The confusion comes w
hen the rejected metaphysical assumptions are reintroduced or inserted back
into the conversation...
Steve said:
To deny free will is to deny the uncaused causer (see also Pirsig's dissolution
of the mind-body problem). To deny determinism is to deny the mechanistic
universe. There is nothing incompatible with doing both.
dmb says:
There is a good example. You've equated free will with an uncaused causer and
equated determinism with a mechanistic universe. But, again, we are talking
about freedom and control as it relates to the MOQ's self , as it relates to
"one's behavior" in a universe that is value all the way down. I mean, we are
still talking about the extent to which PEOPLE are free to act as they will and
the extent to which our actions are determined. To say we are determined by the
laws of cause and effect is just one answer to the question, an answer we can
reject without also rejecting the question. The MOQ's reformulation is a
different answer to the question. I mean, if we are going to discuss the
meaning of Pirsig reformulation, we have to be able to talk about freedom and
control OUTSIDE of SOM and that means that free will is NOT the free will OF
any little god or soul or anything like that. We have to be able to talk about
what constraints mean OUTSIDE of mechanistic causal constraints
. Isn't that the point of the reformulation? To talk about the extent of human
freedom in the absence of those SOM assumptions?
Since Pirsig says that we are free to some extent, he has denied determinism to
some extent. His reformulation says we are controlled to some extent, so he has
affirmed determinism to some extent. The point here is simply that one can
affirm or deny either position without committing one's self to any particular
metaphysical assumption about the nature of the self or the nature of the
universe, such as SOM. The fact that Pirsig's reformulation uses the term
"controlled" instead of "determined" certainly doesn't mean that he's simply
rejected the notion that we could constrained in any way. Pirsig has rejected
the notion that we are controlled by mechanistic, causal factors and he rejects
the notion that we are entirely determined by anything but his reformulation
obviously includes a different kind of controlling factor so that we are
determined to some extent. If Pirsig can reject the metaphysical self and still
say that one's behavior is free to some extent, then why can't
I? I mean, doesn't the Pirsig quote prove that the question of free will and
determinism can be answered without committing yourself to the metaphysics of
the bad answer, without the metaphysical framework we've already rejected?
The only similarity is that we have freedom on one side and constraint on the
other? What other similarity could we possibly hope for? The MOQ's
reformulation is an answer to the question of freedom and constraint. It is
different from the traditional answers, of course. But that answer clearly does
says that one is both free to some extent and controlled to some extent. I
really don't see how you can plausibly deny that EXCEPT by re-inserting the
premise of the old formulation into Pirsig's reformulated new answer. So, when
I say your explanation is "confused", I'm not insulting you. I'm criticizing
your argument and trying to separate things that are tangled up or
inappropriately tied to other things. As you can see from this explanation,
hopefully, I mean "confused" in a formal or logical sense. To oversimplify it a
bit, freedom is the not exclusive property of Cartesians of Christians and
scientific materialists are not the only ones concerned with controlling
factors. Yo
u're letting the question be defined by their SOM answers. As I see it, you're
insisting that the baby is metaphysically attached to the dirty old bathwater.
And so you end up throwing the good stuff out the window and you end up
misreading Pirsig's answer. You know, so that being "controlled" is nothing
like being "determined" and "one's behavior is free" to some extent but this
has nothing to do with whether or not we can act freely? Huh? It looks to me
like you're bending over backwards to deny the obvious. If DQ is the quality of
freedom and sq is the quality of order and in the MOQ that's the stuff that
everything is made of, including us, then the whole dang shooting match, the
whole evolutionary game of living is all about nothing but freedom and
constraint. I think this is very, very far away from the conclusion that we
ought to reject questions about freedom and constraint as meaningless. We want
the bad answers to go away when SOM goes away but the questions and th
e MOQ does have an answer that says we are both controlled and free to some
extent.
Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
Archives:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
http://moq.org/md/archives.html
