I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different actions.
With regard to Firstness, I see it, as a spontaneous state of existence which
might then act upon/be reacted to.., in the 'fullness of this state'. The point
of all the categories is that they operate within Relations; they are not
isolate in themselves. Firstness, as that spontaneous state of existence [which
might dissipate in a nanosecond if it doesn't bond/relate to another
entity]...can provide a novel form of existence.
For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell might be accepted by other cells
and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, might not be accepted and
its energy-content would dissipate.
Or, a novel mode of transportation [Uber] might suddenly develop and might
spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it might disappear in
a month.
The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir provides has on
other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect changes in the larger
system.
Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and refer to
1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see this as a
transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider that the
pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of Firstness,
Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing].
Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and 'something' is
not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is no explanation,
does not mean that I can or even should come up with one - certainly, science
hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist, then, I'm not going to
offer a self-organized belief in god as having been First Cause. I simply
don't know.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Clark Goble
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Clark, List:
Your points, as usual, are well-taken. Is it helpful at all to refer to
"actualization," rather than "cause"? Edwina's position, as I understand it,
is that our existing universe is not only self-organizing but also
self-generating or self-originating; as Houser put it in his introduction to EP
1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the chaos is self-actualizing."
This is the crucial transition from Firstness (possibility) to Secondness
(actuality), and the word "somehow" reflects the fact that Houser's attempt to
summarize Peirce's cosmology effectively leaves this step unexplained.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
ET: Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the
term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of
habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him to
such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a causal force
- and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.
No, I understood exactly what you meant. My disagreement is that I take
"chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather than
randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that could
ever be "a causal force." I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but you
refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad thing!
Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by equivocating over the
term ‘cause.’ In a certain cause pure freedom or spontaneity isn’t causal and
in an other sense it must be. Effectively each firstness is its own unmoved
mover. The problem is that making sense of causality at all when little is
necessary and most things are underdetermined is problematic.
I think causality is problematic for a variety of other reasons too. For
instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic Newtonian formulation
of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the Hamiltonian or Lagrangian
forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet metaphysically quite conceptually
different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution of the wave function (what in
quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or Schrodinger equation) and it’s hard to
make sense of causality in terms of it.
Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have classic arguments against
causality being continuous. (Basically part of the same extended argument I
linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where any sign can be divided
it’s worth asking if we have causality at all.
Despite these problems of causality we all use the term causality.
He referenced the same series of articles in what was probably his very
first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few other comments
about it that are relevant to this discussion.
CSP: I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all
experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my original
hypothesis,) developments out of utterly causeless determinations of single
events, under a certain universal tendency toward habit-forming ... But during
the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis first suggested itself
to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty features of the original
hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others and have struck me in
my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked that my theory was not so
much evolutionary as it was emanational; and Professor Ogden Rood pointed out
that there must have been some original tendency to take habits which did not
arise according to my hypothesis; while I myself was most struck by the
difficulty of so explaining the law of sequence in time, if I proposed to make
all laws develope from single events; since an event already supposes Time. (R
842, emphasis added)
I think this might be better read as there being no cause for firstness not
that firstness can’t be seen a not causal. Again I suspect we’re talking past
one an other again but the mere fact firstness can be an element in a triadic
sign more or less entails a certain sense of causation. (Although I prefer
Peirce’s term determination although that too has the genealogy in problematic
metaphysical understanding)
I should add that this problem of language for this foundational event
isn’t new. You see similar debates in late antiquity over whether the platonic
One is one or ought to be considered two emanation steps. While I’ll confess to
finding such matters idle talk there’s usually a logical reason for the
analaysis. (Much like the whole disparaged “how many angels could dance on a
pin” makes sense in the context of the debates over kinds in medieval
scholasticism)
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